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EXPLORING THE FEASIBILITY OF A CONSOLIDATED JOINT 






Studies performed by the GAO (1997), Dowling and Feck (1999), and Culkin 
(2004) suggest that the services, the Government, and the taxpayer may be better served 
by consolidating the efforts of the separate Civil Augmentation Programs (CAPs) into 
one, joint program.  This study examines five potential efficiency areas—Planning, 
Capabilities Provided, Financial Processes, Command and Control, and Ease of Use—
using Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) to determine the potential cost savings and 
streamlining that might exist under a Joint Civil Augmentation Program (JCAP).   
The results show that significant cost savings will be realized by a JCAP, 
particularly in the area of Planning.  Beyond monetary benefits, having one program 
standardizes and streamlines Planning, Financial Processes, and Command and Control 
functions.  Standardization and streamlining ultimately increase Ease of Use.  Finally, 
having a single logistics support program eliminates duplicative capabilities, processes, 
and program management and administration offices while simultaneously bridging 
existing capability gaps (thus ensuring all military services have access to the full range 
of support functions).   
The study examines three courses of action—Do Nothing, Create a CAP 
Executive Lead Board (CELB), or Create a JCAP.  The examination details the 
advantages, disadvantages, and cultural barriers/implications of each alternative.  The 
recommendation is to establish a formal JCAP, as soon as practicable.   
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The purpose of this study is to determine if it is more cost effective and efficient 
to consolidate the four service-specific civil augmentation programs (CAPs) into a single, 
joint civil augmentation program, or JCAP.  The Army, Navy, and Air Force each 
manage civil augmentation programs to provide support capabilities during contingencies 
(Logistics Civil Augmentation Program or LOGCAP for the Army, Global Contingency 
Construction Contract or GCCC and Global Contingency Services Contract or GCSC for 
the Navy, and Air Force Contract Augmentation Program or AFCAP for the Air Force).  
These programs provide services associated with Base Life Support (BLS), the Theater 
Transportation Mission (TTM), Corps Logistics Service Support (CLSS), and 
engineering and construction capabilities.   
These programs serve as force-multipliers.  Contractors are used to “free up” 
soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen for combat or humanitarian missions.  Contractors 
are also intended to reduce the logistics footprint in a given contingency theater by 
consolidating logistical “tails” so that less “beans and bullets” have to be transported to 
the “tooth” in theater.  In other words, these programs serve as logistical focal points; a 
centralized, streamlined, economical means of supporting the force.  Rather than rely on a 
large network of disparate contractors to supply and support the deployed force, the 
services employ CAP contractors to streamline support.  As noted by Dowling and Feck, 
“Civil Augmentation contracts afford the services flexibility when limited by the 
availability of force structure during contingency scenarios.  Active duty forces are often 
constrained by real world requirements or taskings that limit their use, such as response 
capability to a major regional conflict.  At the same time, activation of reserve and guard 
forces to fulfill needed manpower requirements, in certain scenarios, may be politically 
sensitive”  (Dowling & Feck, 1999, p. 1).  Recent military engagements such as 
Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM and natural disasters such 
as the Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina demonstrate unparalleled reliance on 
contractor support via CAPs. 
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A. CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAMS  
The military has relied on the use of CAPs to meet its needs (e.g., food service 
operations, fuel operations, billeting, engineering, and construction) during contingencies 
and in wartime environments since the Revolutionary War (Nagle, 1999, p. 1).  
Significant personnel cuts after the Vietnam War coupled with the decision to maintain 
an all-volunteer force have forced the military to rely on CAPs for support capabilities. 
As a direct result of manpower limitations, each military service created a CAP to 
provide service-specific support functions. A brief summary of each program is provided 
below.  To understand the full complexity, an in-depth description of each program is 
included in Chapter II. 
1. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 
The Army introduced their first iteration of LOGCAP in 1992 to bridge the 
capability gaps left by the reduction in support troops following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War.  Although the program has changed contract types 
and support capabilities, it serves essentially the same purpose today as it did in 1992—
support capabilities augmentation.  Now in its fourth iteration, LOGCAP IV provides 
base-life support capabilities (e.g., dining facility operations, laundry services, water 
production, etc.), Theater Transportation Mission (TTM) capabilities (e.g., scheduling 
and hauling of supplies and equipment to/from Army Forward Operating Bases, or 
FOBs), and Corps Logistics Support Services (CLSS) operations (e.g., Class I 
subsistence, Class III petroleum, Class IV construction material, etc.).  LOGCAP has 
been used in several major operations, including Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, 
DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and, most recently, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI 
FREEDOM. 
2. Global Contingency Construction Contract (GCCC) and Global 
Contingency Services Contract (GCSC) 
The Navy’s shortfall of capabilities occurs in the area of construction.  They 
awarded their first iteration of CONCAP (predecessor to GCCC and GCSC) in 1995 to 
provide rapid response to emergent construction needs worldwide.  The program’s 
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specific focus was on natural disasters, humanitarian needs and peacekeeping efforts.  
CONCAP was used for hurricane reconstruction in North Carolina, Virginia, the 
Caribbean, Florida Keys, Mississippi and, most recently, following Hurricane Katrina in 
Louisiana.  In 2006, the Navy realized they needed to expand their program to provide 
capabilities such as housing operations, utilities support, and health care support for 
people affected by natural disasters.  As such, they split CONCAP into two separate 
programs1:  Global Contingency Construction Contract (GCCC), which essentially 
operates like CONCAP and focuses on construction; and Global Contingency Services 
Contract (GCSC), which provides “short term support services incidental to construction” 
(NAVFAC, 2007, slide 58). 
3. Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) 
The Air Force’s (AF) shortfall of capability occurs in the areas of Civil 
Engineering, Services, and Logistics.  In 1997, they awarded their first iteration of 
AFCAP to bridge these capability gaps.  AFCAP provides relief and augmentation to AF 
troops during prolonged sustainment operations.  The primary focus of the program is on 
design and engineering, and infrastructure design and construction; however AFCAP also 
performs Air Traffic Control (ATC) functions, airfield maintenance functions, and 
personnel augmentation for specific duties (e.g., War Readiness Materiel, or WRM, 
maintenance).  AFCAP is on its third iteration, AFCAP III, and it has been used in 
Operations SUSTAIN HOPE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The problem statement discusses the need for the study and its relevance to 
current military operations.  The research questions provide an overarching look at the 
areas addressed in this study.  The intent is to answer each research question and provide 
viable solutions to the issues presented in the problem statement. 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this study, the researchers consider GCCC and GCSC two separate programs.  
Besides their program offices being geographically distinct, each has a distinct group of administrative 
personnel. 
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1. Problem Statement 
The purpose of this study is to determine if it is more cost effective and efficient 
to consolidate the four service-specific civil augmentation programs (CAPs) into a single, 
joint civil augmentation program, or JCAP.  The focus is to reduce areas of duplication 
while maintaining the ability to accommodate service-unique requirements.  The need to 
increase joint operability coupled with current and future budgetary constraints is forcing 
the DoD to re-look the structure of several acquisition programs.   
The idea to create a Joint CAP (JCAP) was initiated by Mr. Jack Bell, Deputy 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (DUSD (AT&L)) 
in 2006 with a suggested implementation date of 2008.  The Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) 
postponed discussion of the idea in January 2007 in favor of focusing on the contract 
management and oversight issues being experienced by the Joint Contract Command – 
Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A).  To date, a complete study of the cost-effectiveness of a 
JCAP has not been undertaken.  Such a study is necessary to determine whether or not it 
is cost effective to create and maintain one program with multi-award contracts vice four 
programs with 13 separate contracts.   
A General Accounting Office (GAO)2 report published in 1997 questioned 
the validity of executing three3 separate [programs] and stated that it may 
be more ‘effective and efficient’ if one service acted as the lead executive 
agent to eliminate duplication of services. (Dowling & Feck, 1999, p. v) 
As suggested by the GAO report, there are potential measures of effectiveness 
(i.e., bridging or satisfying capability gaps that exist within each service’s current CAP)  
and efficiencies (i.e., streamlining and standardization of process to facilitate ease of 
program use) to be gained by establishing a JCAP.  This study examines possible 
efficiencies in five main areas:  (1) Planning, (2) Capabilities Provided, (3) Financial 
                                                 
2 The General Accounting Office legally changed its name to the Government Accountability Office 
on 7 July 2004.  Both names are used in this study respective of the time period of the report and/or quote. 
3 In 1997, only three programs existed:  LOGCAP, CONCAP, and AFCAP.  Since 2006, four 
programs have existed:  LOGCAP, GCCC, GCSC, and AFCAP. 
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Processes, (4) Command and Control, and (5) Ease of Use.  Examples of each 
operation/process and their specific study criteria are provided in Table 1. 
 
Potential JCAP Efficiencies 
Efficiency Area Operation/Process/Criteria 
Planning • Acquisition Planning and Source Selection • Planning for New Requirements 
 
Capabilities Provided • Gaps in Capabilities Available • Overlaps in Capabilities Available 
 
Financial Processes • Funding from Sister Services • Funding from Coalition Partners 
 
Command & Control • CONUS Program Administration and Oversight • OCONUS Program Administration and Oversight 
 
Ease of Use • Ability to Understand the Program and its Uses • Cross-Service Utilization of CAPs 
 
Table 1.   Potential JCAP Efficiencies  
2. Research Questions 
Following is the primary research question:  “Is it more cost effective for the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force to combine their individual CAPs into one JCAP?”  This 
question will be addressed by answering the following secondary research questions: 
• How is planning affected by a JCAP? 
• What efficiencies are gained by combining the support requirements of the 
individual services into one JCAP? Which areas of duplication can a 
JCAP eliminate? 
• How are financial processes affected by a JCAP? 
• How are CONUS program administration and OCONUS program 
administration and oversight affected by a JCAP? 
• How is ease of use affected by using a JCAP vice individual programs?  
Will one program serve the needs of the combatant commanders better or 
worse than individual service-specific programs? 
• How will different service cultures affect the implementation, utilization, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of a JCAP? 
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C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether a single, consolidated JCAP is 
more effective and efficient than maintaining separate service-specific programs.  For the 
purposes of this study, effectiveness is defined and measured by the ability and 
completeness of each of the current CAPs to satisfy the capability gaps that exist within 
each service (i.e., the Army, Navy, and Air Force).  Efficiency is defined and measured 
by the amount of streamlining and standardization that exists within CAP processes to 
facilitate ease of program use. This study will balance individual service needs with 
efficiency prospects.  The intent is to provide credible information regarding whether or 
not to implement a JCAP to DoD Acquisition leaders and key decision makers.  
Specifically, this study will analyze and address five areas:  (1) Planning, (2) Capabilities 
Provided, (3) Financial Processes, (4) Command and Control, and (5) Ease of Use for 
both program managers/administrators and users/customers.  For this study, emphasis is 
placed on program use in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), since Operations 
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM are currently placing the highest 
demand on each program. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This inquiry follows the case study methodology (Yin, 2003).  A thorough 
literature review of joint and individual service publications and regulations, Government 
reports, archival records (e.g., previous CAP contracts), business theories regarding 
organizational culture and behavior, Web site articles and reports, and scholarly research 
papers were performed.  Data collected from key informants using semi-structured 
interviews provided expert opinions and insights.  Informants include the full range of 
pertinent players in CAP processes (i.e., Program Managers (PMs), Procuring 
Contracting Officers (PCOs), Contract Administration Office (CAO) Commanders, 
Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs), Quality Assurance Representatives 
(QARs), and Users/Customers).  Using the garnered data, the researchers performed a 
Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) on each of the five areas of potential efficiencies:  (1) 
Planning, (2) Capabilities Provided, (3) Financial Processes, (4) Command and Control, 
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and (5) Ease of Use.  The researchers also examined the effectiveness of the overall 
programs at bridging or satisfying service capability gaps. 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of the study is intentionally constrained due to time and resource 
limits; yet it is sufficiently comprehensive to maintain validity.  The study focuses on the 
use of CAPs supporting the U.S. military and coalition partners in military operations 
(e.g., war and military operations other than war, or MOOTW) outside the continental 
United States (OCONUS).  Currently the majority of CAP capabilities are used 
OCONUS; therefore, this is the most relevant area to study. 
The analysis includes the five main areas previously mentioned:  (1) Planning, (2) 
Capabilities Provided, (3) Financial Processes, (4) Command and Control, and (5) Ease 
of Use for both program managers/administrators and users/customers.  These are the 
areas that most frequently cause problems during program use (and therefore have the 
most efficiency to gain) and are the most important concerns of the managers, 
administrators, and users of CAPs (Joint Publication 4-10, 2008).  These areas provide 
the best cost effectiveness and efficiency information required for senior level decision-
making. 
It is not possible to interview every person who has had experience with, or who 
has a stake in each of the CAPs.  Therefore, a convenience sample of participants who 
have extensive CAP experience is drawn.  Our intent is to interview as many people with 
multiple CAP experience as possible in order to better understand the complexities, costs 
and benefits of using more than one CAP. 
Finally, our work is mostly qualitative (i.e., subjective to the extent that it relies 
on the opinions and insights of expert informants) in nature.  We are attempting to 
explore the basic cost and benefit concepts associated with a JCAP.  A quantitative 
follow-up study is necessary to confirm the findings from this mostly qualitative effort. 
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F. ORGANIZATION 
This report presents the information obtained from our research and analysis in 
five chapters. Chapter II is a literature review of the Gansler Report, organizational 
structure and effectiveness literature, organizational culture literature, and an example of 
joint program management and administration using the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 
program.  Chapter III explains the case study methodology, the data collection process 
and sample procedures, and how Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) is performed in this 
study.  Chapter IV presents the results of the CEA in the five potential efficiency areas: 
(1) Planning, (2) Capabilities Provided, (3) Financial Processes, (4) Command and 
Control, and (5) Ease of Use.  Information for the CEA is gleaned from semi-structured 
interviews with administrators and users of CAPs, from academic research papers about 
CAPs, and from Government reports.  Chapter V provides discussions, conclusions, and 
recommendations regarding the implementation of a JCAP.   
G. SUMMARY 
With the problem statement, purpose, and methodology in place, the next chapter, 
a thorough literature review, provides the reader with background information pertaining 
to each CAP.  Next, contemporary reports and issues, such as the need for 
acquisition/contracting reform (called for by the Gansler Report) and the successes and 
challenges of a high-visibility joint program, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, are 
presented to familiarize the reader with acquisition information that is topical to this 
study.  The literature review also provides information related to organizational structure, 
organizational change, and organizational culture, as these elements are critical to the 
successful implementation of a JCAP, should that course of action be chosen. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The current CAPs used in contingency theaters are providing logistical support to 
each of the services and fulfilling needs in combat operations, peacekeeping missions, 
and humanitarian assistance missions, ranging from Somalia and Haiti to Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  Briefly, the LOGCAP and the AFCAP provide logistical and engineering 
capabilities that are similar in nature (although the AFCAP is more construction-capable 
than the LOGCAP).  Both programs provide food preparation, laundry, housing, and 
construction in a contingency environment.  The Navy’s GCCC is specifically designed 
to provide contingency construction during and after emergency situations, including 
natural disaster recovery and humanitarian assistance; and its GCSC provides base 
support capabilities similar to those of the LOGCAP and the AFCAP. 
In order to understand the complexities of each CAP, a detailed examination is 
performed.  This is followed by a brief overview of several theoretical dimensions that 
apply to this research.  Specifically, the researchers examined the Gansler Report, 
Organizational Structure and Change, Organizational Culture, and the Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF) program to better understand the requirement for consolidation, the organizational 
barriers that may arise, and to get a glimpse of how a successful joint program operates.  
Using these frameworks, the researchers seek to determine the feasibility and cost 
effectiveness of consolidating four CAPs into a single JCAP. 
B. LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM (LOGCAP) 
The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) “is a U.S. Army initiative 
for peacetime planning for the use of civilian contractors in wartime and other 
contingencies to augment U.S. forces in support of Department of Defense (DoD) 
missions” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1985, p. 2).  LOGCAP IV is the 
current iteration of this program.  “The types of services that are delivered under the 
LOGCAP IV include supply operations, such as delivery of food, water, fuel, spare parts, 
and other items; field operations, such as dining and laundry facilities, housing, 
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sanitation, waste management, postal services, and Morale, Welfare and Recreation 
(MWR) activities; and other operations, including engineering and construction, support 
to communication networks, transportation and cargo services, and facilities maintenance 
and repair” (Downie, 2008, p. 2). Table 2 provides a more thorough listing of the 
LOGCAP’s capabilities. 
LOGCAP Capabilities 
DS/GS Operations Field Capabilities  Other Capabilities 
Class I (subsistence) 
Class II (clothing and equipment) 
Class III (petroleum) 
Class IV (construction material) 
Class V (ammunition) 
Class VI (personal demand items) 
Class VII (major end items) 
Class VIII (medical supplies) 




Operations & Maintenance 
Information Operations 
Personnel and Admin 
Laundry 








Maintenance and Motor Pool 
Medical Services 
Physical Security 
Table 2.   LOGCAP Capabilities (From LeDoux, 2005) 
Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM have raised the 
public’s awareness of the Army’s LOGCAP.  The contract, previously awarded solely to 
Kellogg, Brown and Root Services (KBRS) (formerly a subsidiary of Halliburton), 
became more publicly scrutinized as the length of the operations became longer and the 
cost of the cost-type contract, along with subsequent profit potential, became higher.   
1. LOGCAP: Background and History 
The LOGCAP was developed after the U.S. Army’s experience during the 
Vietnam War.  During Vietnam, the Army was forced to rely on civilian contractors 
because its reserve and guard forces were never activated (Dowling & Feck, 1999).  After 
the Vietnam War, downsizing of the military and the decision to field and maintain an 
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all-volunteer force forced the Army to consider the use of civilian contractors as a 
permanent necessity for conducting support operations. 
In 1992, the Army awarded its first centrally managed LOGCAP contract through 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to Brown and Root Services Corporation 
(BRS).  The Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity 
(ID/IQ) contract was awarded for one basic plus four option years (Dowling & Feck, 
1999, p. 5).  This contract was used in several operations including Operation JOINT 
ENDEAVOR in Bosnia.  It was also used to support United Nations forces in Somalia, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Hungary, Saudi Arabia, Rwanda and Haiti. 
LOGCAP II, the program’s second contract iteration, was awarded in 1997 to 
DynCorp Aerospace Technology.  For this award, procurement and contract 
administration functions were transferred from the USACE to the Army Materiel 
Command (AMC).  The format of the LOGCAP II was essentially the same as the 
previous contract.  Like its predecessor, the LOGCAP II had one basic plus four option 
years and was a CPAF contract; however, the LOGCAP II included fixed priced line 
items for planning efforts (Dowling & Feck, 1999).  Planning involved looking at Central 
Command’s (CENTCOM) areas of potential conflict and developing detailed contractor 
support functions that would be necessary from build up to sustainment.  The LOGCAP 
II contract existed during a fairly quiet time in the Army’s history.  It served as the 
follow-on to the original LOGCAP contract; therefore, its main function was to provide 
sustainment functions in Bosnia. However, DynCorp also supported U.S. forces in the 
Philippines, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, East Timor, and Panama.   
The solicitation and source selection process for the third contract iteration of the 
LOGCAP, LOGCAP III, began in 2000.  The contract was awarded in December 2001, 
shortly after the September 11 attacks and the decision to deploy U.S. troops against 
terrorists worldwide.  Kellogg, Brown, and Root Services (KBRS) was selected for 
award.  The LOGCAP III contract was awarded as a CPAF contract for a period of one 
basic plus nine option years.  KBRS bid and won with an unconventionally low base fee 
(1%) and award fee pool (2%); however KBRS was familiar with LOGCAP requirements 
because they held the first USACE contract (KBRS was previously named Brown and 
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Root Services Corporation).  With its low award fee, KBRS was immediately given the 
challenge of providing support functions for troops deployed in support of Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM.  Two years later, they expanded to support troops deployed in 
support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.   
In March 2006, the pre-solicitation notice for the LOGCAP IV contract was 
posted.  Although the LOGCAP III contract was only in its fifth option year (with four 
option years remaining), the Army chose to re-solicit the LOGCAP contract.  In its pre-
solicitation notice, the Army Sustainment Command (ASC, a newly-minted subordinate 
command of AMC), declared:  
Under this proposed LOGCAP IV acquisition strategy, instead of 
awarding all LOGCAP planning, support, and program execution 
worldwide to a single contractor, we intend to award contracts for 
LOGCAP execution to multiple contractors, with a separate single 
contract for LOGCAP worldwide and regional planning and program 
support. (Robacker, 2006, p. 1) 
Having a contractor responsible for worldwide and regional planning and program 
support is a new concept added to the LOGCAP IV contract.  The selected contractor 
performs several functions for ASC, to include developing shelf plans to prepare the 
program to deploy to a new area if necessary (e.g., preparing plans for operations in Iran 
if they became necessary).  The support contractor provides administration functions for 
the PEO, both CONUS and OCONUS. 
As stated by the U.S. Army news release for the LOGCAP IV award, “The three 
performance contractors will compete for individual LOGCAP task orders4 (TOs), 
creating a competitive environment meant to control costs and enhance quality” (Downie, 
2008, p. 1).  Use of a multiple-award logistics umbrella contract proved successful to the 
AFCAP when they awarded their third contract iteration to six companies in November 
2005.  This notion is detailed further in the AFCAP background section of this chapter.  
Multiple-award contracts ease political and taxpayer concerns that one company is 
capitalizing on the major logistical efforts of two wars (colloquially known as “war 
                                                 
4 A task order (TO) is an order for services placed against an established contract or with Government 
sources.   
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profiteering”), as each company must compete for individual TOs written under the 
umbrella contract.  This perpetual competition usually results in increased quality and 
better performance by all contractors since each company’s next TO bid will be evaluated 
using past performance information garnered from their previous TO performance.   
Additionally, multiple-award contracts broaden the base of contractors who understand 
and are capable of meeting, in this case, the Army’s contingency needs.  As such, the 
program is able to handle a rapidly increasing scope of operation faster than if a single 
contract is awarded to a single contractor.   
The planning and support contract for the LOGCAP IV was awarded on 16 
February 2007 to Serco, Inc.  The execution contracts of the LOGCAP IV were originally 
awarded on 27 June 2007 to Kellogg, Brown, and Root Services, Inc. (KBRS), DynCorp 
International, LLC, and Fluor Intercontinental, Inc; however, protests were issued by two 
unsuccessful offerors alleging that the bids were evaluated improperly by ASC.  They 
"argued that the agency's evaluation of proposals was unreasonable" (Hedgpeth, 2007, p. 
1).  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) sustained the protests on 5 October 
2007 and recommended the Army “go back to the stage of negotiations...We're 
recommending they reopen discussions and then request revised proposals from all 
companies and evaluate those proposals and then make a new decision of who should get 
the contract”  (Hedgpeth, 2007, p. 1).  After the Army reevaluated the proposals, they 
were permitted to proceed with the award of the three LOGCAP IV execution contracts.  
Formal contract awards were made to the original three awardees on 17 April 2008.    
Unlike previous iterations of the contract, the LOGCAP IV contracts allow the 
Army flexibility to award CPAF, Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF), Cost Plus Incentive Fee 
(CPIF), Cost, Firm Fixed Price (FFP), Fixed Price Incentive (FPI), or Time and Materials 
(T&M) TOs to match the requirement.  The planning and support (Serco, Inc.) and 
execution (KBRS, DynCorp International, LLC, and Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.) 
functions were awarded with different contract durations.  For the planning and support 
contract, the period consists of one basic plus four option years.  The contract has a 
minimum order amount of $613,677.60 and a maximum value of $45 million dollars per 
year; making the full contract implementation value, a maximum of $225 million.  Like 
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the LOGCAP III contract, the time period for the LOGCAP IV execution contracts 
consists of one basic year plus nine option years.  These contracts have no minimum 
dollar values; however, each contract is guaranteed that, at a minimum, they can establish 
a core program office (HQ Army Sustainment Command, 2006).  The maximum dollar 
value allowed per execution contractor is $5 billion per year, making the maximum 
annual execution program value $15 billion per year, and the total contract value $150 
billion (U.S. Army Sustainment Command, 2008).   
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) performs contract 
administration of the LOGCAP IV contracts.  DCMA provides Administrative 
Contracting Officers (ACOs), Quality Assurance Representatives (QARs), and Property 
Administrators (PAs) to manage the day-to-day operations of the LOGCAP IV 
contractors.  Additionally, the LOGCAP Support Unit (LSU) acts as forward-deployed 
representatives of the ASC to assist customers (e.g., 82nd Airborne Division Staff) in 
defining requirements and developing Statements of Work (SOWs) for inclusion into the 
LOGCAP TOs that serve their Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).  The DCMA and the 
LSU serve as liaisons to the supported Command for LOGCAP functions. 
2. Operational Use 
The LOGCAP is primarily designed for use in areas where no bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or treaties exist; in other words a contingency situation where the 
U.S. military has the task of providing their own logistical support (i.e., full support is not 
provided by the host nation or an organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)).  “LOGCAP may also be used to provide additional support in 
areas with formal Host Nation Support agreements.  LOGCAP support can exist in 
conjunction with other contractor support agreements, and is available during Continental 
United States (CONUS) mobilizations to assist the Outside Continental United States 
(OCONUS) support base to help units prepare for worldwide contingencies” 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1985, p. 3).   
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The LOGCAP is considered the contract support option of last resort because of 
the potential additional costs associated with high risk, cost-type contracts.  “LOGCAP 
[is] primarily designed for areas where emerging requirements are the norm, rapid 
response is required, and/or conditions are such that normal sustainment type contracts 
are not competitively available” (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 
2007, p. 26).  Although the LOGCAP is most commonly thought of, and used in 
contingency environments, it is not solely a contingency program.  Aspects of the support 
contractor’s contract call for the contractor to prepare “shelf” plans for providing 
logistical support in potential contingencies.  The program also allows the logistical 
vehicle to be used in homeland emergencies and military exercises.     
C. GLOBAL CONTINGENCY CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT (GCCC) AND 
GLOBAL CONTINGENCY SERVICES CONTRACT (GCSC) 
The U.S. Navy’s CAPs are called the Global Contingency Construction Contract 
(GCCC) and the Global Contingency Services Contract (GCSC).  GCCC was formerly 
known as the Construction Capabilities (CONCAP) contract.  The purpose of GCCC is to 
“have a contractor available before an exigent situation develops, with a goal of early 
mobilization and startup construction.  Required services include program planning, 
scheduling, design, engineering, transportation, construction management and quality 
control.  The contractors will provide the personnel, equipment, materials, labor, travel, 
and everything needed to give the Navy a quick response for civilian construction 
contract capability” (Naval Facilities Engineering Command, p. 1).  GCSC was 
developed after the Navy’s experience with Hurricane Katrina.  They realized their 
construction-centric CONCAP/GCCC programs could not field some basic life support 
functions (e.g., personnel beddown, dining facility operations, laundry operations, etc.) 
because these functions were out of the contract’s scope, so, in 2006, they awarded a new 
base support service program, GCSC, to bridge the capability gap. 
1. GCCC/GCSC: Background and History 
Perini Corporation was awarded the first iteration of the CONCAP contract, 
CONCAP I, in 1995 as the managing partner in a joint venture between Perini and J.A. 
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Jones.  The Atlantic Division of the Navy brought Perini in as a managing partner of the 
joint venture for the multi-year contract providing “rapid response construction services, 
anywhere in the world, for emergencies related to natural disasters, humanitarian needs, 
and the peace-keeping efforts of the U.S. Government” (Perini Corporation, p. 1). 
The CONCAP I contract’s first test involved cleaning up and rebuilding the 
Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, after Hurricane Bertha in 1996.  The CONCAP I 
contract was also used for hurricane reconstruction in North Carolina, Virginia, the 
Caribbean, Florida Keys, and Mississippi (Naval Facilities Engineering Command).  
OCONUS, CONCAP I was used to design roads in Bosnia, construct a sewage treatment 
plant in Crete, repair the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) 
runway in Morocco, and build detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba  (Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command, 2009).  The contract had a $200 million ceiling, and 50 
TOs were written during its life (NAVFAC, 2007).   
In 2000, Perini lost award of the second iteration of the CONCAP contract, 
CONCAP II, to Kellogg, Brown, and Root Services (KBRS).  The contract was awarded 
for one basic plus four option years.  Over the life of the contract, there were 52 TOs 
issued at a cost of $300 million (Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 2009).     
In 2004, KBRS was again the successful offeror for the CONCAP III contract.  
“NAVFAC Atlantic issued the cost-plus-award-fee, ID/IQ contract with a $500 million 
not-to-exceed amount over a five-year period to KBR on July 26, 2004” (DoD Inspector 
General, 2008, p. 5). The five-year period consisted of one basic plus four option years.  
The CONCAP III contract provided the Navy with a construction capability for 
emergency response to “natural disasters, military conflict, or humanitarian aid” (Defense 
Acquisition University, p. 1). 
In 2006, the Navy split the CONCAP contract into two separate contracts for 
construction and support services, namely Global Contingency Construction Contract 
(GCCC) and Global Contingency Services Contract (GCSC).  They allow the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) to respond to natural disasters and other 
emergencies around the world.  The GCCC contract focuses primarily on construction 
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and “Dry-In” and “Dry-Out” operations in a contingency environment (DoD Inspector 
General, 2008).  “Dry-In” and “Dry-Out” operations consist of everything from 
construction and repair of buildings, such as a dome roof (dry-in), to the clean up efforts 
after a hurricane (dry-out).  The GCCC is a multiple-award contract with a $1 billion 
ceiling.  Three contractors, URS-IAP, LLC (a joint venture between J.V. URS Group and 
IAP World Services), Fluor Intercontinental, and Atlantic Contingency Constructors 
(ACC, consisting of JV Shaw E&I, AECOM Government Services, and PAE 
Government Services) were awarded contracts with one basic year plus four option years 
on 4 August 2006 (Hemstreet, 2008).  The GCCC is a CPAF ID/IQ.  “It provides 
worldwide rapid civilian construction and engineering services response for disaster 
recovery, military conflict, military operations other than war, humanitarian assistance, or 
projects with similar characteristics” (Defense Acquisition University, p. 1). 
The GCSC is also a CPAF ID/IQ contract.  It was awarded to a single contractor, 
Contingency Response Services (a joint venture between DynCorp International, Parsons 
Global Services and PWC Logistics), on 30 August 2006.  The contract has a ceiling of 
$450 million over one basic plus four option years (Hemstreet, 2008).  It is used to 
provide “short term facilities support services with incidental construction in response to 
natural disasters, humanitarian efforts, contingencies, and non-performance of incumbent 
contractor” (NAVFAC, 2007, slide 58).   
2. Operational Use  
Although GCCC and GCSC are used to provide logistical support in contingency 
environments, these contracts are not intended or equipped to “carry out military defense 
or offense, [and are] not intended to replace all of the functions and capabilities of the 
military engineer” (NAVFAC, 2007, slide 60).  Hence, neither the scope of the GCCC 
nor the GCSC matches the breadth of the LOGCAP or the AFCAP.  Furthermore, the 
GCCC and the GCSC are not permitted to operate in openly hostile environments; 
therefore, they are not currently used in Afghanistan or Iraq. 
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The NAVFAC created three-part criteria for GCCC use.  These criteria consist of: 
(1) an emergency or contingency situation, or conditions where the mission demands 
exceed normal acquisition timing parameters and/or where the contingency environment 
is too austere to rely on local contract support; (2) an element of significant uncertainty as 
to the scope, or schedule, (i.e., the requirement cannot be well-defined), thus supporting 
the use of a cost-type contract; and, (3) the work required is predominately construction 
and construction-related services (Hemstreet, 2008, slide 60).  As mentioned, the GCSC 
was created to supplement the GCCC with support functions necessary during 





• Port Operations 
• Range Operations 
• Operations Support 
• Facility Support 
• Health Care Support 
• Personnel Support 
• Morale, Welfare & Recreation Support 
 
• Base Support Vehicles & Equipment 
• Housing 
• Environmental 





Table 3.   GCSC Capabilities (After Hemstreet, 2008, slide 59) 
Contract administration for the GCCC and the GCSC can be performed by 
DCMA; however, it is more likely to be performed by representatives from NAVFAC-
Atlantic and NAVFAC-Pacific (i.e., internal Navy contracting assets).  The assignment of 
contract administration responsibilities for individual TOs depends mainly on the location 
of work.  Delegations are passed to the appropriate administration entity at the time of 
TO award. 
D. AIR FORCE CONTRACT AUGMENTATION PROGRAM (AFCAP) 
The U.S. Air Force’s Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) is a “contingent 
tool to provide Civil Engineer & Services personnel with a force multiplier by leveraging 
use of the commercial sector in meeting urgent mission requirements”  (AFCESA, p. 1).  
The program is meant to augment and provide a sustainment substitute for the Air 
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Force’s limited Civil Engineering, Services, and Logistics personnel.  The AFCAP III 
contract is similar in contract and management structure to the LOGCAP contract; 
however its scope and dollar value are significantly smaller. 
1. AFCAP: Background and History 
The AFCAP was initiated by the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency 
(AFCESA) located at Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), Florida in 1996 after witnessing the 
successes of the Army and Navy’s own contingency support programs.  The AF 
recognized that significant personnel reductions left capability gaps in their support 
functions, mainly civil engineering, services, and logistics.  Addressing this gap without 
carrying additional personnel required the Air Force to contract for contingency design 
and engineering expertise, capabilities such as dining facility operations, and logistical 
functions such as War Reserve Materiel (WRM) maintenance.   
The first AFCAP contract was awarded in 1997 to Readiness Management 
Support, LC (RMS) as a joint venture between Johnson Controls and Lockheed Martin.  
The contract was written for a period of one basic plus four option years.  The contract 
contained both CPAF and FFP line items.  The FFP line item was generally used to 
provide manpower backfills at military bases.  The ceiling for the original AFCAP 
contract was capped at $452.6 million over the life of the contract (Dowling & Feck, 
1999).  Both AFCESA and various AF Major Commands (MAJCOMs) use AFCAP 
support functions.  MAJCOMs may request AFCAP support provided they supply the 
funds and personnel for TO oversight. 
The second contract iteration, AFCAP II, was also awarded to RMS as a CPAF 
and FFP contract in February 2002 with a time period of one basic plus seven option 
years.  TOs for AFCAP II were used to repair, set up, and manage several runways and 
air traffic control operations in Afghanistan shortly after Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM began.  In 2003, the AFCAP II contract began providing functions in support 
of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  The emphasis in Iraq is on base camp maintenance, 
WRM management, and providing contractors to augment squadrons of Logistics and 
Services airmen. 
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The AFCAP III, the current iteration of the AFCAP contract, was awarded on 8 
November 2005 as a multiple-award ID/IQ with a time period of one basic plus nine 
option years.  The six successful contractors are: 
• Washington Group International in Denver, CO (contract FA3002-06-D-
0001) 
• CH2M Hill Global Services in Englewood, CO (contract FA3002-06-D-
0002) 
• URS/Berger JV in Washington, DC (contract FA3002-06-D-0003) 
• Bechtel National in Frederick, MD (contract FA3002-06-D-0004) 
• DynCorp International in Fort Worth, TX (contract FA3002-06-D-0005) 
• Readiness Management Support in Panama City, FL (contract FA3002-
06-D-0006) (Larsen, 2005) 
Each contractor competes for new TO awards.  The minimum amount to be 
awarded to each of the contractors is $15,000. The ceiling for AFCAP III is capped at 
$10B for all contractors over the life of all six contracts.  To provide the AF with 
maximum flexibility and maximum cost control, TOs may be written as CPAF, CPFF or 
FFP.  Contract administration and surveillance for the AFCAP III contract is performed 
by two main entities:  Air Force Program Executive Office (PEO) for Combat and 
Mission Support, (located in Washington, DC) and DCMA.      
2. Operational Use 
Although the AFCAP is capable of accomplishing bed-down taskings (e.g., food 
service operations, billeting, constructing perimeter security fences and barriers, etc.), its 
focus is on sustainment activities.  Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (Prime BEEF) 
and Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (RED 
HORSE) are the main, organic AF civil engineering forces used for accomplishing bed-
down taskings.  The AFCAP is primarily a relief or augmentation tool for prolonged 
sustainment activities (Dowling & Feck, 1999, p. 16).  Contractors for the AFCAP III 
contracts are not permitted to be deployed during heavy, combat due to the large amount 
of risk to unarmed contractor personnel.  However, after cessation of heavy combat, the 
AFCAP III contractors move in to help build and operate new base camps.  The AFCAP 
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maintains only one generic War and Management Plan (WMP) as opposed to the several 
site-specific plans developed by the LOGCAP.  The plan is tested or validated twice per 
year to ensure the contractors and the deploying forces understand their roles and 
responsibilities and are familiar with each other’s operations. 
The contracts are currently used in many areas of Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East, most extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The AFCAP III contracts provide 
capabilities such as design and engineering, concrete batch plants, power production 
plants, infrastructure design and construction, tear-down and re-packing services, WRM 
maintenance and support, and air traffic control.  Contractors for the AFCAP III provide 
deployment relief and longer dwell times (defined as periods between deployments) for 
frequently deployed AF support personnel.  Contractors remain through many cycles of 
AF deployers and provide much-needed continuity.     
In recent years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), and other oversight and accountability agencies have stressed 
the need for better control over contingency contracting contracts and their associated 
administration and oversight processes in several reports.  The LOGCAP, the GCCC, the 
GCSC, and the AFCAP are not immune to the criticisms contained in these documents.  
Perhaps the most recognized recent report is the one entitled “Urgent Reform Required.”  
It is colloquially known as “The Gansler Report” for the head of the commission that 
wrote the report, Jacques Gansler, and it points out the downfalls of the Army’s current 
contracting processes.  It is prudent to note that the Army is not the only service with 
contracting problems.  While the other services were not specifically addressed in the 
report, they too experience many of the problems highlighted by the report or can 
preempt problems by learning from the Army’s experience. 
E. THE GANSLER REPORT (“URGENT REFORM REQUIRED”) 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, titled “The Cost of Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11”, states that each 
logistics program has grown in size, shape, and complexity over the last several years.  
As the programs have expanded beyond initial capability and cost estimates, the 
 22
complexity has increased while the available federal contracting workforce has decreased 
over the years (Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. 4).  The impact of these two 
conditions, growth in size and complexity, has created a situation where fewer federal 
contracting officials can effectively manage these large-scale contracts. The fast 
operations tempo of the contemporary contingency environment affects the workforce’s 
ability to meet all the needs of the supported unit and make sound contracting decisions.  
This situation leads to compromising thoroughness and sound business judgment for 
speed.  When a contracting officer loses the ability and time to make sound business 
decisions, the repercussions show themselves in poor stewardship of U.S. taxpayer 
resources, inattention to the public interest, loss of public trust, lost of integrity for the 
contracting officer, lack of accountability, and latent defects with regard to the contract 
itself (i.e., several major changes or modifications to the contract because it was poorly 
written from the start). 
Dr. Jacques Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)), reviewed the Army’s acquisition system and 
its role in large-scale expeditionary operations.  Gansler’s commission traced audits and 
investigations involving the actions of both contractors and Government contracting 
personnel.  The commission used those investigations to identify and highlight major 
issues associated with contemporary contingency contracting.  
The Gansler Report identified four critical areas for the Army to focus on for 
future success in contingency environments:  (1) increased stature, quantity and career 
development for contracting personnel—both military and civilian, particularly for 
expeditionary operations; (2) restructure of the organization and responsibility to 
facilitate contracting and contract management; (3) training and tools for overall 
contracting activities in expedtiontary operations; and (4) obtaining legislative, 
regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness—important in 
expeditionary operations (Army.Mil/News Release, 2007).  The Gansler report identified 
areas that the Army needs to improve in order to be better prepared for future 
contingency operations.  It is the intent of this study to utilize the areas identified in the 
report to explore improvement opportunities.   
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Improvement opportunities inherently require change.  Change can come in many 
forms, such as policy changes, change in processes or practices, changes in behaviors, 
and changes in organizational culture.  If a JCAP is implemented, there will be several 
changes in policies and procedures that will influence and guide changes in 
organizational behaviors and culture.  The next section addresses organizational 
structures and change so that the reader is aware of the impediments that may block the 
transition from individual CAPs to a JCAP. 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CHANGE 
Throughout the 1990s, organizational change has been the focus of many 
studies ranging from the Sashkin and Burke (1987) to Pasmore and Fagans 
(1992) studies.  Research themes found in these studies addressed content 
issues, contextual issues, process issues, and nature of criterion variables 
commonly assessed as outcomes.  This literature review highlights the 
significant findings per research focus.  (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999, pp. 
293–294) 
Research focused on content identified two dynamics inherent to organizational 
change: transformational and transactional.  Transformational factors deal with areas that 
require new behaviors as a consequence of external and internal environmental pressures 
while transactional factors deal with psychological and organizational variables that 
predict and control motivational and performance within a controlled climate. 
Contextual research highlights several facets of organizational change pertinent to 
this study.  First, environmental change does not necessarily increase the “probability of 
strategic re-orientation.”  Second, older organizations have the tendency to resist change 
more than younger organizations. Third, the size of an organization does not directly 
relate to the responsiveness to change within the organization.  Fourth, organizations 
have the tendency to revert to changes previously implemented or experienced.  Finally, 
organziational strategy changes do not directly contribute to the failure of an 
organization. “A change effort is likely to fail if an organization adopts a strategic 
orientation that does not match the requirements of its external environment.”  
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Process research studies recommend phases for “change” agents to implement to 
ensure successful organization change and demonstrates how organizational members 
react to change within an organization as the change unfolds. Several premises came out 
of the studies: (1) creating readiness for change minimizes resistance; and (2) converting 
constituencies affected by change into “agents of change.”  Ultimately, the process “used 
to plan and enact an organizational change is as important as the state of existing content 
and contextual factors” (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999, pp. 296–303). 
In terms of outcomes variables, various studies determined that outcomes were 
more often described in terms of success/failure criteria, such as profitability or market 
share.  Further, organizational members are more likely to resist change if they believe 
that they stand to lose something of value, such as their job or duty position, etc.  As a 
result, individuals may have the tendency to protect one’s self-interests without regard for 
the overall “health” of the organization. 
When developing a culture or considering a culture change, a company 
generally selects an organizational structure that will suit its desired 
culture.  Federal Express has a more centralized structure than some 
companies because of its focused mission to provide totally reliable, 
competitively superior global air-ground transportation of high priority 
goods and documents that require rapid, time-certain delievery. (United 
States General Accounting Office, 1992, p. 11) 
The GAO report (1992) and Denison (1997) suggest that four major cultural 
aspects apply to the problem at hand.  The areas explored by Denison  (United States 
General Accounting Office, 1992) are: (1) the values and beliefs held by an 
organization’s members; (2) policies and practices used by an organization; (3) the 
translation of core values and beliefs into policies and practices in a consistent manner; 
and (4) the interrelationship of core values and beliefs, policies and practices, and the 
business environment of the organization. 
Many public organizations, to include the DoD, are structrued as centralized 
organizations.  Centralized organizations have a high degree of hierarchichal authority 
and participation in the decision-making process is limited to the highest ranking players.  
Centralized organizations benefit from high levels of command and control and 
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standardization; however they are inhibited by their inflexibility and lack of alternate 
viewpoints (Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2007).  To effectively implement a JCAP, 
centralization of PEOs, practices, and policies is essential; however organizational 
leaders must ensure that centralization does not prohibit effective and rational decision-
making nor program flexibility. 
Policies and procedures changes are routine occurrences in DoD.  While not 
necessarily easy to implement, most servicemembers and public servants are used to 
periodically changing their practices to adhere to new guidance.   Organizational culture, 
like organizational policies and procedures, is hard to change.  The values and beliefs 
common among individuals in the same organization are deeply-rooted and cannot be 
changed overnight.  JCAP implementation would require each service to change a bit of 
their culture to meet the new, joint culture.  Organizational culture is highlighted to 
emphasize to the reader the importance of acknowledging that this change will be time-
consuming, and the importance of securing leadership commitment to the change so that 
it is not defeated by slow progress. 
G. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
The concept of organizational culture has received considerable attention within 
organizational theory in the last decade (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001). Researchers of 
organizational culture have explored the role of commitment to organizations, mutual 
beliefs and a sense of community in workers’ everyday interactive lives (Gudykunst et 
al., 1985).  Organizational culture is a pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered, 
or developed by a given group as the group learns to cope with its problems of survival in 
an external environment and its problems of internal integration (Schein, 1990) (Driskill 
& Brenton, 2005, p. 17).  
For the purposes of this study, culture will be defined using the root metaphor 
approach.  The root metaphor approach presents three premises: culture as a shared 
cognition; culture as systems of shared symbols; and culture as the expression of 
unconscious processes.  Each premise addresses specific details; however, this study only 
addresses the broader concepts such as patterns of logic shared among an organization, 
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organizational symbols, and how organizational symbols display underlying beliefs and 
assumptions (Driskill & Brenton, 2005, p. 30).  Organizational culture exists to support 
an organization’s strategy, to prescribe acceptable ways to interact, and to set 
performance criteria  (Gordon, 1999). 
Gagliardi (1986) identifies two types of cultural change:  cultural incrementalism 
and cultural revolution.  Cultural incrementalism incorporates new values and 
assumptions that do not challenge or debunk the existing cultural elements.  Cultural 
revolution, on the other hand, causes some of the existing cultural elements to be 
abandoned as new ones replace them  (Golembiewski, 1993).  How easy or difficult it is 
to change an organization’s culture is directly related to whether the culture is weakly or 
strongly embedded.  Enacting change (whether incremental or revolutionary) requires 
transformational leadership.  The transformational leader must hold the respect of his/her 
subordinates and include them in the decision to change and in the actual change process 
itself.  Cultural change is not easy, but it is possible to change an organization’s culture in 
a way that does not alienate the members of the organization.  Gordon (1999) notes that 
top management should provide the vision and support for the change, while mid-level 
and lower-level managers should devise the policies and practices to enact the change.   
The Joint Strike Fighter is a case where the services and allied partners were able 
to overcome organizational change and cultural barriers to successfully field and deliver 
an aircraft that meets the individual needs of each participant.  They did so while 
spending less time and money than would be spent on 13 (three U.S. military services 
plus 10 allied partners) individual programs.  It is this concept of working jointly to 
eliminate redundant programs that first sparked the researchers’ interest in the feasibility 
of a JCAP. 
H. F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) 
This program is relevant to our study because it demonstrates a successful process 
for conducting a joint program.  Althougth multiple services (to include allied partner 
services) are interested in individual outcome of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, 
the U.S. Military has a structure in place that addresses individual service interests while 
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maintaining progress within the program itself.  Joint development is “responsive, 
efficient, and in the best interests of the success of the JSF program” (Congressional 
Research Service, 2009, p. 5). In order to gain understanding into how a joint program 
works, the researchers reviewed the processes and structure of a large-scale joint 
program, the JSF.  This program provides insight into how participating nations and 
services work together to develop the requirement and production of a fighter aircraft. 
The JSF Program, formerly known as the Joint Advanced Strike Technology 
(JAST) Program, is the Department of Defense’s focal point for defining affordable next 
generation strike aircraft weapon systems for the Navy, Air Force, Marines and U.S. 
Allies.  “The program’s rationale and primary emphasis is joint-service development of a 
next-generation multi-role stirke aircraft that can be produced in affordable variants to 
meet different operational requirements” (Congressional Research Service, 2009).  The 
program was structured…to be a model of acquistion reform, with an emphasis on 
jointness, technology maturation, concept demonstrations, and early cost-performance 
trades integral to the weapon system requirements definition process (Congressional 
Research Service, 2009, pp. 2–3). 
Much like the JSF program, we intend to demonstrate the applicability of a joint 
partnership in contingency logistics support programs.  The JSF program is jointly staffed 
and managed by the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy 
(comprised of the Navy and Marine Corps) with coordination among the services 
reinforced by alternating Air Force and Navy Department officials in key management 
positions (Congressional Research Service, 2009). 
A key benefit of this program is the maximum commonality in the airframe, 
engine, and avionics components to reduce development, production, operation and 
support costs (Congressional Research Service, 2009, p. 3).  Former Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen stated, “that the JSF’s joint approach ‘avoids the three parallel 
development programs for service-unique aircraft that would have otherwise been 
necessary, saving at least $15 billion’” (Congressional Research Service, 2009, p. 3).  
The JSF program resembles the notion of a JCAP in that both attempt to gain efficiencies 
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by capitalizing on and leveraging similar needs and by eliminating expensive 
redundancies through the use of one joint program. 
I. SUMMARY 
This literature review presents studies and theories useful in determining the 
feasibility of a JCAP.  The Gansler Report lays the foundation for change within the 
acquisition community in contingency situations.  Although the report focuses primarily 
on LOGCAP, the crux supports the need for a joint program in terms of program 
responsiveness, effectiveness, training, and the limited number of available workers in 
the field of contracting.  Organizational analytic tools that highlight the importance of 
recognizing organizational structure, change processes, and culture provide a framework 
to manage change in the most effective manner, should a joint program be implemented.  
Finally, the use of the JSF program as a model demonstrates the reality of multiple 
nations and services working hand-in-hand to create, maintain, and execute a large-scale 
program that satisfies the various needs of each of the individual services involved in the 
acquisition.  This program is an example of how limited funding and a willingness to 
work jointly can be successful despite organizational or cultural differences.  
The following chapter introduces Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) and how it 
will be used in the course of this study.  It also details how the researchers performed and 
collected data from semi-structured interviews.  Finally, it discusses the type of questions 





This study examines the advantages and disadvantages of a consolidated JCAP by 
performing a qualitative Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) of five program areas:  (1) 
Planning, (2) Capabilities Provided, (3) Financial Processes, (4) Command and Control, 
and (5) Ease of Use for both managers/administrators and users/customers.  Again, the 
purpose of the study is to measure both CAP effectiveness (i.e., bridging or satisfying 
capability gaps that exist within each services’ current CAP) and efficiencies (i.e., 
streamlining and standardization of process to facilitate ease of program use) to be gained 
by establishing a JCAP.  The CEA methodology allows the researchers to simultaneously 
consider both costs and effectiveness in a qualitative manner.  To garner information for 
analysis, key program participants such as Program Managers (PMs), Procuring 
Contracting Officers (PCOs), Contract Administration Office (CAO) Commanders, 
Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs), Quality Assurance Representatives 
(QARs), and Users/Customers were interviewed. 
B. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS (CEA) 
Cost-Effectiveness Analyses (CEA) is popular in Government (public) decision-
making (Thompson, 1980; Quade, 1965).  This method helps decision-makers make 
informed choices on matters that lack quantifiable information.  The ensuing discussion 
introduces CEA and details how it will be used it in the study. 
1. Introduction to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) 
CEA “can be used to determine whether any objective is worth achieving, which 
among alternative objectives should be achieved, and the way to achieve any set 
objective”  (Thompson, 1980, p. 221).  It has been defined as “benefit-cost analysis 
without monetary valuations of program outputs”  (Thompson, 1980, p. 225) and “any 
analytic study designed to assist a decisionmaker [to] identify a preferred choice from 
among possible alternatives”  (Quade, 1965, p. 1).  CEA is used when program effects 
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are difficult to value, including those that take into effect the cost or quality of human life 
or process efficiencies.  CEA is popularly used by hospitals for making health care 
decisions and by the military for making weapons systems capability assessments.  “With 
program effects [that are] difficult to value, an appealing analytic approach is not to value 
them:  to work through all other parts of the program valuation; to organize and present 
information that will aid valuation of these effects; but to leave the actual value 
judgments on them to the decision-makers (and not to the analysts)” (Thompson, 1980, p. 
222).   
Thompson (1980) goes further to address four difficulties associated with placing 
or determining program value.  The first difficulty is the global nature of the value.  CAP 
support in contingency situations may not provide any benefit at all to many of the 
taxpayers whose dollars support the program.  How do you account for the value (or lack 
thereof) placed on CAPs from the taxpayer’s perspective?  The second difficulty is the 
inability to compensate losses.  What is the true cost of not having a JCAP in place?  
What do the warfighter and taxpayer lose by choosing to provide contingency logistical 
support functions in a different manner?  The third difficulty takes into account goals as 
constraints.  In other words, how does the logistical support provided by individual CAPs 
compare to the support theorized by a JCAP?  Is there an improvement in quality, cost, 
and/or customer satisfaction?  What value do you place on improvements?  Likewise, 
what is the value given up by failing to make improvements?  The fourth difficulty 
accounts for an excess of imponderables.  Unceratinty of events (as occur in war or other 
contingency situations) produce  unanswerable questions for decision makers.  How long 
will this contingecy last?  What types of support will be required?  How much of that 
support will a JCAP provide?  It is very difficult to place certain values on uncertain 
elements. 
Due to the confounds associated with the study of complex problems for which 
value uncertainties are prevalent, the researchers have turned to CEA for valid analysis.  
CEA has been used in professions where outcomes are difficult to measure.  For instance, 
in health care, CEA is used to weigh healthcare benefits against potential costs of 
foregoing those benefits.  While the cost of providing additional physicians or testing 
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may be well documented, the cost of not providing the benefits and the potential risks to 
human life are difficult to measure.  The same is true of some military weapon platform 
decisions.  Effectiveness in the military weapon platform context is often measured in 
lives saved.  The benefit or value of the number of lives saved is also difficult to quantify.   
While it is possible to quantitatively analyze how much a new bomber airplane costs, it is 
much more difficult to measure the benefits, or effects, achieved by the new aircraft (how 
effective the payload is against curbing the actions of enemy combatants, how striking a 
target helps meet the overall war strategy, and how many potential lives can be saved). 
CEA attempts to make the effects of a particular decision easier to decipher and 
compare by valuing them with common, equivalent criteria.  The common value may be 
expressed in terms of cost, time, functionality, or a host of other criteria.  The CEA data 
for this study were garnered via qualitative interviews with experienced informants in 
order to “capture data on the perceptions of local actors ‘from the inside’, through a 
process of deep attentiveness, of empathic understanding, and of suspending or 
‘bracketing’ preconceptions about the topics under discussion”  (Shaw, 1999, p. 13).  The 
intent is to interpret the actions of the main players in a process that has limited resources 
to understand why certain actions are taken and to identify potential courses of action 
(and the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of each course of action) for policy maker 
decision-making purposes.  CEA relies on subjective judgment used in a systematic 
manner.  In other words, information provided by expert informants is used to assess and 
interpolate value for a particular set of criteria in order to make the best, most effective 
decision possible.   
Quade (1965) prescribes one method for implementing a CEA.  He presents five 
steps to walk a user through the process: 
1. The Objective—to help choose a policy or course of action.  What is the 
decision to be made? 
2. The Alternatives—substitutes or another way to perform the same function.  
What are the means by which we can obtain the objective? 
3. The Costs—determining what we are forgoing by choosing one alternative.  
What are the opportunity costs? 
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4. A Model—visually representing the objectives, alternatives and costs.  Used 
as a means to predict the cost that each alternative would incur and how 
effective that alternative would be in obtaining the objective 
5. A Criterion—rule or standard to rank the alternatives or weigh the costs 
against the alternatives.  Which alternatives are most desirable? 
Using those five steps, Quade (1965) suggests the following approach: 
The consequence of choosing an alternative (which may have to be 
discovered or invented as part of the analysis) are obtained by means of 
the model or a series of models.  These consequences tell us how effective 
each particular alternative is in the attainment of the objectives (which 
requires that we have a measure of effectiveness for each objective) and 
what the costs are.  A criterion can then be used to arrange the alternatives 
in order of preference. (emphasis in original, Quade, 1965, p. 63) 
He also points out some “defects” in this type of analysis: short-sightedness or 
attention bias that fails to involve all inherent matters into the analysis; analysis that is 
“necessarily incomplete” (i.e., the analyzer uses non-quantifiable factors such as 
expertise and judgment where specific monetary or time values cannot be obtained); 
effectiveness measures that are inevitably incomplete (i.e., using best judgments and 
approximations in lieu of hard, measureable data); ways to predict the future that are 
lacking; and all analysis of choice falls short of scientific research (i.e., providing 
recommendations based on understanding and predictions vice factual/testable figures) 
(Quade, 1965, pp. 10–14).  Where possible, actual monetary costs will be used in the 
CEA for this study. 
2. CEA Application to JCAP Study 
CEA is the most appropriate analysis tool for a JCAP case study because it 
associates the processes and how the programs operate with the potential cost savings of 
a JCAP.  Costs associated with the CAPs are important, of course; however proper 
analysis should also include program effectiveness since they (the programs) are used in 
contingency situations where meeting the needs of the services (i.e., the quality and 




The CEA methodology permits the simultaneous consideration of both costs and 
effectiveness (measured in quality and timeliness of support capabilities) in a qualitative 
manner.  
This study will employ CEA to evaluate the five analysis areas in order to provide 
senior leaders with useful information for deciding whether to keep the CAPs separate or 
to combine them into a single JCAP.  For instance, for the first potential efficiency area, 
Planning, we intend to perform a CEA to determine if maintaining separate, service-
specific plans for using programs in contingency situations is more effective or less 
effective than having one, combined plan under JCAP.  As another example, for the 
fourth potential efficiency area, Command and Control, we intend to perform a CEA to 
determine if maintaining separate CAPs is easier or more difficult to administer and 
provide oversight for (by both the PEO and CAO) than it would be for one JCAP (while 
at the same time maintaining the current level of program effectiveness).  The qualitative 
analyses in each of the five areas will provide a framework for valuation and decision-
making by senior leaders. 
C. DATA COLLECTION   
Data for this qualitative study was collected mainly from semi-structured 
interviews and follow-up questions with key informants.  This section details how the 
semi-structured interviews were conducted and how the sample of participants, or 
informants, was chosen.  It also provides insight into how the researchers developed 
questions for each of the five analysis areas. 
1. Structured Interviews   
The interview process began with the development of seven different interview 
protocols that correspond with each of the six groups of informants (PMs, PCOs, CAO 
Commanders, ACOs, QARs, and Users/Customers) plus one protocol that encompasses 
questions for all groups.  These informant positions were selected because they are key to 
the success of the programs, and the people who hold them are often quite familiar with 
the inner workings of the entire program, not just their specialty area.  Here, open-ended 
questions were developed (see Appendix) to collect the requisite data from key 
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informants.  The goal was to develop questions that provided insight into the informants’ 
experiences and garnered their thoughts on the cost effectiveness or ineffectiveness and 
efficiencies or inefficiencies associated with the current CAPs and a potential JCAP.   
Since our analysis is largely qualitative, the questions are process-related and 
fairly open-ended, allowing the informant to provide his or her personal insights and 
experiences.  Efforts were made to avoid biases by ensuring the questions were not 
leading the informant in any particular direction, but rather probing for his or her 
personal experiences and thoughts.  To bolster face validity, the interview protocols were 
reviewed and edited by subject matter experts, to include one of the advisors on this 
project.   
Throughout the interview process, trends emerged among the responses that 
signaled “converg[ence] on the same set of facts or findings”  (Yin, 1994, p. 78).  This 
allowed main ideas to be triangulated from multiple sources (e.g., interviews, GAO 
reports, etc.) and interpreted by the researchers.  Often during the interviews, other 
possible informants were suggested as a way of corroborating and evidencing the 
informant’s experiences.  These additional sources allowed findings to be substantiated 
and provided a greater pool of informants and data.  After the initial semi-structured 
interviews, additional questions arose and were posed to all of the informants.  Again, 
trends were pulled from the responses to these additional questions and used by the 
researchers during analysis.   
2. Sample 
Once the questions were developed, the process of selecting informants began.  A 
convenience sample, rather than a random sample, was taken because identification of 
and access to the entire population of CAP administrators and users was not possible.  
The intent was to maximize the number of participants who had experience with more 
than one services’ CAP in order to identify valid areas of overlap and process efficiencies 
and to reduce the number of interviews required.  In other words, the focus was to 
determine whether there was excessive duplication in the use of multiple CAPs that could 
be eliminated with a JCAP.   
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Another focus was to determine “best practices” or areas of efficiency in the 
individual programs.  If these efficiencies do exist, are they able to be transferred to a 
JCAP, or do they lose their effectiveness when combined into a single, joint program?  
Another goal was to interview a sufficient number of informants so perspectives from 
each program and functional role are captured and considered.  A limitation experienced 
during the study was the ability to find, contact and coordinate an interview with several 
informants in a timely manner.  Because military members often relocate, separate, or 
retire from service, the pool of candidates was difficult to access.  Furthermore, 
contractor employees with actual field experience were unable to provide information.  
Instead, they referred us to their public affairs offices.  Unfortunately, public affairs 
representatives could not provide detailed answers because of their lack of field 
experience.  Nonetheless, 16 government participants were found and all provided useful, 
relevant information to the study. 
The LOGCAP and the AFCAP have been used extensively in Operations 
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM; therefore, it was fairly easy to find 
informants who had participated in both the LOGCAP and the AFCAP.  It was more 
difficult to find participants who had dual experience with the LOGCAP or the AFCAP 
and the CONCAP, GCCC, or GCSC because these programs do not operate in openly 
hostile areas and, therefore, have not been used in the same ENDURING FREEDOM and 
IRAQI FREEDOM geographical areas as the LOGCAP and the AFCAP.   
Participants were selected from a large number of CAP duties:  Program 
Managers (PMs), Procuring Contracting Officers (PCOs), Contract Administration Office 
(CAO) Commanders, Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs), Quality Assurance 
Representatives (QARs), and Users/Customers.  Each duty provides a different 
perspective of the program.  The mix of short-term (generally military members) and 
long-term (generally civilians) experience provided an over-arching, all-encompassing 
look at the state of the current CAPs and the potential cost-effectiveness and efficiency of 
a JCAP.  The majority of participants had recently (i.e., within the last two years) dealt 
with the programs, so the information received is deemed current and relevant.  Tables 4–
6 identify the informants’ backgrounds and associations with the programs. 
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Informant Background and Program Association—LOGCAP 
Program Role Rank (If applicable) 
CAP Experience 
(Years) Career Field 
Owning 
Organization 
PM GS Employee 5 Program Management ASC 
PCO GS Employee 7 Contracting ASC 
CAO 
Commander O-6 2.5 Logistics DCMA 
ACO O-5 1 Contracting DCMA 
ACO O-5 2 Contracting DCMA 
QAR GS Employee 1 Quality Assurance DCMA 
User/Customer O-6 13 Multi-Functional Logistics 
82d Airborne 
Division 
User/Customer O-5 1 Field Artillery 4
th Infantry 
Division 
Table 4.   Informant Background and Program Association—LOGCAP  
Informant Background and Program Association—GCCC & GCSC 
Program Role Rank (If applicable) 
CAP Experience 
(Years) Career Field 
Owning 
Organization 
PM GS Employee 4 Contracting NAVFAC Pacific 
PCO GS Employee 3.5 Contracting NAVFAC Atlantic 
Table 5.   Informant Background and Program Association—GCCC & GCSC  
Informant Background and Program Association—AFCAP 
Program Role Rank (If applicable) 
CAP Experience 
(Years) Career Field 
Owning 
Organization 
PM GS Employee 8 Program Management AFCESA 
PCO GS Employee 9 Contracting AFCESA 
CAO 
Commander O-6 2.5 Logistics DCMA 
ACO O-5 1.5 Contracting DCMA 
ACO O-4 1 Contracting DCMA 
User/Customer O-5 1 Field Artillery 4
th Infantry 
Division 
Table 6.   Informant Background and Program Association—AFCAP  
3. Question Development 
The questions posed in this study mirror the five potential efficiency areas as 
closely as possible in order to make analysis easier to follow.  Although there were five 
major analysis areas, we constructed six question areas: (1) planning questions, (2) 
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questions regarding the breadth of capabilities provided, (3) financial processes 
questions, (4) command and control questions, (5) ease of use questions, and (6) general 
and program process questions.  The interview protocol is found in the Appendix. 
a. Planning 
The first of the five main areas, Planning, examines initial ID/IQ contract 
award, how new TOs are negotiated, and how new requirements are added to the 
contract.  The advantages and disadvantages of each method are extracted and explained 
by the cultural differences in the way each service conducts contingency operations.  It is 
generally accepted that planning with the contractor is critical to mission success; 
therefore, the goal of the planning questions is to determine the costs-effectiveness and 
efficiency associated with planning using separate CAPs versus a single JCAP.   
b. Capabilities Provided 
The second area, Capabilities Provided, examines whether the current 
CAPs are able to meet the needs and requirements of the services they are supporting, if 
there are any gaps in capabilities (requirements that cannot be fulfilled due to the 
program’s structure or limitations), and the amount of overlap or duplication of 
capabilities that exists among the programs.  The goal of the capabilities questions is to 
determine the cost-effectiveness and efficiency with which the breadths of capabilities 
are provided by the current CAPs.  How much duplication exists and what are the costs 
associated with duplication?  Does having duplicated areas increase the effectiveness of 
the programs?  Are there gaps in one program that might be fulfilled by a different CAP 
or be better served by one all-encompassing JCAP?  Could overlaps be more efficiently 
provided by one JCAP? 
c. Financial Processes 
The third area, Financial Processes, examines the ease or difficulty of 
funding the programs.  It takes into consideration multiple service and coalition partner 
use.  The goal of the financial questions is not necessarily to look at the hard figures and 
determine acceptability; rather, it is to look at the financial transfer costs (i.e., how often 
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money is transferred from one service to another to use CAP functions), of sharing the 
CAPs with sister services and coalition partners, and how efficiently the transfers of 
funds are accomplished.  Are the transfers easy or difficult to enact?  Is the transfer 
process time consuming or not?  Would it be easier to fund one JCAP for all services to 
use?  It is a process-based approach vice a numerical-based approach.  In other words, it 
is an examination of how financial matters are handled in each program vice the amount 
of money associated with the programs. 
d. Command and Control 
The fourth area, Command and Control, examines how effectively and 
efficiently the program is managed from the viewpoint of both the contract administration 
entities (i.e., the PEO and the CAO) and the area of operations commanders.  There are 
many organizations involved with the CAPs.  The Program Executive Offices (PEOs) are 
the owners of the programs.  The main PEO players are the Program Manager (PM) and 
the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO).  The PEO is responsible for the overall 
program; they are essentially the “home base” of the CAP.  The PEO creates and issues 
the ID/IQ contract and all subsequent TOs.   
The CAP’s administrative body is the Contract Administration Office 
(CAO).  The CAO players include the CAO Commander, the Administrative Contracting 
Officer (ACO) and the Quality Assurance Representative (QAR, sometimes referred to as 
the Quality Assurance Evaluator, or QAE).  The CAO is responsible for the day-to-day 
oversight of the individual TOs and the related contractors in their area of operations, and 
they receive their delegation of responsibilities from the PCO.  The PEO and CAO 
interact and communicate continuously to ensure proper program use.   
The user or customer is the commander and staff of the supported unit.  
The customers generate requirements that are captured and fulfilled by the CAO in 
collaboration with the PEO.  There are also “outside” relationships that affect the CAPs.  
For instance, in some situations, CAP contractors must interact with non-CAP contractors 
(such as local firms contracted from local contracting activities and coalition-country 
firms contracted from both local contracting activities and U.S.-based contracting 
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activities) when their tasks overlap or connect.  Another “outside” relationship is that of 
the contractor with the host nation.  Many CAPs require the contractor to use host 
country nationals (HCNs) in the fulfillment of contract requirements to the maximum 
extent possible (e.g., as food service personnel, as cleaning crews, as skilled craftsmen, 
etc.).  Therefore, the contractor must maintain favorable relationships with local 
populations.  As is evident, the command and control of a CAP is highly complex.  
This area explores the ability of the PEO and CAO to effectively manage 
the program with current resources and whether duplication of personnel exists among 
the CAPs.  The goal of the command and control questions is to ascertain the costs of 
managing separate CAPs (including both CONUS and OCONUS administration) and the 
effectiveness of the management process.  Would management be streamlined (by 
reducing duplication) and oversight be strengthened by using a single JCAP? 
e. Ease of Use 
The fifth area, Ease of Use, examines how easy or difficult it is for the 
customer to understand the program and its various uses, and how easy or difficult cross-
service CAP utilization is (i.e., how easy or difficult it is for the Army to request and 
receive the AFCAP functions).  Questions in this area pertain to standardization of 
processes, and the ease or difficulty of turning on or adding requirements to the contract.  
The goal of the ease of use questions is to determine the learning curve costs associated 
with CAPs and how effectively the programs adjust and adapt to meet the needs of the 
commanders.  Could implementing a JCAP flatten the learning curve?  Would a JCAP be 
flexible enough to accommodate the needs and requirements of all supported services? 
f. General and Program Process 
The general and program process questions are additions to the five main 
areas.  The general questions encompass demographic-type inquiries (e.g., which 
programs the informant has been associated with, in what capacity they served the 
program, etc.), and questions pertaining to the overall goal of our study (e.g., what the 
informant believes to be the overall costs and benefits associated with combining the 
CAPs).  The goal is to gain insight into the informants’ experiences with both their job 
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duties and with the programs.  The program process questions take a closer look at the 
specific processes each informant performs in his or her job (e.g., does the informant 
believe the programs’ processes are standardized in a way that helps him or her to 
perform their duty?).  The goal with these questions is to identify differences in the basic 
processes of each CAP in order to capture any “best practices” that exist and to capture 
differences in processes that cause higher costs or less effectiveness/efficiency, or both.  
Best practices might become useful for any ensuing acquisition strategy, be it centralized 
or decentralized.    
D. SUMMARY 
This report uses CEA to analyze the five potential efficiency areas of a JCAP.  
The goal is to glean expert opinions and insights from informants during semi-structured 
interviews and use patterns of opinions and insights to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the individual CAPs and the effectiveness and efficiency of a single JCAP.  
Key program participants will provide the data necessary to draw conclusions and make 
recommendations for senior-level decision-makers.  The next chapter, Cost Effectiveness 
Analysis, displays the results of the data gathering and the researchers’ assessments. 
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IV. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to better understand the effectiveness of each program, and whether there 
are efficiencies to be gained by implementing a JCAP, a cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) was performed on each of the five study areas.  As a reminder, the five study areas 
are displayed in Table 7. 
Potential JCAP Efficiencies 
Efficiency Area Operation/Process/Criteria 
Planning • Acquisition Planning and Source Selection • Planning for New Requirements 
 
Capabilities Provided • Gaps in Capabilities Available • Overlaps in Capabilities Available 
 
Financial Processes • Funding from Sister Services • Funding from Coalition Partners 
 
Command & Control • CONUS Program Administration and Oversight • OCONUS Program Administration and Oversight 
 
Ease of Use • Ability to Understand the Program and its Uses • Cross-Service Utilization of CAPs 
 
Table 7.   Potential JCAP Efficiencies  
The analyses seek to answer the overall research question, “Is it more cost-
effective and efficient for the Army, Navy and Air Force to combine their individual 
CAPs into one JCAP?”  This question is addressed by answering the six secondary 
research questions: 
• How is planning affected by a JCAP? 
• What efficiencies are gained by combining the support requirements of the 
individual services into one JCAP? Which areas of duplication can a 
JCAP eliminate? 
• How are financial processes affected by a JCAP? 
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• How are CONUS program administration and OCONUS program 
administration and oversight affected by a JCAP? 
• How is ease of use affected by using a JCAP vice individual programs?  
Will one program serve the needs of the combatant commanders better or 
worse than individual service-specific programs? 
• How will different service cultures affect the implementation, utilization, 
effectiveness and efficiency of a JCAP? 
B. CEA: PLANNING 
Planning is a process that occurs continuously throughout the life of a CAP, from 
building the overarching acquisition plan to adding new requirements to the contract.  As 
noted in Joint Publication 4-0,  
Planning for the use of contracted capabilities is a complex undertaking. It 
must address both contracting capability and the management of 
contractor personnel. Planning for contract support is complicated by the 
fact that support flows from inside and outside the theater.  Detailed 
planning should be done for both contracting support (contracting support 
plan) and contractor (personnel) integration (either integrated into 
appropriate functional areas of the plan or in a separate contractor 
integration plan annex). (Department of Defense, 2008) 
This section analyzes two of the main areas of CAP planning: (1) acquisition 
planning and source selection, and (2) planning for new requirements.  It defines the 
research question and details how the CEA will be performed. 
1. Research Question 
The research question, “How is planning affected by a JCAP?” aims to determine 
what planning differences, if any, exist between the individual CAPs and how using a 
JCAP might shape or change the planning process.  Analysis of the acquisition planning 
and source selection processes examines the number of manhours it takes to formally 
select program contractor(s) for each of the individual CAPs and projects the number of 
manhours required for a single JCAP.  Planning for new requirements (i.e., requirements 
fulfilled by the use of TOs) will use the same man-hour analysis; however, it will 
compare new requirements sourced under each CAP to the time consumed using one 
JCAP.  Manhours in both areas of analysis is defined as the number of employees the 
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process took multiplied by the number of hours each person worked each day multiplied 
by the number of days each process spanned.  Naturally, not every person worked solely 
on the requirement every day; thus, allocated time must be considered.  Allocated time 
will be approximated based on information provided by informants.  Each informant was 
asked questions pertaining to how many people were involved in each planning process 
and the number of hours each person committed to CAP planning tasks to ensure the 
accuracy of the figures. 
2. Acquisition Planning and Source Selection 
Planning for the individual CAPs and for a single JCAP starts at the development 
of the program’s acquisition plan.  The program office works in conjunction with the 
users, or customers, to develop a broad Statement of Work (SOW) whose scope 
encompasses all requirements that might be necessary for the contractor to perform over 
the life of the contract.  Interested offerors attend “industry days” or other forums held by 
the program office to pose questions and inquire about the requirement.  The program 
office uses the contractor’s questions to further define the requirement for potential 
offerors.  No requirement is ever perfectly composed when it is announced; however, the 
program office and acquisition planners do their best to capture and define as much of the 
requirement as possible before they issue the Request for Proposals (RFP).  Once issued, 
offerors have a specific amount of time (generally three to four months for a requirement 
the size of a CAP) to prepare their proposals.   
Once the proposals are submitted, source selection begins.  The program office 
typically receives eight to twelve offers from well-known companies in the industry (e.g., 
KBR, IAP, DynCorp, Bechtel, etc.), subsidiaries, or joint ventures.  The proposals and 
their attachments can be hundreds of pages in length, and each requires thorough review.  
Therefore, in order to evaluate the highest rated offers and make award(s) in a timely, 
efficient manner, the program office down-selects the proposals to a manageable 
competitive range.  This action is permitted per FAR 15.3(c), which states, 
Based on the ratings of each proposal against all evaluation criteria, the 
contracting officer shall establish a competitive range comprised of all of 
the most highly rated proposals.  Provided the solicitation notifies offerors 
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that the competitive range can be limited for purposes of efficiency, the 
contracting officer may limit the number of proposals in the competitive 
range to the greatest number that will permit an efficient competition 
among the most highly rated proposals. 
Once the competitive range is established, the program office holds discussions to 
better understand the offerors’ proposals.  Proposal review, competitive range selection 
and discussions can take up to five months to complete, given the large amount of 
information to review and evaluate.  Finally, after the source selection is complete, 
contractor(s) are chosen and award(s) is (are) made.    
CAPs are unique in many ways.  The sheer magnitude of dollars associated with 
the programs draws the attention of the few companies who specialize in contingency life 
support capabilities.  In general, the same contractors (or their subsidiaries) are involved, 
or have been involved, in one or more of the CAPs.  CAP contracts are generally awarded 
for one basic plus several (i.e., between five and nine) option years, which means the 
chance to win a contract only occurs approximately once or twice per decade.  
Furthermore, once a company wins a CAP contract, it is guaranteed work on that ID/IQ 
contract, barring any major errors or problems with performance.  FAR 16.504(a) 1 
states, 
The contract must require the Government to order, and the contractor to 
furnish, at least a stated minimum quantity of supplies or services.  
For LOGCAP, the minimum order for the Serco support contract is $613,677.60 
and for each of the execution contracts, the minimum is for each company to establish a 
core program office  (HQ Army Sustainment Command, 2008).  GCCC has a minimum 
award amount of $100K for each of its contractors (Anderson, 2006).  AFCAP III has a 
minimum award amount of $15K for each of its contractors (Larsen, 2005).  For 
multiple-award programs, TO awards are competed on a “fair opportunity” basis between 
the incumbent contractors.  The contractors are incentivized to perform well on each TO 
award they receive, as past performance serves as a factor for future TO awards.  In some 
situations, the fair opportunity process can be excused.  Per FAR 16.505(b) 2, exceptions 
include:   
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(i) The agency need for the supplies or services is so urgent that providing 
a fair opportunity would result in unacceptable delays. 
(ii) Only one awardee is capable of providing the supplies or services 
required at the level of quality required because the supplies or services 
ordered are unique or highly specialized. 
(iii) The order must be issued on a sole-source basis in the interest of 
economy and efficiency because it is a logical follow-on to an order 
already issued under the contract, provided that all awardees were given a 
fair opportunity to be considered for the original order. 
(iv) It is necessary to place an order to satisfy a minimum guarantee. 
Because the CAP contracts have the potential to be worth hundreds of millions, or 
even billions of dollars, and because the industrial base of companies capable of 
providing CAP capabilities is small, competition is often fierce.  A mistake in the 
acquisition process can cause an unsuccessful offeror (or a group of unsuccessful 
offerors) to file a protest claiming an impropriety.  The Government is obligated to 
investigate all protests and make a determination regarding its merit.  This process can 
take several months, as witnessed in the LOGCAP IV protest that took nearly four 
months to investigate and another six months to correct the deficiencies identified.  After 
ten months of analyzing and redressing, the LOGCAP IV contracts were finally awarded 
in April 2008.   
The manhours required for each of the services’ current CAPs is simple to 
determine.  Informants provided the researchers with approximations of the number of 
employees and number of days required.  Further, informants noted that approximately 
one-fifth of the total number of employees worked the acquisition as their sole duty, and 
the remaining four-fifths worked as an additional duty and/or only during stages of the 
process that required their expertise (e.g., technical representatives were involved in the 
requirements generation and evaluation processes, but not in the development or posting 
of the RFP itself).  Using an average of eight hours per day for one-fifth of the employees 
and two hours per day for the remaining four-fifths in each acquisition, the calculations 
yielded total manhours of 138,240 for the LOGCAP IV, 10,080 for the GCCC, 25,380 for 
the GCSC, and 152,520 for the AFCAP III, as shown in Table 8.  The differences in 
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manhours reflect the breadth of the requirements and the size of the program (the GCCC 
and the GCSC are small programs compared to the LOGCAP or even the AFCAP). The 
total manhours for all programs is 326,220, or the equivalent of 405 full-time equivalent 
(FTE) employees working 8 hours per day on the program for approximately 41 months 
(3.4 years) (assumes 25 days of work per month). These estimates do not include the 
possibility of protest, the number of protests, or any variables other than the time required 
to produce one acquisition plan and perform one source selection.  
Estimated Manhours Required for Individual CAP  










x Number of Days Required = 
Number of 
Manhours 
LOGCAP IV 12  
Full Time x 8 x 720 = 69,120 
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Part Time x 2 x 720 = 69,120 
TOTAL LOGCAP IV = 138,240 
GCCC 3  
Full Time x 8 x 210 = 5,040 
 12  
Part Time x 2 x 210 = 5,040 
TOTAL GCCC = 10,080 
GCSC 6  
Full Time x 8 x 270 = 12,960 
 23  
Part Time x 2 x 270 = 12,420 
TOTAL GCSC = 25,380 
AFCAP III 10 
Full Time x 8 x 930 = 74,400 
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Part Time x 2 x 930 = 78,120 
TOTAL AFCAP III = 152,520 
TOTAL ALL PROGRAMS = 326,220 
Table 8.   Estimated Manhours Required for Individual CAP Acquisition Planning and 
Source Selection  
The normative manhours required for a single JCAP was more difficult to 
determine because no two of the four programs are exactly alike.  Each is unique in its 
size, complexity, breadth of capabilities, and acquisition practices of the owning service.  
Because a JCAP does not currently exist, the estimations used to predict the number of 
                                                 
5 40 FTEs was chosen as an evaluative figure based on the rounded average of total employees in 
Table 8 (156 total employees/4 programs = 39 FTEs).   
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manhours necessary for formulating and acquisition strategy and source selection is 
difficult.  The researchers took a conservative approach by assuming the hours required 
for JCAP would be similar to those of the program with the largest number of manhours.  
In this case, AFCAP III had the largest amount of manhours spent in acquisition planning 
and source selection, and therefore serves as the conservative estimate for a JCAP.  Using 
the same figures as AFCAP III, above, JCAP is estimated to take 152,520 manhours to 
plan and select contractors, as shown in Table 9 below.  This is the equivalent of 40 FTE 
employees working 8 hours per day on the program for approximately 19 months (1.6 
years) (assumes 25 days of work per month).  As is evident, the total manhours saved by 
using JCAP is potentially 173,700 hours for each iteration of the program’s contract.  
This is a savings equivalent of 40 FTE employees working 8 hours per day on the 
program for approximately 22 months (1.8 years) (assumes 25 days of work per month) 
for each iteration.   
The average program office grade is GS-12, which was computed by averaging 
the pay grades of all the program office employees for all three programs (based on 
organization charts provided by informants).  This estimate includes converting military 
positions into equivalent civilian grades.  At base pay of $76,627 per year6, not including 
fringe benefits, the average savings using a JCAP is $5.5M7 per acquisition planning and 
source selection iteration.  The manhours and money freed by forming a JCAP could be 
directed to other service-specific acquisitions, such as major weapons systems or 





                                                 
6 From the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) General Schedule (GS) Salary Calculator 
using Grade of GS-12, Step 5, Locality “Rest of U.S.” 
7 Calculated by multiplying the annual wage * 40 FTEs * 1.8 years.  
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Projected Manhours Required for JCAP  














Full Time x 8 x 930 = 74,400 
 42 
Part Time x 2 x 930 = 78,120 
TOTAL JCAP = 152,520 
TOTAL ALL PROGRAMS (Table 8) = 326,220 
TOTAL MANHOURS SAVED  = 173,700 
Table 9.   Projected Manhours Required for JCAP Acquisition Planning and Source 
Selection  
3. Planning for New Requirements 
Due to the contingent nature of the CAPs, new requirements occur daily.  There is 
a large difference in the way each service processes new requirements.  Each process will 
be described, and a manhour assessment will be performed.  Table 10 provides the results 
of this assessment.  All manhours are best estimations based on information received 
from informants and are averages of both routine requirements (which tend to follow the 
normal course of approvals and take longer) and emergency requirements (which 
generally skip many of the approval levels and are processed more quickly). 









x Number of Days Required = 
Number of 
Manhours 
LOGCAP IV  10 x 8 x 60 = 4,800 
GCCC 15 x 8 x 14 = 1,680 
GCSC 9 x 8 x 30 = 2,160 
AFCAP III 5 x 8 x 29 = 1,160 
Total Manhours 9,800 
Table 10.   Manhours of Planning Required for New Requirements—Individual CAPs  
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The Army is in the process of transferring the single-award LOGCAP III to the 
multiple-award LOGCAP IV.  The LOGCAP IV takes a regional approach to awarding 
TOs.  In other words, the multiple contractors will compete to provide capabilities for 
geographical areas such as “Northern Afghanistan” or “Kuwait.”  The competition results 
in one contractor winning the award to perform capabilities in their designated region.  
This provides the incumbent Commander with better unity of command as a large 
majority of his units’ support requirements will be provided by a single contractor.  
Additionally, it allows the Commander to maintain better positive control over the 
contractor employees in his area of operations (AO).  Once a contractor has been 
awarded the requirements for that region, they are responsible for providing the wide 
range of LOGCAP capabilities in support of the units in the region (i.e., from food 
services to logistical transportation).  LOGCAP TOs have broad SOWs and an operating 
budget that is meant to fund all the SOW requirements for the TO’s duration (generally 
six months to one year).  New requirements necessitate additional funding and may 
require an addition to the SOW.   
For example, requirements that are within the scope of a specific TO and are 
currently “turned on” (i.e., currently being performed), no new SOW is necessary.  For 
example, at FOB Good Times, the contractor has been performing operations and 
maintenance (O&M) services on all the existing buildings and structures.  The task of 
O&M is within the scope of the TO and it is “turned on,” or currently being performed.  
The contractor keeps a list of all the buildings and structures they are responsible for 
operating and maintaining.  Now assume that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recently 
completed a multi-million dollar dining facility for the FOB.  To ensure it does not fall 
into disrepair, the customer requests for the LOGCAP contractor to add this building to 
their list and begin performing O&M services.   
The supported unit works with the local LOGCAP Support Unit (LSU), an 
organization designed to assist users/customers with capturing, organizing, and securing 
funding for LOGCAP requirements.  The LSU consists of a number of LOGCAP Support 
Officers (LSOs), typically Army Reservists, who, like the ACOs, are responsible for the 
requests and requirements of a segmented part of the area of operations (i.e., the LSO and 
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ACO work together to support a certain number of FOBs).  Working in conjunction with 
the ACO, the LSO helps the customer fully define their requirement, produce a SOW, 
and request a Project Planning Estimate (PPE) from the contractor.  The PPE is a 
planning tool where the contractor provides detailed cost and schedule information to the 
Government so they (the Government) can make a decision whether or not to provide the 
funds to add the requirement to the TO.  Once the requirement is submitted, the 
LOGCAP contractor inspects this building for proper construction (and fixes any 
deficiencies prior to accepting it) and ensures they have adequate manpower (i.e., 
sufficient number of plumbers, electricians, HVAC specialists, etc.) to properly maintain 
it.  If the construction is sound and the manpower is available, the contractor adds the 
building to the O&M list and begins performing O&M functions.  This requirement did 
not necessitate a new SOW, because the work associated was already within scope of the 
TO and “turned on.”  It is now part of the contractual TO requirement.   
If the construction is not sound and requires a significant amount of work to make 
it safe and operable (which is oftentimes the case with construction performed by host 
country nationals, or HCNs), then the contractor develops a cost estimate to repair the 
building and the supported unit decides whether or not the building repair is worth 
funding.  Additionally, if sufficient contractor manpower is not available, the contractor 
develops an estimate of how many additional personnel are needed, which is presented to 
the supported unit for the funding decision.  Note that buildings are generally added in 
bulk – it is not simply a one-for-one process (i.e., 20 new buildings requires one 
additional plumber and one electrician for maintenance; rather than each new building 
needing one additional plumber and one electrician). 
The process is more difficult for new requirements that are in the scope of the 
base contract but are not “turned on” for the TO.  These requirements require an addition 
to the TO’s SOW and additional funding.  Again, the supported unit works with the local 
LSU to produce a SOW and request a PPE from the contractor.  When technical experts 
are available, the Government will also build an independent Government estimate (IGE) 
in order to compare cost expectations.  Once the customer and contractor reach an 
agreement concerning requirement expectations and cost, the unit provides funding and 
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the ACO adds the requirement to the TO.  Upon expiration, the TO is re-negotiated 
inclusive of all the continuing “new requirements” that were added throughout the period 
of performance.  In this process, the emerging needs of the customer are added to the TO 
incrementally throughout the year, and a “sweep” of requirements is performed during 
each TO re-negotiation to solidify the inclusion of the “new requirements” as continuing 
requirements. 
The majority of work for new requirements on a LOGCAP TO is performed in 
theater, hand-in-hand with the customer and contractor.  The PCO is involved when 
large, substantive changes will be made or if there are issues that arise in the process of 
capturing and defining the requirement.  The PCO receives every change, regardless of 
size or complexity; however he/she may not know about the change beforehand, unless, 
again, it is substantive or has issues.  Handling the processing of new requirements in 
theater decreases the amount of time necessary to communicate and define the 
requirement (especially considering the differences in work schedules and time zones 
between the PEO and the CAO), and can provide greater flexibility and potentially faster 
response time to the customer.  However, this method places a large amount of trust and 
control in the hands of the CAO.  This can cause problems because CAO representatives 
rotate in and out of theater every six to twelve months, whereas the PEO representatives 
are in place continuously for many years.  First time CAO representatives experience a 
steep learning curve and can potentially make costly mistakes in the performance of their 
duties.  This is a risk that is accepted in this program, and both the PEO and CAO do 
their best to manage and mitigate the risk. 
To add new requirements to the Navy’s GCCC/GCSC programs, much of the 
work is performed at the CONUS PEO.  When the need for a new requirement emerges 
(either CONUS or OCONUS), the NAVFAC contacts the operations department of the 
PEO and they begin to develop a project plan (e.g., establishing a new base in Djibouti).  
The Capital Improvements and Public Works technical experts get involved to develop a 
basic scope of the project.  Once the scope is established, the Contracting Officer 
develops an RFP and presents it to the multiple contractors within the GCCC or the sole 
contractor within the GCSC.  The contractors compete (where applicable), the proposals 
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are reviewed, and a winner receives the awarded TO.  However, in the case of natural 
disasters, the contractor will generally accompany the Contractor Officer to the site and 
the Contracting Officer will issue technical directives to get the contractor to work 
immediately.  Later, the Contracting Officer revises the TO and incorporates all the 
technical directives in order to capture the requirements and work that was performed. 
The GCCC and GCSC are able to perform in this manner because the programs 
are small enough (relative to the LOGCAP) that each requirement can be handled by the 
respective PEO (versus a delegated CAO).  By performing the majority of work in the 
PEO, the GCCC and GCSC are able to take advantage of the experience and continuity of 
their CONUS employees.  This reduces the risk of faulty administration at the contingent 
site (e.g., when administrators continuously rotate in and out of theater approximately 
every six months, as is the case with the LOGCAP, the lack of continuity causes the TO 
to “stall” while the administrator is brought up to speed on the full scope of the TO and 
previous contractual actions.  Due to the generality of the requirements and the latitude 
for interpretation, the TO may be handled in a looser or stricter manner, depending on the 
personality and experience of the administrator.  Or, the administrator may initially make 
contractual mistakes based on his or her unfamiliarity and inexperience with the program 
or contract administration). However, it may also increase the amount of time it takes to 
get the requirement on contract because of potential differences in time zones and 
extended lines of communication.   
The Air Force’s AFCAP TOs have more specific SOWs than those of the 
LOGCAP.  The AFCAP TOs address specific needs of specific units; as such, the 
majority have fixed dollar values and fixed time periods.  They do not encapsulate 
regional needs like the LOGCAP IV TOs.  When a new requirement arises, the user 
works directly with the PEO to develop a SOW.  The SOW is competed among the 
multiple AFCAP III contractors, and the winning contractor is responsible for fulfilling 
the requirement.  Once awarded, changes to AFCAP TOs are handled via equitable 
adjustments; however, the changes are generally fewer and of smaller scale than those 
associated with the LOGCAP TOs. 
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Work is handled fairly equally between the PEO and the CAO for new 
requirements on an AFCAP TO.  The CAO may assist the customer in developing their 
SOW, but the PEO has the responsibility of competing the requirement among the 
multiple contractors and selecting the successful offeror.  Handling the processing of new 
requirements in CONUS has the potential to increase the amount of time necessary to 
communicate and define the requirement (again, given the differences in work schedules 
and time zones between the PEO and the customer), and provides less flexibility and 
potentially slower response time to the customer.  However, this method ensures the PEO 
understands every requirement and preserves program standardization and integrity since 
PEO representatives are in place continuously for many years.  This method is effective 
for the AFCAP because it is small relative to the LOGCAP. 
Whether or not a JCAP would be more cost-effective in the area of adding new 
requirements to a TO is difficult to determine because it would involve either picking one 
of the methods listed above (performing the majority of new requirement work CONUS 
at the PEO or OCONUS at the CAO), or developing a new method.  Regardless of the 
method chosen, the efficiencies gained by combining into a JCAP occur in the area of 
standardization.  Developing a standard process for adding new requirements to a TO 
would simplify the duties of the PEO and CAO, hopefully resulting in better, more 
complete TO administration.   
Standardized training could be accomplished with both the administrators and 
customers prior to deployment to ensure they understand the process.  This would lessen 
the “drinking from the fire hose” effect that occurs upon arrival in theater.  Once a person 
has deployed once as an administrator or user of the JCAP, they will have a general 
understanding of the process.  In the current situation, for instance, if you are an ACO at 
a location that has both LOGCAP and AFCAP TOs, you must learn (and convey to your 
customers) both processes for adding a new requirement to the TO.  This is difficult and 
time consuming for both the administrator and the customer.  Finally, having one process 
would help manage customer expectations regarding how much time it takes to get a new 
requirement added.  As users get familiar with the program, they will know approximate 
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lead times and costs associated with their requirements.  Developing this standardized 
knowledge has the potential to improve administration and understanding of the program. 
4. Organizational Culture 
While the acquisition and source selection process itself is essentially the same for 
each service, the type of requirements can and do differ among the services.  Similarities 
result from regulatory (e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation) and statutory procedures 
(e.g., Competition in Contracting Act) that prescribe the stringent requirements and 
processes each service must follow to award contracts.  Although the general process is 
the same, the requirements input can be very different.  For instance, the Army does not 
require MILCON-level construction in its CAP contract because it has the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE) to perform large-dollar construction.  The Navy’s program 
is not permitted to operate in actively hostile areas, so using the GCCC or the GCSC in 
hotbeds such as Afghanistan or Iraq is not possible.  As evidenced, the requirements vary 
because of the differences in services’ cultures.   
Furthermore, the way new requirements are added to the TO or contract vary 
amongst the services.  It is apparent that the Army prefers to work hand-in-hand with the 
CAO and the contractor on the ground to help develop and add new requirements.  This 
method works; however, studies suggest the Army is not performing their planning as 
efficiently and as effectively as possible (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2004).  Army Regulation 700-137 notes that “MACOMs must evaluate each 
function, define the acceptable degree of risk, and balance its military and contractor 
support mix accordingly. Advanced acquisition planning can reduce the risk by providing 
redundancy and multiplicity of sources of support” (Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, 1985, p. 3) and repeatedly mentions the need to include LOGCAP administrators 
and contractors into the mission planning process.  However, in their 2004 report 
“DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires Strengthened 




because the Army did not include the contractor in its planning, notwithstanding 
guidance to the contrary” (United States Government Accountability Office, 2004, p. 2).   
Furthermore, a 2008 GAO report pointed out the risks associated with allowing 
contractors close access to inherently governmental functions.  It noted, “The closer 
contractor services come to supporting inherently governmental functions, the greater the 
risk of their influencing the government’s control over and accountability for decisions 
that may be based, in part, on contractor work. This may result in decisions that are not in 
the best interest of the government, and may increase vulnerability to waste, fraud, and 
abuse” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008, p. 6).  The risk of a contractor 
performing inherently governmental functions can be reduced by clearly articulating the 
job descriptions of contractor employees and by providing specifically detailed 
requirements for contractor performance.  The Army must be keenly aware of the 
functions they are asking the contractor to perform in the requirements planning process, 
lest they cross the “inherently governmental” line.   
Speed and flexibility are of utmost importance to the Army, and that is why they 
try to include the contractor in the requirements planning process.  Their process is 
similar to Alpha Contracting, which is a framework that expedites the acquisition process 
by establishing a partnering relationship between the Government and the contractor to 
streamline the acquisition process.  Both parties work together to perform necessary steps 
(e.g., SOW development, pricing the work, and preparing the contract) in parallel instead 
of serially.  Parallel performance is achieved without compromising a fair and reasonable 
price or violating the requirements process.  The Army is able to perform in this manner 
because their TOs are regionally designed; therefore, once a TO is awarded to one 
contractor, there is no further competition of requirements for that region until the TO 
expires.  In other words, the contractor providing input in the planning process is the 
contractor who will perform the work.  
The Navy and the Air Force prefer to develop and add new requirements by 
working largely with the PEO and using minimal contractor input.  The emphasis for the 
Navy and Air Force is on continuity, control, competition among short-term 
requirements, and acquisition integrity.  They are able to perform in this manner because 
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their TOs are functionally designed; therefore, each new requirement (or function) 
necessitates a new TO competition and award.   
5. JCAP Efficiencies 
How is planning affected by a JCAP?  The Acquisition Planning and Source 
Selection process would be largely unaffected if a JCAP were implemented.  The rules 
and regulations of the FAR make the process uniform; therefore, planning and sourcing a 
JCAP is not different from planning and sourcing the individual CAPs.  The advantage of 
implementing a JCAP is that the planning and source selection process, which takes 
several months, would be required only once, not four separate times for similar 
requirements.  This has the potential to save 173,700 manhours, or the equivalent of 
$5.5M, per contract iteration.   
Planning for New Requirements would be affected because the services would 
have to agree to how and where new requirements will be handled.  Choosing one of the 
existing methods would require the other services to make cultural changes to adapt to 
the new style.  Or, if a completely new method is developed, all three services must adapt 
to the new style.  To ensure unity of command and to limit the number of contractor-to-
contractor interactions, it would be best to follow LOGCAP’s format of competing and 
awarding regionally-based TOs.  However, to maintain program continuity and integrity, 
it would be best to follow the Navy and Air Force’s method of defining the requirement 
with minimal contractor input.  The contractor could still be involved, of course, however 
they would serve as technical experts providing advice rather than technical experts 
defining the requirements.  The efficiency of a JCAP is that it will save $5.5M per 
contract iteration and will allow the best planning practices of each service to be 
implemented into a single program. 
C. CEA:  CAPABILITIES PROVIDED 
The capabilities provided by a CAP are the most important functions of the 
programs.  CAPs exist solely to fulfill logistical support needs that the military services 
can no longer perform because of limited manpower.  This section will review the gaps in 
the capabilities available for each CAP and the amount of overlap in the capabilities 
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available between the CAPs.  It will define the research question associated with 
capabilities provided and how the CEA will be performed. 
1. Research Question 
The research questions, “What efficiencies are gained by combining the support 
requirements of the individual services into one JCAP?” and “Which areas of duplication 
can a JCAP eliminate?” aim to determine where gaps and overlaps occur between the 
four individual CAPs.  Areas considered gaps by one program might be fulfilled by using 
a different program, or might be better served by one all-encompassing JCAP.  Areas of 
overlap may result in excessive, expensive duplication of effort that could be eliminated 
by using a single JCAP. 
In order to perform a CEA on maintaining four individual programs versus one 
JCAP, this study evaluated the types of capabilities provided under each individual 
program.  The metric for evaluation involves categorizing the capabilities of each 
program under a general title and determining the number of gaps and overlaps that exist.  
This study recognizes that although a service title does not capture the finer details of the 
capabilities, the rudiments are common among the CAPs.  For example, the service of 
food preparation must follow the sanitation standards found in the Technical Bulletin 
titled “Occupational and Environmental Health Food Sanitation,” also known as TB 
MED 530.  This technical bulletin provides the baseline for the handling, labeling, 
preparation, protection against contamination, storage of, and transportation of food. This 
study is not evaluating how the service is performed, but rather noting the overarching 
function of the basic function.  The researchers recognize that potential variance in 
standard operating procedures may exist between military services.  Once the capabilities 
have been categorized, gaps and overlaps in the capabilities provided are easily 
identified.  The implications of the gaps and overlaps are discussed in the following 
sections. 
2. Gaps in Capabilities Available 
Logistical capabilities comprise the support capabilities that collectively enable 
the U.S. to rapidly provide “global sustainment for our military forces.  Logistics services 
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include many disparate activities that are highly scalable capabilities. Included in this 
area are food, water and ice, base camp, and hygiene services” (JP 4-0, p. xiv).  The 
LOGCAP IV contract includes Base Life Support (BLS), Theater Transportation Mission 
(TTM), and Corps Logistics Support Services (CLSS) operations.  The principal effort of 
the AFCAP is to provide deployment capabilities generally aligned with Air Force 
functions associated with limited base operating support, specifically the Civil Engineer 
and Services career fields.  The scope of the GCCC encompasses construction tasks 
including, but not limited to, power plant and power distribution construction, water 
treatment plant construction, water well drilling, airfield construction, pier construction, 
troop billeting facility construction, and bridge and road construction.  The GCSC 
provides BLS functions similar to those of the LOGCAP and the AFCAP.  It is pertinent 
to note that each program “specializes” in certain functions due to the nature of its 
structure and the support requirements of the program.  For instance, the Navy and Air 
Force structured their programs to provide light and heavy engineering and construction 
capabilities to augment the Seabees and the RED HORSE, respectively.  Therefore, the 
GCCC and the AFCAP “specialize” in engineering and construction capabilities.  In the 
same respect, the LOGCAP does not specialize in engineering and construction efforts 
because the Army relies on the USACE to perform those functions.  The following table, 
Table 11, displays the capabilities provided under each program, and highlights the gaps 
in scope that exist between the four programs. The GCCC and GCSC are evaluated 
together in this section because the Navy has control over the use of both in any given 
contingency. 
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Gaps in Capabilities Provided by Program 
CAPABILITY LOGCAP GCCC/GCSC6 AFCAP 
Food Service X X X 
Construction (Light) X X X 
Construction (Heavy) O X X 
Supply Class Operations X O X 
Billeting/Lodging X X X 
MWR X X X 
Operations & 
Maintenance X X X 
Transportation X X X 
Engineering X X X 
Signal Support Services X O X 
Power Generation & 
Distribution X X X 
Fuel Operations X O X 
Utility Plant Operations1 X X X 
Fire Protection2 X O X 
Trades3 X O X 
Laundry Operations X X X 
Individual 
Augmentation4 X X X 
Hazardous Material5 X O X 
Notes: 
1 Utility Plan Operations includes water treatment, sewage, solid waste disposal, etc. 
2 Fire Protection includes both structural and aircraft protection and prevention services 
3 Trades includes carpentry, plumbing, electrical, mechanical (e.g. refrigeration, air conditioning, heat) 
that are performed on a continual basis (vice one-time during construction). 
4 Individual Augmentation is the process of writing a Task Order for additional personnel support 
5. Hazardous Material: receipt and storage only 
6.  Non-hostile areas only—creates capability gaps 
Table 11.   Gaps in Capabilities Provided by Program  
Table 11 shows that seven of the 18 capabilities are “gaps” in one of the 
programs.  One-third of the capabilities depicted are not available to the Navy under the 
GCCC/GCSC programs.  The breadth of capabilities would remain the same under a joint 
program.  The consolidation of all capabilities under one program is a feasible solution 
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and it ensures that no existing capabilities are lost in the transition from individual CAPs 
to a single JCAP.  This study shows that all necessary capabilities are available via two or 
more of the CAPs.  A joint program would include all these capabilities (making all 
functions available to all of the military services) while consolidating capability and 
overhead costs under one program.    
The existing gaps in available capabilities, presents several issues for individual 
programs, particularly in contingency situations.  Several examples exist where an 
individual service’s programs failed to meet the needs of the warfighter or supported 
personnel.  The first example is derived from the Navy’s CONCAP program during 
Hurricane Katrina relief operations.  The CONCAP was effective in responding to a 
preponderance of construction requirements, but lacked the ability to provide essential 
life support capabilities due to a narrow, construction-oriented scope of work.  The 
CONCAP was used to build temporary living shelters for displaced victims of the 
hurricane, but they could not provide the capabilities associated with bed-down (i.e., 
purchasing beds, linens, and other supply items), nor could they provide billeting 
functions to assign people to temporary shelters.  The program provided the functions 
(with good intent) despite being out of scope.  There are, of course, potential legal 
ramifications associated with consistently performing out-of-scope work; therefore, the 
Navy awarded separate construction and support programs (the GCCC and the GCSC) to 
address the capability gaps in the CONCAP contract.  However, many of the capabilities 
the Navy added via the GCSC already existed under the LOGCAP and the AFCAP.  
Despite these changes, gaps remain in both GCCC and GCSC. 
The second example concerns gaps that result from the Army’s internal 
construction arm, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).  The Army does not 
allow the LOGCAP to provide heavy, MILCON-level construction capabilities because 
the functions already exist in the USACE.  The Army has been criticized for justifying 
construction (e.g., dining facilities) as “incidental to services.”  In other words, the 
LOGCAP has been used on several occasions to build a non-permanent dining facilities 
(using O&M funds vice MILCON dollars, as MILCON dollars are not available on the 
LOGCAP) in order to perform food services, an inherently LOGCAP function.  
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Naturally, the contractor tasked with providing functions (such as food service 
operations) prefers to design and build their own dining facility so they have the control 
necessary to ensure the building meets their servicing needs.  The only heavy 
construction alternative for the Army is their low-density, high-demand USACE arm.  In 
fluid environments, such limitations have the potential to hinder operational missions.  A 
JCAP could eliminate this problem by ensuring that heavy construction (as well as all 
other current support capabilities) is available to every service under one program.   
To reduce the difficulties associated with these existing capability gaps, the 
contracting workforce must be knowledgeable about the full range of support functions 
available within each of the four programs.  A knowledgeable, experienced contracting 
professional has the tools to understand the functionality and capabilities available under 
each individual program and the ability to use each program to fulfill requirements.  
However, as the Gansler Report (2007) pointed out, “In spite of the large increases in 
workload, the increased complexity of the contracts, and the increased tempo required, 
there has been a dramatic reduction in the capability of the Army to meet this 
challenge…[T]his combination represents a ‘perfect storm’ in Army contracting.”  Under 
a joint program, a contracting professional has every conceivable contingent capability 
available to them and reduces the difficulties in networking through other services to get 
effective and timely action.  The notion of a joint program is that all capabilities are 
available in a contingent situation and they are selected and implemented as needed.  The 
more resources available to a commander in a contingency environment, the more 
effective he/she will be in fulfilling the operational mission.   
A joint program office will appear different than current program offices, in that 
the organizational size would likely increase within the single joint office (i.e., there will 
likely be more workers in a JCAP PEO than in any one of the current CAP PEOs); 
however, the total number of personnel required to operate the programs would decrease 
as the number of PEOs shrinks from four to one.  Centralizing program operations into 
one office will help the administrators maintain positive control over requirements and 
allow for processes to be standardized.  
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3. Overlaps in Capabilities Available 
Table 12 highlights areas of overlap where the same capabilities are currently 
being performed by two or more programs.   
Overlaps in Capabilities Provided by Program 
CAPABILITY LOGCAP GCCC/GCSC AFCAP 
Food Service X X X 
Construction (Light) X X X 
Construction (Heavy)  X X 
Supply Class Operations X  X 
Billeting/Lodging X X X 
MWR X X X 
Operations & 
Maintenance X X X 
Transportation X X X 
Engineering X X X 
Signal Support Services X  X 
Power Generation & 
Distribution X X X 
Fuel Operations X  X 
Utility Plant Operations1 X X X 
Fire Protection2 X  X 
Trades3 X  X 
Laundry Operations X X X 
Individual 
Augmentation4 X X X 
Hazardous Material5 X  X 
Notes: 
1 Utility Plan Operations includes water treatment, sewage, solid waste disposal, etc. 
2 Fire Protection includes both structural and aircraft protection and prevention services 
3 Trades includes carpentry, plumbing, electrical, mechanical (e.g. refrigeration, air conditioning, heat) 
that are performed on a continual basis (vice one-time during construction). 
4 Individual Augmentation(s) is the process of writing a Task Order for additional personnel support 
5. Hazardous Material: receipt and storage only 
Table 12.   Overlaps in Capabilities Provided by Program  
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Each of the critical capabilities is provided by at least two CAPs.  A full 67 
percent are available under each CAP.  Using a JCAP, there would be one entity 
responsible for providing these capabilities in a contingency environment.  Again, a joint 
program would include all these capabilities (making all functions available to all of the 
military services) while consolidating capability and overhead costs.   
A reduction in duplication of capabilities may provide relief in oversight and 
program administration as standardization increases.  For example, food service 
operations are provided under three programs (i.e., LOGCAP, GCSC, and AFCAP) with 
different contractors using different performance and quality criteria.  From an efficiency 
viewpoint, a joint program would consolidate these efforts under one 
oversight/management entity and provide the path for program standardization and 
customer familiarization.  Additional efficiencies include performing under a single, 
standardized SOW, implementing standardized inspection processes, having one 
performance standard (to control expectations), and standardizing the assignment and 
management of CORs.  The U.S. Merit Protection Board issued a report in 2005 that 
shows that 25 percent of the CORs surveyed were not formally delegated the authority to 
perform their contracting work.  This is a problem that is common to all the services and 
agencies involved in contingency contracting.  The report links proper COR assignment 
and experience to successful contract administration.  The study shows that ensuring 
CORs are assigned, trained, given ample time to execute their COR duties, and rated on 
their performance significantly improves contract quality, timeliness, completeness, and 
cost (U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 2005).    
Where multiple programs are co-located in theater, accountability for contractor 
actions and/or incidental errors creates a perpetual chain reaction of contractors blaming 
each other for support failures.  For example, one informant spoke of a situation in Iraq in 
which the LOGCAP and the AFCAP served separate, yet critical, functions in providing 
hygiene capabilities within the camp.  An AFCAP contractor was responsbile for 
maintaining water tanks and pumps on shower units, whereas a LOGCAP contractor was 
responsible for ensuring that the tanks were filled with water.  If the LOGCAP 
contractors missed a water drop, the pump operated and maintained by the AFCAP 
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contractors would burn out.  Water pumps were continually being damaged, and the 
contractors were quick to blame each other for lack of performance.  These types of 
contractor-contractor interfaces have the potential to costs the Government additional 
money (i.e., to remove, replace, and maintain new tanks and pumps).  Under one 
program, these sort of contractor-contractor interfaces would be minimized and 
performance could be directly linked to one contractor.   
In another example, an informant spoke of a situation in Afghanistan in which an 
AFCAP contractor was used to expand an airfield by several hundred thousand square 
feet.  Construction was performed in the spring and summer due to the inclement weather 
Afghanistan experiences during the winter.  Unfortunately, despite the fact that all 
entities (the AFCAP contractor, the LOGCAP contractor, and the supported units) 
witnessed the construction, coordination between the contractors was not addressed.  
When the airfield expansion was completed in the late fall, the LOGCAP contractor had 
not been approved to purchase the additional runway de-icing material, snow clearing 
equipment (which required Other Procurment—Army, or OPA funds, not the O&M 
funds that is used by the LOGCAP), and additional personnel necessary to maintain the 
expanded area.   Gaps in communication would be minimized using a JCAP, since one 
contractor would be responsible for all aspects of a project—from construction to 
maintenance and support. 
In another example, the same LOGCAP contractor was working under the 
guidance of two different services’ commanders.  At an airfield in Afghanistan, the 
Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (A/DACG)—an Army fuction—was collocated 
with the Aerial Port Squadron (APS)—an Air Force function.  The collocation was 
necessary because the base did not have enough demined territory close to the airfield to 
provide land for both functions.  As such, the LOGCAP contractor was forced to navigate 
their duties between the Army and the Air Force.  Each service performs their functions 
differently; thus, the contractor was constantly put in the situation of wondering which 
commander’s direction to follow.   
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Both units were responsible for cargo arriving and departing the airfield.  In 
several instances, materiel was not placed in the proper grid location (i.e., numbered 
locations in the lay-down yard where materiel is received, annotated as having arrived, 
and either picked up by the receiving units or pushed forward to a different FOB).  
Improper placement caused materiel to be “frustrated” (not properly documented and 
therefore stalled in transit).  Frustration of material can lead to potentially costly 
situations (e.g. forwarding of ammunition for units in combat is delayed, a unit does not 
receive essential safety items, unclaimed items are shipped back to their origin, 
repurchase of “missing” materiel, etc.).  In this particular case, the base experienced 
delays in sending ammunition, inability to account for missing materiel (likely caused by 
lot theft), excess/unclaimed materiel (including F-15 jet aircraft engines valued at 
approximately $3.5M each (GlobalSecurity.org) made useless by the amount of time 
spent exposed to the elements), and hazardous or combustible materiel being accidently 
located in the same location as ammunition.  These issues were the result of one 
contractor essentially reporting to two different commanders.  Having one JCAP would 
provide unity of command between the services, as they both would be following the 
same TO and SOW. 
Ideally, a joint program would support the strategic sourcing goal set forth by 
Shay Assad, the Director of the Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy (DPAP) and 
Strategic Sourcing.  “Strategic sourcing is a proven best practice and represents how the 
DoD will acquire goods and services moving forward.  It is the collaborative and 
structured process of analyzing an organization’s spend and using the information to 
make business decisions about acquiring commodities and services more effectively and 
efficiently” (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 2009).   
For example, the supply lines running in and out of the major theaters of 
operation can be streamlined to reduce transportation costs.  In terms of air and naval 
cargo assets, the reduction from multiple, smaller lines to a major, large line increases the 
efficiency and effectivness of supporting forces within theater.  Reduction of lines is not 
possible under the current four-CAP construct because each of the programs is competing 
for space in the supply lines.  They not only compete with each other, but with smaller, 
 66
individual contractors.  By combining into a single JCAP, the program would be able to 
coordinate the moves of the most important supplies, thus ensuring critical items arrive 
faster.  Additionally, at the command level, the commanders and command staff could 
have visibility into the supplies their regional contractor is ordering and where those 
supplies are in the logistical chain.   
Another example of supporting the strategic sourcing goal lies in achieving 
economies of scale.  Certain supply items are used at all locations.  These items, such as 
lumber, copper wire, fiber optic cable, air conditioning units, generators, and material 
handling equipment (MHE) could be purchased in bulk and at volume discounts.  Some 
items could be bulk-ordered by region (i.e., the contractor responsible for Northern 
Afghanistan orders enough fiber optic cable to fulfill the needs of his region), and others 
could be bulk-ordered for the entire program (i.e., the program determines specific brands 
or models of air conditioning units, generators, or MHE that the contractors will use and 
places a bulk order for all regions).  Additional advantages of gaining economies of scale 
is the standardization of supplies.  Standardization is especially important when ordering 
consumable parts for maintenance and repair and for personnel training purposes (e.g., a 
generator technician trains to repair three to five types of generators vice thirty or more).  
A 2006 study by Rudzki et al. found that strategically sourcing indirect materials and 
services can produce savings of approximately 10 to 20 percent (Rudzki et al., 2006).  In 
a program the size of a JCAP, saving 10 to 20 percent on indirect materials and services 
is a significant accomplishment. 
4. Organizational Culture 
The biggest cultural consideration involved with consolidating into a joint 
program involves confronting the loss of control each service will experience when they 
no longer are the sole owner of “their” program.  Currently, the services are empowered 
to control their own, service-specific CAP.  With a joint program, the services lose some 
control over decision-making and responsiveness to their individual needs.  Under a joint 
program, the responsibility of decision-making falls on a multi-service contracting entity 
that is also responsible for prioritizing all requirements.   
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A requirements board known as the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) 
currently exists in theater.  At the JARB, new requirements are presented, defended by 
the requirement owner, and voted on by the board.  The board consists of theater-level 
decision makers such as the J4, J7, and J8.  If a requirement passes the board, it is 
prioritized for contractor action (by the same individuals) to ensure mission-critical needs 
are met before lesser requirements.  The JARB is supposed to have jurisdiction over all 
contracting requirements in theater as well as jurisdiction over how those requirements 
will be fulfilled (e.g., by using the LOGCAP, the AFCAP, the JCC-I/A, etc.).   However, 
the reality is that many requirements escape the JARB’s purview because they are 
coordinated with outside entities (i.e., the unit or customer contacts a familiar contracting 
entity in CONUS to fulfill their requirement).   
For instance, if the Army has Base Operating Support Service (BOSS) 
responsibilities for a certain FOB, the Air Force must request support through the JARB.  
If the JARB denies the request, or if the Air Force determines the request will wait too 
long in queue before execution, they can essentially coordinate directly with the AFCAP 
PEO to fulfill the requirement.  This ability to directly coordinate undermines the process 
efficiency intended by the JARB.  It also results in a lack of control over contracting 
actions being performed in a Commander’s AO.  While the JARB process is not perfect, 
and users sometimes feel it adds a level of bureaucracy that stifles the intended efficiency 
of the CAPs, it is necessary to ensure program accountability (i.e., that the users make 
decisions regarding requirements and funding, not the ACO or program administrators), 
and to maintain control and responsibility for the contracting actions occurring in a 
Commander’s AO, regardless of whether the requirement is sourced to the LOGCAP, the 
GCCC/GCSC, or the AFCAP. 
A final aspect of organizational culture to consider is that of service equity.  
Currently there is only an informal system to establish urgency and time standards for 
requirement completion.  For instance, each program may have time-sensitive 
categorizations to label requirements as “mission critical,” “urgent,” or “routine;” 
however one standard does not exist for requirements vetted through the JARB.  Rather, 
when a requirement becomes “mission critical” it is placed at the top of the list and all 
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other requirements are moved lower on the priority list.  If the requirements garnered 
from all supported units (regardless of service) were prioritized and labeled appropriately 
by the JARB members, contract administrators and the contractor could focus their 
resources on actions deemed most critical.   
5. JCAP Efficiencies 
What efficiencies are gained by combining the support requirements of the 
individual services into one JCAP?  Which areas of duplication will be eliminated by 
using a JCAP?  By implementing a JCAP, 100 percent of the gaps in current programs 
could be filled and 100 percent of the overlaps among the programs could be eliminated.  
Using a JCAP to fill the scope gaps allows each of the services access to the same 
support functions.  This ensures that the military services can meet any contingency 
mission—from light and heavy construction to the full range of capabilities—without 
delay.  Overlaps in support capabilities can be eliminated by combining similar functions 
under one program, thus reducing duplicative efforts (e.g., multiple source selections) 
among the four CAPs.  The final efficiency gained by a JCAP in the area of capabilities 
provided is the establishment of one performance standard for every service.  One 
standard not only provides the contractor with clear guidance, it also allows the program 
administrators to objectively rate the contractor’s performance and to manage the 
demands of the supported units. 
D. CEA:  FINANCIAL PROCESSES 
Financial processes are essential to the smooth operation of any program, CAPs 
included.  This section will analyze two of the more complex areas of financing CAPs:  
(1) funding from sister services and (2) funding from coalition partners.  It will define the 
research question associated with financial processes and how the CEA will be 
performed. 
1. Research Question 
The research question, “How are financial processes affected by a JCAP?” aims 
to determine what financial processes, if any, would be affected by combining the 
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individual CAPs into a single JCAP.  The analysis of funding from sister services 
examines the average number of Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs) 
that were required each month for each CAP.  The analysis of funding from coalition 
partners will explore the level of ease or difficulty involved in funding, accounting for, 
and receiving payment from various coalition partners for each of the CAPs.  The level of 
difficulty is measured on a scale of one to five, with one being minimal level of effort, 
three being a moderate level of effort, and five being maximum level of effort.  In both 
cases, the data were obtained and extrapolated from interviews.  
2. Funding from Sister Services 
The MIPR is the DoD’s method of transferring funding between the Army, Navy 
and Air Force.  If one military service requires capabilities offered by a different military 
service, the first military service may use a MIPR to provide their own funding for 
capabilities acquired on the second military service’s contract.  For instance, imagine a 
contingency location where the predominant service is the Army.  The Army contracts 
for base support functions at this location.  Now imagine a small contingent of Air Force 
personnel arrives to perform limited air operations.  Seeing no need to duplicate efforts, 
the Air Force uses the Army’s dining facility, laundry services, and fuel.  To pay for their 
portion of use, the Air Force and Army agree to a price for the capabilities used and the 
Air Force transfers “Air Force funds” to the Army for “reimbursement.”   
The transfer is performed via a DD 448, or a MIPR.  MIPRs can only be executed 
between DoD services (Army, Navy, and Air Force).  MIPRs cannot be executed 
between the DoD and DoS, or any other civilian agency.  That is not to say that funds 
cannot be moved from DoS to DoD for use on one of the CAP contracts—indeed, they 
can.  However, the process cannot be performed via a MIPR.  The process occurs in a 
very limited number of cases; therefore, it was not considered in the scope of this study.   
Table 13 provides the average number of MIPRs processed each year for each 
program.  The number represents the average MIPRs based on information received and 
extrapolated from interviews.  It might seem as though the AFCAP has an exorbitant 
amount of transactions compared to the other programs; however their high number is a 
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bit misleading.  The AFCAP averages more MIPRs than the other programs, but each 
individual unit pays for their own TO and therefore must transfer funds to begin or 
modify a TO.  The Accounting Classification Reference Numbers (ACRNs), or funding 
lines, are different for each Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) in theater.  Therefore, every 
time an AEW has a requirement that necessitates a new TO, a MIPR must be 
accomplished.  Additionally, because the AFCAP TOs are written for specific, detailed 
requirements, any significant changes generally require additional funding, and therefore, 
a new MIPR.  Furthermore, requirements can be open-ended or cost-based, in which case 
the unit must transfer funds each time the costs are definitized.   
The GCCC and the GCSC follow the same guidelines as the AFCAP; however, 
their number of MIPRs is smaller because they have had less program activity in recent 
years.  The LOGCAP, on the other hand, provides one funding stream for their programs 
via the supported unit.  So, if the 82d Airborne Division owns the requirements for all of 
Afghanistan, then the funding comes from their ACRN.  New requirements simply “pull 
from the pot” of existing money, rather than requiring a new MIPR.  MIPRs for the 
LOGCAP and the GCCC and the GCSC generally come from outside use of the program 
(e.g., when the USAF chooses to use LOGCAP capabilities, they transfer funds to the 
contract via MIPR for pre-payment or reimbursement of support functions). 






17 10 225 
TOTAL MIPRs/Year 252 
Table 13.   Average MIPRs Per Year Per Program  
Combining the services’ requirements into one JCAP would likely reduce the 
number of MIPRs required because up-front funding provided from each of the services 
would cover the majority of expenses incurred each month.  If coordinated and tracked 
correctly, each service would only be required to process one MIPR/month for 
unanticipated requirements, for a total of 36 MIPRs/year.   
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Reducing the number of MIPRs, however, may not be the true efficiency source 
in the financial processes of a JCAP.  The real efficiency may lie in the intangible area of 
financial processes—the amount of negotiation and trust required to make each service 
perceive they are getting a good deal.  Using the example above, when the Air Force 
reimburses the Army each month for the capabilities they used, they want to know that 
they actually used what they are paying for.  In some cases (especially large dollar 
projects), disputes occur when one service does not agree with the price estimated by the 
other service’s contractor.  Essential work can, and does, stall until the parties can come 
to an agreement on price.  Situations like this provoke mistrust among the services and 
can sour inter-service relationships.  Having one JCAP gives each service more visibility 
into the “average” costs of projects and levels support expectations.  Visibility and 
leveling would likely reduce inter-service funding disputes, thus saving time, effort and 
trust. 
3. Funding from Coalition Partners 
Coalition partners, in the majority of cases, are also required to reimburse the 
supporting service for their CAP usage.  The process starts when an Acquisition and 
Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) is signed between the U.S. and the coalition partner.  
“[ACSAs] are bilateral international agreements that allow for the provision of 
cooperative logistics…[and] are intended to provide an alternative acquisition option for 
logistics support for exercises or exigencies” (Department of Defense, 2007, p. 11.2.3).  
Once signed, a standing agreement exists that allows the coalition partner use of the CAP 
in their region, provided CAP capacity is available for support.   
Requests for new or additional support are processed in the same manner as 
requests from U.S. services; the only difference is the funding from coalition partners 
generally takes more time to arrive.  The amount to be transferred depends on the amount 
of capabilities received or work performed by the CAP for the coalition partner.  The 
supporting service and the coalition partner come to an agreement on the level of usage 
and the cost of capabilities to establish the transfer amount.  Transfers can be periodic 
and recurring, as in the case of daily service usage (e.g., dining facilities, laundry, fuel, 
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etc.), or they can be one-time payments, as in the case of unique projects (e.g., building 
renovation, national holiday celebration, etc.).  Table 14 presents the level of ease or 
difficulty of processing funding from coalition partners as reported by informants. 
Coalition Partner Funding Level of Effort 
 
Informant* 1 – Minimal  
Level of Effort 
3 – Moderate  
Level of Effort 
5 – Maximum  
Level of Effort 
A X   
B  X  
C  X  
D  X  
E   X 
F X   
TOTAL 2 3 1 
*NOTE: GCCC does not perform functions for coalition partners; therefore, there were no Navy 
informant responses. 
Table 14.   Coalition Partner Funding Level of Effort  
The majority of informants agree that the level of effort required to handle 
coalition funding is minimal to moderate.  Combining the individual CAPs into a single 
JCAP is unlikely to change this perception, since all the services are currently following 
the same procedures.  However, efficiencies likely exist in learning the process to accept 
transferred funds from coalition partners.  With a JCAP, there is only one program office, 
and therefore only one set of financial administrators who need to know the processes 
associated with coalition partner funding.  Additionally, like the MIPR process, a JCAP 
would permit funding from coalition partners who are located in several regions (e.g., the 
British Army, Navy and Air Force in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf) to be 
summed into one transfer.  A JCAP could provide a better view of how often the 
coalition partners use the program and what they owe for reimbursement across all 
theaters of operation. 
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4. Organizational Culture 
Financial processes are similar for each of the services.  Regulations regarding 
MIPRs and ACSAs apply to all services within the DoD; therefore, there are no 
outstanding differences.  There are no peculiar organizational culture considerations in 
the area of financial processes.   
5. JCAP Efficiencies 
How are financial processes affected by a JCAP?  The number of financial 
transactions from sister services and coalition partners would be reduced.  Each service or 
coalition member could provide a funding commensurate to their expected program use 
up-front; or, for more accurate reimbursement, the sister service or coalition partner could 
wait until the costs are definitized and provide periodic funding based on actual costs.  By 
using a JCAP, costs could be totaled for each individual entity across all theaters of 
operation, thus reducing the amount of transactions and the possibility for errors.   
Additionally, having one program office under a JCAP allows the funding process 
to be streamlined and funneled to a small number of financial administrators who are 
intimately familiar with the processes of both sister services and coalition partners.  A 
final important financial benefit to using a JCAP is the ability to standardize labor rates.  
Rates would only have to be negotiated and checked for cost realism one time (vice four 
separate times) per iteration (i.e., annual or semi-annual updating).  This would allow for 
better administration, as ACOs and customers would have just one set of rates to use 
during proposal review. 
E. CEA: COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Command and control of CAPs involves the coordination of both the PEO and 
CAO.  This section will analyze two complex areas of command and control:  (1) 
CONUS program administration and (2) OCONUS contract administration and oversight.  
It will define the research question and how the CEA will be performed. 
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1. Research Question 
The research question, “How are CONUS program administration and OCONUS 
contract administration and oversight affected by a JCAP?” aims to discover where areas 
of duplication exist and if the administration and oversight of the program and contracts 
could be improved by combining them into a single JCAP.  CONUS program 
administration will analyze the number of FTEs required to maintain each program to see 
if there is excessive duplication.  OCONUS contract administration and oversight will 
also analyze if personnel duplication exists and if the task of managing four different 
programs affects the quality of oversight. 
2. CONUS Program Administration 
CONUS program administration encompasses all the activities of the PEO, 
including acquisition plan creation, contract award(s), TO awards, contract and TO 
administration, processing payments, award fee board preparation (when applicable), and 
TO and contract close-out.  Because the majority of the day-to-day field administration is 
performed OCONUS, the program office also provides continuity while a series of 
ACOs, QARs, PAs, and supported units rotate in and out of theater. 
Each program office is structured to support its individual program.  The focus of 
our analysis is not to question whether or not the program office is staffed properly for 
the amount of work to be done; rather it is to determine whether duplication of efforts 
exists, and if it does, to what extent.  Table 15 shows the number of personnel each 
program office has for each job specialty. 
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LOGCAP 2 7 1 0 2 12 
GCSC 2 8 0 2 2 14 
AFCAP 3 6 0 0 2 11 
TOTAL 7 21 1 2 6 37 
* No data from GCCC. 
Table 15.   Program Office Staffing by Specialty  
A quick glance at the numbers shows that duplication of effort indeed exists 
between the programs, most notably in the Program Manager and Contract Manager 
specialties.  Establishing a JCAP will not eliminate all duplication of personnel; however, 
it could consolidate the most knowledgeable and most experienced personnel from each 
specialty.  This would enhance overall program administration while reducing the cost 
associated with maintaining four different program administration staffs.   
Table 16 shows the estimated amount of personnel from each specialty area 
needed to administer a program like JCAP.  Conservative estimates were made on the 
basis that the program would be slightly larger than the LOGCAP office.  This estimate 
assumes the number of theater requirements would remain the same overall; however, 
instead of meeting those requirements in a task-by-task, piecemeal fashion by four 
separate programs, requirements would be consolidated under large, geographically 
administered TOs (i.e., similar to the way the LOGCAP IV currently divides its TOs).  
Therefore, there will be fewer, larger TOs.   
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JCAP 3 8 2 2 3 18 
Table 16.   Joint Program Office Staffing by Specialty  
The estimate is based off the current division of geographic locations:  (1) 
Northern Afghanistan, (2) Southern Afghanistan, (3) Northern Iraq, (4) Southern Iraq, (5) 
“Middle East” (i.e., Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates), (6) “Horn of 
Africa” (i.e., Djibouti with the possibility of expanded operations in Africa as AFRICOM 
operations grow), (7) the Philippines, and (8) Eastern Europe (i.e., Georgia and Bosnia).  
For each geographic region, there would be one PCO assigned.  Three PMs would 
manage the overarching regions:  Middle East (to include Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, 
and the United Arab Emirates), Southwest/Southeast Asia (to include Afghanistan and 
the Philippines), and Europe/Africa (to include Djibouti, future AFRICOM support, and 
the relatively small amount of support work being performed in Georgia and Bosnia).  
The remaining program office members (i.e., Property Administrators, Technical 
Support, and Administrative Support personnel) would be used to provide technical 
insights and management support to the joint program.  Using geographically 
administered TOs allows for maximum standardization of TOs since every region will 
require many of the same support capabilities (e.g., food services, laundry services, water 
purification services, fuel services, O&M services, etc.).  Standardization leads to easier, 
more streamlined TO administration, which, in turn, leads to the need for fewer 
administrators.   
Furthermore, it is easier to roll the requirements currently supported by the 
GCCC, the GCSC, and the AFCAP into the LOGCAP geographic format since the 
former are much smaller in scope (compared to the scope of the LOGCAP TOs) and are 
already located in the LOGCAP support areas.  Implementing a JCAP would essentially 
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involve rolling the current GCCC, GCSC, and AFCAP requirements into the respective 
LOGCAP TOs in the geographic areas that are currently in use (by the LOGCAP).  
Consideration is given to the fact that CAPs are exhausting programs to be 
involved with due to the contingency nature and importance of each requirement.  
Personnel involved with CAPs are essentially “available” 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  
This operational tempo takes a toll on all parties involved; therefore, ensuring depth of 
personnel in each position is essential to the health of both the employees and the 
program.   
By combining the CAPs into one JCAP, it is possible to eliminate 19 duplicative 
FTEs.  The average salary of program employees was determined by averaging the grade 
for all employees listed in Table 15.  The average employee on the CAPs is a GS-12.  
Given an average base salary of $76,627 per year (not including fringe benefits), that’s a 
$1.45M savings per year, or $14.5M over the life of one ten year JCAP. 
A more accurate way to estimate the number of personnel needed to properly 
administer (i.e., from requirements gathering, to TO award, through TO administration, 
and finally to TO closeout) a JCAP is to examine the historical data for all CAP TOs in a 
region to determine the number of manhours of PEO and CAO administration that each 
JCAP TO requires.  As each individual CAP TO expires and is “folded into” the JCAP, 
the losing (i.e., service-specific CAP) PEO would work with the gaining (i.e., the JCAP) 
PEO, to examine the total requirements for the region, and use historical data (i.e., the 
capabilities provided by each TO, the number of TO modifications performed, the 
number of troops supported, etc.), to estimate the number of manhours that the new JCAP 
TO will require.  Those manhours would then be used to staff both the PEO and the 
CAO.   
Naturally, for this method to work, a JCAP PEO would have to be established and 
in the early stages of operation concurrent to the operation of the four existing service-
specific PEOs.  In other words, there will essentially be five CAP PEOs (i.e., LOGCAP, 
GCCC, GCSC, AFCAP, and JCAP) for a period of time.  Those five PEOs will slowly be 
whittled down to one (i.e., the JCAP PEO) as each service-specific TO expires and is 
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folded into the JCAP regional TO.  Once a PEO’s TOs have all been folded into the 
JCAP, the PEO can officially disband.  The expectation is that some of the personnel 
currently operating the service-specific CAPs will transfer to the new JCAP PEO.  This 
method is preferred because it allows the JCAP PEO to retain the large amount of 
invaluable “corporate knowledge” and experience that current CAP personnel possess.  
Therefore, a case would have to be made to support the stand-up and staffing of a new 
JCAP PEO.  The case should include the expectation that adjustments will be made as the 
program expands and contracts to meet future contingency needs. 
For example, if a new JCAP TO was going to replace the one LOGCAP and four 
AFCAP TOs in Northern Iraq, the JCAP PM and PCO would work with the LOGCAP 
and AFCAP PMs and PCOs to establish a timeline for rolling the existing requirements 
into a JCAP TO.  Ideally, the roll-up would coincide as closely as possible to the 
expiration dates of the LOGCAP and AFCAP TOs.  Requirements will likely have to be 
phased-in as TOs expire (i.e., the new JCAP TO could be written to include the total sum 
of requirements, and requirements can be “turned on” as the existing LOGCAP and 
AFCAP TOs expire).  Once the timeline is established, the PMs and PCOs work together 
to gather recent and relevant historical data about the requirements (i.e., how many new 
requirements were added, and how long the requirements process takes, how many 
modifications occurred and how long it took to process each modification, the number of 
work orders processed and how long it takes to process and administer each request, how 
many quality audits were performed and how long each audit took to perform, etc.), and 
use that data to estimate the number of manhours required to administer a JCAP TO for 
Northern Iraq.  Once the manhours are established, the JCAP office can staff the TO 
administration appropriately and make staffing recommendations to the CAO.   
The offices performing this assessment must be sure to rely on more than just 
historical data.  They must also use common sense to determine which LOGCAP and 
AFCAP TO requirements represent duplicative efforts between the two programs and 
eliminate the duplication.  They should take into account anticipated future 
requirements—customer input is essential to this process.  Finally, they must realize that 
the process of matching requirements to staffing should occur continuously throughout 
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the life of the JCAP.  Contingencies programs are constantly expanding and contracting 
to meet the needs of the warfighter, and staffing should expand and contract concurrently.  
This process is not perfectly accurate; however it will provide a more thorough 
assessment of the required staffing of a JCAP PEO and CAO.   
Perhaps more important than potential cost savings are the efficiencies that could 
be gained by having one program office for one JCAP.  The program office would serve 
as the hub for all JCAP training, requirements, questions, and issues.  Once the process 
was established, program office personnel could work with deploying CAO personnel 
and deploying unit commanders to ensure they understand how to properly administer 
JCAP contracts overseas.  New requirements and questions could be vetted easier 
because the CAO and customers would have one program office to work with for all 
requirements.  The learning curve would be steep, especially for first-time JCAP 
administers deploying to a contingency environment; but once a person works with and 
understands the program in that environment, they will not have to start the learning 
process over for their next deployment.  After familiarization, having a single JCAP will 
reduce the steepness of the learning curve and will likely lead to better, more thorough 
administration of the program and its contracts. 
3. OCONUS Contract Administration and Oversight 
OCONUS contract administration and oversight encompasses all the activities of 
the CAO, including TO administration and compliance, quality inspections, property 
administration, new requirements planning, material requisition approvals, compiling and 
presenting award fee information (where applicable), and serving as the link between the 
contractor and the customer.  CAO personnel, including CAO Commanders, ACOs, 
QARs and PAs, frequently rotate in and out of their positions in theater.  The average 
tour length is six months; however, some positions (mainly Commanders) average a tour 




The Gansler report noted that CAOs are undermanned, given the requirements of 
their programs.  Informants routinely expressed they lacked the time necessary to meet all 
customer and oversight requirements.  All agreed that they focused on the major 
requirements and attended to minor requirements if time allowed.  Additionally, many 
CAO personnel were responsible for Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) outside the one 
where they were physically located.  These FOBs received the least amount of personal 
attention simply due to the physical separation and associated travel difficulties.  Figures 
1, 2, and 3 present geographic displays of the distribution of LOGCAP and AFCAP 
personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Similar images were not available for the GCCC and 
GCSC.  Table 17 presents the number of CAO personnel, contractors, and supported 
personnel (including military, contractors, and DoD civilians) and the number of FOBs in 
Afghanistan and Iraq supported by program.  No data is available for GCCC and GCSC 
because they do not operate in Afghanistan or Iraq. 
 
 
Figure 1.   DISTRIBUTION OF LOGCAP SITES IN AFGHANISTAN (From Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA), 2008)  
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Figure 2.   DISTRIBUTION OF LOGCAP SITES IN IRAQ  (From Defense Contract 




Figure 3.   DISTRIBUTION OF AFCAP SITES IN SWA  (From Air Force Contract 
Augmentation Program (AFCAP), 2008) 
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LOGCAP 198 54,433 350,000 122 1/275 1/1,768 
AFCAP 71 1,767 100,000 16 1/25 1/1,409 
Table 17.   CAO Support Statistics for Afghanistan and Iraq  
The large difference between the LOGCAP and the AFCAP in CAO/Contractor 
Ratio column is a result of the difference in reporting and the difference in the 
capabilities provided by the programs.  For instance, the LOGCAP’s total for CAO 
Personnel includes only DCMA personnel.  It does not include approximately 1,000 
CORs/COTRs assigned to individual FOBs across both theaters.  Conversely, the 
AFCAP’s total includes their QAE/COR/COTR personnel.  Furthermore, the type and 
magnitude of capabilities provided by the LOGCAP (BLS, TTM, CLSS) requires a large, 
permanent population of contractors.  The AFCAP, on the other hand, often writes TOs 
for smaller, more specialized requirements that call for less, more temporary contractors.  
Including the CORs/COTRs to the LOGCAP numerator provides a better comparison of 
ratios for the CAO/Contractor Ratio, as shown in Table 18. 

























LOGCAP 1,198 54,433 350,000 122 1/46 1/293 
AFCAP 71 1,767 100,000 16 1/25 1/1,409 
Table 18.   Normative CAO Support Statistics for Afghanistan and Iraq  
A JCAP would likely take on the attributes associated with the LOGCAP: a large, 
permanent population of contractors to provide day-to-day support capabilities.  The 
nature of the capabilities necessary to keep a FOB operational simply demands a large 
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contractor population.  However, proper program training prior to deployment for both 
CAO and unit personnel (as previously mentioned) could increase the efficiency and 
quality of the program’s administration.    
The number of CAO personnel available to deploy is limited.  Currently, the 
DCMA serves as the CAO for the LOGCAP and the AFCAP, the two largest programs, 
and most military personnel in the DCMA do multiple tours while with the agency.  The 
DCMA recruits its civilians to augment the military in OCONUS oversight; but there is 
still a shortage of personnel available for deployment.  Augmentation by the individual 
services (i.e., personnel who do not belong to the DCMA) is possible and has been used 
in the past; however, given that the DoD has a “shortage of qualified oversight and 
contract administration personnel”  (GAO, 2008, p. 8), it is difficult to get the services to 
agree to provide contracting assets to administer and oversee the CAPs.  The Navy uses 
both military and civilian personnel to manage their GCCC and GCSC.  Military 
personnel are Active Duty Navy members who belong to NAVFAC or the Navy in 
general.  Because of the small size and few locations of their TOs, the Navy does not 
generally have trouble filling their CAO positions. 
Seven cases of personnel duplication exist in the administration of the LOGCAP 
and the AFCAP overseas.  Duplication is defined as having both LOGCAP and AFCAP 
administration duties at the same site with different administrators.  DCMA has allocated 
one position to serve as the administration and oversight for all the AFCAP locations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  This is possible because the TOs issued under the AFCAP are very 
specific and can be monitored effectively by Air Force QAEs/CORs on the site.  The 
designated ACO travels regularly to all the various AFCAP sites to oversee operations 
and get feedback from the QAEs/CORs.  The feedback is consolidated every month and 
sent back to the PEO for contractor evaluation purposes.  As mentioned, at seven of these 
locations, DCMA personnel already exist to administer the LOGCAP.  Whether or not 
the LOGCAP administrator can handle the extra duty of also administering AFCAP TOs 
depends on the requirements of each program at that site.  Based on information received 
from informants, in six of the seven places, both LOGCAP and AFCAP duties could be 
handled by one administrator.  Since the Navy operates its contracts at only non-hostile 
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locations outside the areas where either the LOGCAP or the AFCAP primarily operate, 
there is no duplication between the LOGCAP and the GCCC/GCSC or between the 
AFCAP and the GCCC/GCSC. 
There is a significant amount of overlap in the basic office functions performed 
between all four CAPs.  All programs require PMs, PCOs, ACOs, QARs, PAs, and other 
technical representatives, and each of them is focused on the rules, regulations and 
policies of their individual program.  Thus, if a person is required to deploy to different 
programs, he/she must take the time and shoulder the burden of learning the specificities 
of each program.   
Two examples might highlight the differences associated with each of the 
programs.  First, as previously detailed, LOGCAP requirements are handled on-site, are 
heavy with contractor input, and must be vetted through the JARB and other approval 
boards (e.g., the LOGCAP Working Group (LWG)) before being added to the existing 
TO by the ACO in theater.  New requirements are not competed because TOs are 
regionally designated, not task designated.  AFCAP requirements, on the other hand, are 
handled mainly at the PEO, have minimal contractor input, and may proceed without 
JARB approval (depending on whether or not the requirement is vetted properly by the 
user/customer).  Once vetted through the PEO, the program office competes the 
requirement, and issues a new TO and the notice to proceed.  Each process is unique and 
requires the personnel involved to understand the process and know the right people to 
ensure the process flows smoothly.   
A second example highlights the differences in performance feedback.  For the 
LOGCAP, metrics are established for each service on the regional TO.  Monthly 
Performance Evaluation Boards (PEBs) are performed in a manner similar to an actual 
Award Fee Evaluation Board (AFEB) to provide feedback to the contractor.  While the 
PEBs do not technically determine award fee earned, they do contribute to the semi-
annual AFEB input.  The feedback process involved with such large cost-type TOs is 
rigid and requires in-depth knowledge of the SOW and accurate assessment of the 
contractor’s performance.  AFCAP, on the other hand, issues many more FFP-type TOs 
that require much less burdensome (i.e., requires less formal procedures than a CPAF 
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Award Fee Board) contractor evaluation and feedback.  Feedback is provided, of course, 
but the rating scales and metrics are very different from those of the LOGCAP.  Again, 
all personnel involved in the feedback for either program must be very familiar with their 
SOW and the contractor’s performance.  This can be quite a daunting task in a 
contingency environment where the pace of operations is rapid and change is constant, to 
say nothing of the complexity of the TOs or the sheer page-length of the SOWs.  
Potential efficiencies exist in the training of personnel by combining all the CAPs 
into a single JCAP.  Given the current operations tempo, the average contracting officer 
can expect to deploy for at least two six-month deployments in a three-year assignment.  
This is true for all DCMA and AF deployers (Anonymous, 2009; Schwartz, 2009).  Army 
contracting officers generally perform at least one 12-month deployment during each 
three-year assignment; however, some experience two 12-month deployments because of 
the high operations tempo.  Although the Army and AF are attempting to bolster their 
contracting force numbers, it takes several years to adequately educate and train 
personnel in this career field.  Therefore, the operations tempo for contracting officers is 
expected to remain high for the foreseeable future.  
Multiple deployments would serve to make administrative and oversight 
personnel more adept and familiar with the joint program, flattening the learning curve 
and decreasing the amount of time it takes to acclimate to the program and to the stress 
associated with the number of “unknowns” that exist in administering a multi-million 
dollar TO in a contingency environment.  Efficiency is needed in this environment to 
counter the issues addressed by the Gansler Report and various recent GAO reports 
(United States Government Accountability Office, 1997; United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2008; United States Government Accountability Office, 2004; 
United States Government Accountability Office, 2008) regarding contingency 
contracting, such as the need for consistent, standardized, planned use of CAPs; 
strengthened oversight and administration; and better inter-agency coordination.   
Furthermore, by becoming a joint program, JCAP would be able to pool the 
contract administration personnel of all four services (Marine Corps included) to support 
the program in contingency environments.  Efficiencies could be gained by having a 
 86
larger pool of people.  For instance, contingency positions could be filled according to a 
person’s skill level, with smaller, less problematic FOBs receiving newer, less 
experienced or less knowledgeable contract administrators; while large, problematic FOB 
positions could be filled with more experienced, more knowledgeable contract 
administrators.  This would ensure a more efficient use of DoD’s limited contract 
administration personnel. 
4. Organizational Culture 
Naturally, each service would prefer to retain individual CAPs, because they 
allow each of them to exercise complete command and control over “their” contractors 
and the functions they perform for “their” service.  Furthermore, the PEOs are part of 
“their” service’s organizational chart, meaning that the people who work in those offices 
have a proclivity for pleasing “their” service—“their” customers.  If the programs were to 
combine into a JCAP, determining whose procurement and administration “models” to 
follow would be a very difficult endeavor since each service is accustomed to their own 
way of doing things.   
Furthermore, standards of individual functions to be performed, regulations, 
policies, and instructions would have to be agreed upon by each service.  Finally, the 
most difficult part of combining CAPs would likely be addressing personnel 
requirements.  The number of PEO personnel required to operate and maintain continuity 
of one program is smaller than the combined total of all four CAP PEOs.  This implicates 
that some experienced PEO personnel might have to move to a new location (wherever 
the new JCAP PEO is established) if they choose to remain involved with the CAP, and 
other PEO personnel might find themselves removed from the CAP staff altogether.  For 
OCONUS contract administration and oversight, each service must be willing to throw its 
available contracting personnel into the pool of potential administrators.  These are 
cultural issues that would require a significant amount of thought and compromise to 
satisfy each service. 
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5. JCAP Efficiencies 
How is CONUS program administration and OCONUS contract administration 
and oversight affected by a JCAP?  CONUS program administration for a JCAP would 
consist of one joint PEO vice the four PEOs that currently exist.  There would also be 
fewer basic ID/IQ contracts to negotiate, award, manage, and close out.  Currently there 
are 13 basic contracts (three LOGCAP, three GCCC, one GCSC, and six AFCAP).  A 
JCAP would require significantly fewer basic contracts.  The total number would depend 
on how many contractors the JCAP PEO is willing to award contracts to; however, the 
total is likely to be between three and six contractors.  The result is a decrease of five to 
eight basic ID/IQs to negotiate, award, manage, and close out.  Consolidating the effort 
would mean that 19 fewer positions are necessary, resulting in a savings of $1.45M per 
year.  Those in the program office would necessarily be highly capable and experienced.  
They would be responsible for the continuity of the program, and for training the 
continuous stream of CAO personnel and units that will use their program. 
OCONUS program administration for a JCAP would require all CAO personnel 
to fall underneath one expeditionary unit.  The unit commander would assign available 
personnel to positions commensurate to their abilities.  Each service would provide 
properly trained administration personnel, reducing the strain on heavily-utilized Air 
Force and Army personnel.  CAO personnel would initially experience a steep learning 
curve (like they would experience the first time they join any large program); however, 
that curve would become flatter each time they were deployed in conjunction with the 
program.   
F. CEA: EASE OF USE 
Ease of use is an important element for all CAPs, to both administrators and 
users/customers.  Military operations require flexible, accommodating logistical tails. 
This section will analyze two areas of ease of use:  (1) the ability to understand each CAP 
and its uses and (2) cross-service utilization of CAPs.  It will define the research question 
and how the CEA will be performed. 
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1. Research Question 
The research questions, “How is ease of use affected by using a JCAP vice 
individual programs?” and “Will one program serve the needs of the combatant 
commanders better or worse than individual service-specific programs?” seek to 
determine if any efficiencies in customer education and program administration could be 
gained by standardizing the individual CAPs into a single JCAP.  The goal is to 
determine how difficult or easy it is to understand each CAP (i.e., the capabilities 
provided, how new requirements are added, etc.) and whether or not it would be 
administratively (CONUS and OCONUS administration and oversight) easier and 
promote better understanding amongst CAP users to have one JCAP.  To perform the 
CEA, the learning curve theory was used to examine potential time savings that may 
occur by consolidating the CAPs into one program.  Furthermore, this study examined 
how easy or difficult cross-service CAP utilization is and whether consolidating would 
better serve the needs of the combatant commanders. 
2. Ability to Understand the Program and its Uses 
For any first-time user of a CAP, the learning curve is steep.  Each program is 
complex and has unique methods for requesting support, adding new requirements, and 
evaluating the contractor.  T.P. Wright first introduced the concept of learning curve to 
the aircraft industry in 1936. Wright theorized that learning curves occurs “primarily 
because the time required to perform a repetitive task will decrease each time the task is 
repeated” (Defense Acquisition University, 2006).  Generally, the repetition of the same 
tasks or operations results in less time or effort expended on that operation.  Item 
complexity and workforce stability are aspects that can hinder learning curves, and thus, 
effectiveness in the long run. As mentioned, CAPs are complex and contain a mix of 
stable workforce positions and unstable workforce positions (generally stable at the PEO 
and unstable at the CAO); therefore, the learning curve is steep and only flattens as one 
gains more experience with each program.  As the administrative workforce makes gains 
along the curve, less energy and time are required to understand and execute the program.  
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Currently, because the four CAPs are individual programs, the learning curve is unique 
for each new program the administrator joins.  
McMillon (2000) found that the training time allotted for a new administrative 
deployer to learn the details of a program can range from twelve to eighteen days, and 
that the training regiments differ per service.  Furthermore, the amount of personal 
training and education an administrator has plays a role in how well they will perform 
once in theater.  If the individual has an extensive background in their field (i.e., 
contracting, quality, property management, etc.), it will likely be easier for that individual 
to understand the program’s nuances and be able to communicate them to the customer.  
However, if an individual has little background experience, he or she will face an 
extremely steep learning curve, which may hinder the mission or operations of the FOB 
he or she is assigned to until the proper amount of knowledge is developed.   
In regards to the ability to understand the program, the benefit of combining all 
four CAPs into one JCAP lies in standardization.  One program means there is only one 
set of policies, regulations, and manners in which the CAP is executed.  This flattens the 
administrator’s learning curve.  In terms of contract monitoring, a joint program enhances 
a contracting officer’s and contracting officer respresentative’s ability to monitor the 
contractor’s performance because the SOW would not vary as widely across TOs.  One 
SOW is far easier to monitor and evaluate than multiple SOWs under multiple programs.    
One program means there is only one way to request new support functions—add 
new capabilities, and evaluate the contractor.  This decreases the customer’s learning 
curve.  Finally, one program means that administrators and customers can attend one set 
of training in order to have a similar understanding of the program when they deploy.  
Possessing a good foundation of program knowledge prior to deploying is essential when 
supporting contingency operations where time is of the essence.  This type of 
standardization would serve to manage the expectations of the customers, and it would 
also ease the burden on heavily-laden administrators, perhaps reducing the amount of 
administrative errors.  
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3. Cross-Service Utilization of CAPs 
For an administrator or customer, understanding your own service’s CAP is 
difficult enough; however, in some contingency situations, administrators and customers 
must learn another service’s CAP because they are the prevailing service-provider at their 
FOB.  This section examines the level of difficulty cross-service utilization of CAPs 
presents.  Responses from informants suggest there is little incentive to learn or 
understand another service’s CAP until you are forced into a situation where your 
service’s CAP is unavailable or is not the predominant service-provider.  When this 
happens, the administrator and customer must learn the intricacies of another program.  
One Army officer noted, “In the deployment time crunch, I was more concerned with 
getting up to speed on [the] LOGCAP.  I figured if I learned [the] LOGCAP, [the] 
AFCAP would be similar.  [That turned out to be] true for the support services, but not in 
how to request services and who to contact.”  Another Army officer said, “I didn’t know 
[the] AFCAP even existed until I was put in charge of administering it.”8  Furthermore, 
the majority of informants did not know that the Navy had logistics support programs 
similar to the LOGCAP and the AFCAP.  Naturally, informants expected other programs 
to function similar to their own.  Frustration quickly arose when they learned how 
different the programs were and how their “urgent” requirement was going to take more 
time than anticipated.   
Basic differences mentioned by the informants involved: getting a new 
requirement approved (i.e., the steps for submitting a new requirement, the level(s) of 
approval necessary, and the level of customer involvement in creating the SOW); the 
scope of capabilities available (i.e., how broad or specific a TO could be, and the type of 
capabilities available or unavailable to the customer); and monitoring and evaluating 
contractor performance (i.e., the level of customer involvement and commitment in the 
feedback process, the expectation of the customer to provide CORs, and whether the 
customer gets a voice in the feedback process at all).  Table 19 demonstrates the 
differences between the four programs. 
                                                 
8 NOTE:  Informant was referring to his first Operation IRAQI FREEDOM deployment in 2005. 
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Program Process Differences 




Requirement submitted to 
JARB and LWG 
 
Approval provided by CJ4, 
CJ7, CJ8, CAO 
Commander 
 
Customer plays small role 
in SOW creation 
(performed mostly by the 
LSO) 
Requirement submitted to 
ACO and PCO 
 
Approval provided by PCO 
 
 
Customer plays a large role 
in SOW creation 
 
Requirement submitted 
to ACO and PCO 
 




Customer plays a large 




TOs are broad in nature and 
most new requirements are 
considered in scope 
TOs are somewhat broad in 
nature and some new 
requirements are considered 
in scope 
TOs are narrow in 
nature and some new 
requirements are 
considered in scope 








feedback to high-level 
commanders or to the ACO 
 
Customer expected to 
provide CORs for major 
service support areas (i.e., 
water production, food 
operations, etc.) 
 
Customer feedback is 
highly valued and used to 
provide contractor feedback 
and evaluation 
Customers provide 
feedback to high-level 
commanders or to the ACO 
or CORs 
 
Customers must provide 




Customer feedback is 
highly valued and used to 
provide contractor feedback 
and evaluation 
Customers provide 
feedback to high-level 
commanders or to the 
ACO or QAEs 
 
Customers must provide 




Customer feedback is 
highly valued and used 
to provide contractor 
feedback and evaluation 
Table 19.   Program Process Differences  
The standardization that would occur by using one JCAP would, again, serve to 
manage customer expectations and decrease the learning curve of a new administrator or 
customer.  Efficiencies would be gained in planning (i.e., understanding the approval 
system and anticipating the amount of planning necessary to use a JCAP), time (i.e., the 
amount of time required to add a new requirement from paper to execution), and 




and providing timely and accurate feedback).  Improvements in CAP efficiency while 
maintaining or improving effectiveness will undoubtedly lead to increased customer 
satisfaction. 
4. Organizational Culture 
Consolidation of the existing CAPs will lessen the cultural differences among the 
services in the areas of policy, regulations, processes and expectations because all of the 
services will be performing within one set of guidance.   Combining into a single JCAP 
requires the services to agree on one set of policies, regulations, and processes.  This may 
be more difficult than expected. For instance, the Army prefers to write large, broad, 
regional TOs and add new requirements incrementally.  The Navy and Air Force prefer to 
write specific, task-oriented TOs with few anticipated changes.  Which style would the 
services agree upon for a JCAP?  Furthermore, the Army prefers to gain several levels of 
approval before adding new requirements to a TO, whereas the Air Force approval 
structure is relatively flat.  Which style would the services agree upon for a JCAP?  These 
cultural differences will need to be addressed with the mindset that ease of use is a 
common goal. 
5. JCAP Efficiencies 
How is ease of use affected by using a JCAP vice individual programs?  Will one 
program serve the needs of the combatant commanders better or worse than individual 
service-specific programs?  Ease of use will be improved under a JCAP because of 
standardization.  Instituting one program will allow administrators and customers to 
follow one set of guidelines and procedures.  By doing so, all entities will be able to 
understand the support capabilities available, the process for adding new requirements, 
the levels of approval that are necessary, the timeline associated with their particular 
requirement, and what their role will be in the administration and evaluation of their 
requirement.  Standardization helps in the strategic and operational planning processes 
because commanders know what they can expect from their supporting contractors and 
how to include those expectations (and the contractors themselves) into campaign plans.   
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Because this standard will remain the same from FOB to FOB, from theater to 
theater, and from CONUS to OCONUS, combatant commanders and their subordinate 
commands will find the program easier to understand with each use.  Best practices can 
be easily transferred to all locations where the program is used, thus increasing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the JCAP while maintaining or improving performance 
standards.  Finally, administration will improve as administrators become more familiar 
with the JCAP, ensuring tax dollars are spent as efficiently as possible. 
G. SUMMARY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
This chapter addressed the cost effectiveness of each of the five research areas.  
For planning, the study shows that by performing acquisition planning and source 
selection for one JCAP vice four individual programs, there is potential to save 173,700 
manhours, or the equivalent of $5.5M per program iteration.  By having one JCAP, 
commanders are better able to plan for and use the program during major conflicts or 
humanitarian assistance operations.  Standardization of processes would help new 
requirements make it to contract faster, as all the people involved would understand the 
process and approval system.   
With a JCAP, the breadth of capabilities available would encompass all of the 
functions that exist in the current programs.  Duplication of effort would diminish, while 
gaps that currently exist in the individual programs would be fulfilled by the all-
encompassing JCAP.  In this manner, all military services have the full range of support 
functions available to them.  In the area of financial processes, one JCAP would serve to 
streamline the funding process while capitalizing on (or creating new) financial expertise 
that currently exists in the programs.    It would also serve to provide an accurate baseline 
of costs that all services could use to create their support function budgets.  In the area of 
command and control, one JCAP would reduce the number of PEO personnel needed, as 
four program offices could be combined into one.  This would diminish the amount of 
personnel duplication that exists between the four program offices by 19 FTEs, resulting 
in a savings of $1.45M per year and providing better unity of command.  Additionally, all 
services could provide personnel to administer the JCAP, thereby increasing the number 
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of people available and allowing CAO commanders to fit an individual administrator’s 
experience to jobs and locations commensurate with their abilities.  Finally, perhaps most 
important to the customers of large logistics support programs, ease of use would 
improve under a JCAP because the best practices of each of the programs could be used 
to develop standards and processes of the JCAP.  Standardization of processes would 
make the program easier to understand for all parties, easier to use for customers, and 
easier to administer for PEO and CAO personnel.  Table 20 provides a summary of the 
Cost Effectiveness Analysis. 
Summary of Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) 
 Individual CAPs JCAP Potential  Efficiency 
Acquisition Planning and 
Source Selection Process 
is required four times per 
contract iteration 
Acquisition Planning and 
Source Selection Process 
would only be required 
once per contract iteration 
Fewer time-consuming 
Acquisition Planning and 
Source Selection 
Processes (potentially as 
few as one/decade when 
using a basic plus 9 option 
years contract) 
Manhours required for 
Acquisition Planning and 
Source Selection for four 
separate programs: 
326,220 Hours 
Manhours required for 
Acquisition Planning and 
Source Selection for one 
program: 
152,520 Hours 
173,700 hours or $5.5M 
saved per contract 
iteration 
1.  Planning 
Planning for New 
Requirements is done 
individually with each 
program office 
Planning for New 
Requirements is done 
collectively at the sole 
joint program office 
(would require service 
agreement on how and 
where new requirements 
will be handled) 
Joint determination and 
handling of new 
requirements 
7 of 18 capabilities are 
considered “gaps” in one 
of the programs 
0 capability gaps All capabilities available 
to all services 
Each of the critical 
capabilities are provided 
(or are “overlaps”) by at 
least two programs 
0 capability overlaps 
(because there’s only one, 
joint program) 
Reduced duplication of 
capabilities 
2.  Capabilities 
Provided 
Performance standards for 
quality and timeliness 
vary among all programs 
Performance standards for 
quality and timeliness are 
standardized  






Summary of Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) 
Total MIPRs/Year:  252 Total estimated 
MIPRs/Year:  36 
Reduction of 216 MIPRs 
per year 
3.  Financial 
Processes 
Labor Rates must be 
negotiated and checked 
for cost realism separately 
on each program 
Labor Rates cold be 
negotiated and checked 
for cost realism one time 
One set of rates assists 
administrators during 
proposal reviews 
Four separate PEOs with 
a total of 37 personnel 
One PEO with a total of 
18 personnel 
19 fewer personnel 
necessary, or the 
equivalent of $1.45M 
savings per year 
4.  Command and 
Control 
OCONUS program 
administration falls under 
four separate program 
offices, training varies 
among the programs, 
learning curve is steep 
when switching programs 
OCONUS program 
administration falls under 
one program office/one 
expeditionary unit, 
training could be 
standardized, learning 
curve flattens with each 
administration 
assignment, personnel 
could be matched to 
positions based on 
individual skills and 
capabilities 
Potentially more thorough 
administration, flattened 
learning curve, bigger 
pool of candidates from 
which to draw 
administrators, one face to 
the supported Commander 
Disparate guidelines and 
procedures/processes for 
each program 
One set of standardized 
guidelines and 
procedures/processes for 
the joint program 
Standardization helps the 
strategic and operational 
planning process by 
showing Commanders 
what they can expect from 
their supporting 
contract/contractors, 
increases potential for 
proper administration and 
oversight 
5.  Ease of Use 
No mechanism for 
implementing the best 
practices among the four 
programs 
Best practices from each 
of the four programs 
would be implemented in 
the creation of a JCAP  
Increased effectiveness 
and efficiency 
Table 20.   Summary of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)  
The next chapter will provide conclusions about the cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) performed in this chapter and recommend whether or not a JCAP is feasible and 




in the course of the study.  Finally, it will provide courses of action available and make 
recommendations for the future of military logistics support programs and for future 
studies related to this topic. 
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V. FINDINGS, BEST PRACTICES, COURSES OF ACTION, 
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section will use the information presented and analyzed in Chapter IV to 
generate a list of findings from the Cost-Effectiveness Analyses (CEA) and a list of best 
practices from all of the programs.  Further, three courses of action—Do Nothing, Create 
an Executive Lead Board, and Create a JCAP—will be presented for high-level decision-
making review.  Finally, the researchers will provide recommendations and list areas for 
further research. 
B. FINDINGS 
As discussed in the last chapter, there are potential efficiencies in each category 
represented in the Cost-Effectiveness Analyses (CEA).  These findings serve as the 
platform for constructing and presenting the best practices of each CAP and the three 
potential courses of action regarding a JCAP.  As a refresher, the potential efficiencies 
associated with implementing one joint program are described below and summarized in 
Table 21. 
In the area of Planning, a JCAP could potentially reduce the number of time-
consuming Acquisition Planning and Source Selection processes needed to let a new 
contract to as few as one per decade (when using a one basic plus nine option years 
contract).  This reduction could save 173,700 manhours, or approximately $5.5M per 
contract iteration.  Furthermore, a joint program would allow for coordinated, joint 
determination of requirements, thus ensuring all services’ needs are met in one 
program/one contract. 
In the area of Capabilities Provided, a JCAP allows all services to access the full 
range of capabilities available.  It also eliminates duplicative capabilities that currently 
exist between the four individual CAPs.  Additionally, standardization of the capabilities 
allows for more through, more efficient administration, oversight, and performance 
measurement. 
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In the area of Financial Processes, a joint program could potentially reduce the 
number of MIPRs needed per year by 216—from 252 to 36 per year.  More importantly, 
a JCAP would have one set of Labor Rates for use during proposal reviews.  One set of 
Labor Rates reduces the administrative burden on Contracting Officers and also 
decreases the potential for administrative mistakes. 
In the area of Command and Control, a JCAP could potentially reduce the number 
of PEO personnel needed to administer the program by combining the four individual 
PEOs into one, joint PEO.  The basic geographic- or regional-based approach used in this 
study suggests the potential savings will be 19 fewer FTEs, or a savings of $1.45M per 
year, or $14.5M over the life of one ten-year contract.  As mentioned, a more thorough 
workload assessment is needed to determine adequate staffing levels and accurate 
potential savings (i.e., savings based on actual workload numbers vice the geographic- or 
regional-based assessment used in this study).  A JCAP could also potentially lead to 
more thorough administration due to the standardization of practices and a flattened 
learning curve (as administrators become more familiar with the program and/or 
repeatedly administer the program). With the ability to draw administrators from all 
services (vice single-service administrative support), CAO Commanders have a larger 
pool of candidates from which to select and assign administrators.  This allows CAO 
commanders to match administrators to FOBs and duties commensurate with their 
abilities and experience level.  Perhaps most important to the Users/Customers, a joint 
program would serve as “one face” to the supported Commander.  He/she will no longer 
have to interact with two or three different CAPs within their AO—instead they will 
interact with one JCAP.  “One face” is critical to providing timely, uncomplicated 
support capabilities in contingency environments.   
Finally, in the area of Ease of Use, the standardization of program capabilities 
assists the strategic and operational planning process because one JCAP would help 
supported Commanders know what they can expect from their supporting 
contract/contractors.  As Commanders use the program, they will understand the 
processes associated with the program and the lead times required to start new services 
and acquire support.  Having accurate lead times and knowing what to expect allows the 
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supported Commanders to make better strategic and operational planning decisions.  
Additionally, a JCAP could combine the best practices and lessons learned from the 
current CAPs to create a better joint program.   
Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) Findings 
 Potential JCAP Efficiency 
Fewer time-consuming Acquisition Planning and Source Selection Processes 
(potentially as few as one/decade when using one basic plus 9 option years contract) 
173,700 manhours or $5.5M saved per contract iteration by combining requirements 
into one, joint Acquisition Planning and Source Selection Process 
1.  Planning 
Joint determination and letting of requirements 
All capabilities available to all services 
Zero duplication of capabilities 
2.  Capabilities 
Provided 
Standardization allows for more thorough and efficient administration, oversight, 
and performance measurement 
Reduction of 216 MIPRs per year 3.  Financial 
Processes One set of Labor Rates used during proposal reviews (reduces administrative burden 
and potential for administrative mistakes) 
19 fewer PEO personnel needed by combining four PEOs into one, or the equivalent 
of $1.45M savings per year, $14.5M over the life of one ten-year contract 
4.  Command and 
Control 
Potentially more thorough administration due to standardization, flattened learning 
curve, bigger pool of candidates from which to draw administrators (selecting 
administrators from all services, vice single-service administrative support), one face 
to the supported Commander 
Standardization helps the strategic and operational planning process because 
Commanders know what they can expect from their supporting contract/contractors 
5.  Ease of Use 
Increased effectiveness and efficiency through the combined implementation of best 
practices 
Table 21.   Cost-Effectiveness Analyses (CEA) Findings  
C. BEST PRACTICES 
In the course of this study, several practices from each of the programs stood out 
as “best practices.”  Many of the informants who are familiar with more than one 
program pointed out the best practices of each program—and followed with the trailing 
question, “I don’t know why our program doesn’t do it like that…?”  The “best practices” 
listed below are the result of consolidating the expert opinions of several informants.  
Only areas mentioned by two or more informants as “best” are presented in Table 22.   
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Program Best Practices 





• Encourages competition 
• Competition often lowers price while 
preserving quality 
• Develops base of contractors who are able to 
support the mission 
• Contractors who demonstrate poor 
performance do not receive new TO awards—
motivates quality performance 
LIMITATION:  Must be able to produce enough 
work to attract and maintain multiple contractors. 
LOGCAP Customer Training 
Process 
• Ensures supported customer understands the 
program and the specificities of the TOs in 
their AO prior to deployment 
AFCAP 
GCCC / GCSC 
Requirements Definition 
Process 
• Performed as an inherently Governmental 
function without excessive contractor 
participation 
• Ensures minimal conflict of interest / avoids 
situation where the contractor writes their own 
requirements 
LIMITATION:  Must have the workforce and the 
technical “know-how” to develop a SOW with 
proper performance parameters.  Admittedly, it 
can be a slower process; however requirements 
definition is an inherently Governmental function. 
LOGCAP Performance Evaluation 
Process 
• Provides monthly feedback to the contractor 
in the same manner and using the same 
performance measurements as the semi-annual 
AFEB 
• Process is standardized across all theaters 
Allows for maximum customer (supported 
unit) participation 
• Ensures there are no surprises at the AFEB 
LIMITATION:  Requires active customer 
participation and a clear set of defined 
performance parameters.  Also requires a fairly 
long TO period of performance (approximately 6-
12 months or more). 
Table 22.   Program Best Practices  
D. COURSES OF ACTION 
The three courses of action—Do Nothing, Create an Executive Lead Board, and 
Create a JCAP—were developed by the researchers in response to the thoughts and 
recommendations of informants.  This list is inclusive of all the reasonable possibilities.  
Unreasonable alternatives such as “Disband the CAPs” were not considered because they 
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are simply not possible given the current all-volunteer structure of the U.S. military and 
the nature of the regions in which the military currently operates (i.e., immature areas in 
terms of the availability of Host Nation support and support resources).  Details 
concerning each of the reasonable possibilities are provided in the following sections. 
1. COA 1: Do Nothing—Leave Programs as They Are  
The easiest course of action is to do nothing.  Simply leaving the programs as they 
are requires no change in processes, procedures, policies, or organizations, and causes no 
“ruffling” of the services’ “feathers.”  The advantage to this alternative is that it is viable 
and easy—the programs currently function as required.  The main disadvantage of 
leaving the programs as they are is that the DoD will not be able to capitalize on the 
many efficiencies and best practices that exist among the programs.  In other words, each 
of the programs could benefit from something from another program—from better 
processes to a wider range of support capabilities.  For instance, the LOGCAP could 
improve its requirements definition process by following the more standardized processes 
of the AFCAP or the GCCC/GCSC.  Similarly, the AFCAP and the GCCC/GCSC could 
benefit from examining and implementing many of the performance evaluation processes 
that the LOGCAP uses.  Furthermore, capability gaps that exist in one program can be 
filled by using another—provided that the customer knows how to request support from 
another service’s CAP.  For example, heavy construction that is not allowable under the 
LOGCAP could be provided using AFCAP resources.  By doing nothing, the logistical 
tail will remain splintered four ways and no contract administration processes will be 
streamlined or standardized. 
Although doing nothing is easy, it is not necessarily cost effective.  Why, in an 
increasingly joint environment, do we maintain four separate program offices that 
provide essentially the same support functions?  Why do we put the time, effort, and tax 
dollars into four acquisition plans and source selections for each of the four program 
iterations when they are providing the same support functions and we know the potential 
savings involved in completing just one acquisition plan and source selection process is 
$5.5M?  Why do we maintain four separate program offices when we know that 
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combining the offices could potentially save $1.45M in manpower costs per year, a total 
of $14.5M over the life of one ten-year contract?  These are questions that this course of 
action fails to address.  Table 23 provides potential efficiencies and/or efficiencies 
foregone if this course of action is used. 
COA 1:  Do Nothing—Leave the Programs as They Are 
Current Efficiencies / Efficiencies Foregone 
 Current Efficiencies Efficiencies Foregone 
Each service is able to plan for their 
service-specific requirements without 
the extra effort associated with 
including other services’ 
requirements/needs in the process.  
This efficiency benefits the individual 
service, but not the public interest (i.e., 
it is easier for the people doing the 
planning, but not necessarily more cost-
effective or efficient for the taxpayer). 
Fewer time-consuming Acquisition 
Planning and Source Selection Processes 
(potentially as few as one/decade when 
using one basic plus 9 option years 
contract under a JCAP). 
Foregoing a potential Acquisition 
Planning and Source Selection time 
reduction of 173,700 hours, or $5.5M per 
contract iteration. 
1.  Planning 
Does not require inter-service 
agreements on how (i.e., via JARB, via 
detailed SOW, via Work Order, etc.) or 
where (i.e., CONUS at the PEO or 
OCONUS at the CAO) new 
requirements will be handled. 
Joint determination of requirements as 
planning for new requirements is done 
collectively at the sole joint program 
office (would require service agreement 
on how and where new requirements will 
be handled). 
Having more than one source available 
to fulfill a requirement (i.e., taking 
advantage of program capability 
overlaps). 
Having all capabilities available to all 
services, zero capability gaps. 
Reduced duplication of capabilities, zero 
capability overlaps. 
2.  Capabilities 
Provided 
Only need to develop/maintain 
individual service performance 
standards for quality and timeliness – 
no need to take into consideration other 
services’ standards. 
More thorough and efficient 
administration, oversight, and 
performance measurement as 
performance standards for quality and 
timeliness are standardized. 
3.  Financial 
Processes 
Ability to negotiate and maintain Labor 
Rates deemed realistic and appropriate 
for and individual service (i.e., no need 
to come to Labor Rate agreements with 
the other services). 
Reduction of 216 MIPRs per year. 
One set of standardized Labor Rates used 
for proposal reviews. 
4.  Command and 
Control 
No need to change/modify current PEO 
structures to accommodate a joint 
program. 
Able to maintain current program 
training processes. 
One PEO with a total of 18 personnel; 
reduction of 19 PEO personnel, or the 
equivalent of $1.45M savings per year. 
Potentially more thorough administration 
due to standardized training processes, 
flattened learning curve, bigger pool of 
candidates from which to draw/match 
administrators, one face to the supported 
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COA 1:  Do Nothing—Leave the Programs as They Are 
Current Efficiencies / Efficiencies Foregone 
Commander 
5.  Ease of Use No need to change current guidelines 
and procedures/processes for an 
individual program.   
One set of standardized guidelines and 
procedures/processes for the joint 
program.  Standardization helps the 
strategic and operational planning process 
by showing Commanders what they can 
expect from their supporting 
contract/contractors. 
To increase effectiveness and efficiency, 
the best practices from each of the four 
programs could be implemented in the 
creation of a JCAP. 
Table 23.   COA 1:  Current Efficiencies / Efficiencies Foregone  
2. COA 2:  Create a CAP Executive Lead Board (CELB) 
The second course of action is to create an executive lead board that serves to 
make the existing, independent CAPs act in a joint manner.  For instance, an executive 
lead board would consist of leaders who are familiar with each of the CAPs—the 
capabilities they provide, how to request support, how to perform feedback, etc.  When a 
new requirement arises, the supported command contacts the board (e.g., for a 
geographical area such as Northern Afghanistan, or Southern Afghanistan, or Kuwait, 
etc.), the board assesses what capabilities will be needed (e.g., basic support capabilities 
and no construction, or basic support capabilities and heavy construction, etc.) and then 
selects the best CAP or combination of CAPs to perform the mission.  For instance, if any 
area required basic support capabilities for 25,000 troops as well as required many heavy 
construction projects, the board might recommend the LOGCAP for support and the 
AFCAP for construction.  The requirements would be gathered and the necessary 
documentation (i.e., SOWs, performance criteria, etc.) presented to the LOGCAP and the 
AFCAP PMs for solicitation and bids from their multiple contractors.  The estimate and 
bidding processes would proceed and the contractors would perform operations for the 
supported command.  This process would be repeated for each new requirement.   
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Figure 4 provides a suggested organizational chart to show the reporting structure 
for new requirements.  New requirements would flow from the supported units to the 
JARB in their geographic location.  The CAP Executive Lead Board (CELB), which 
would serve as the interface between the programs and the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)), would be a member of the 
weekly or bi-weekly JARB via teleconference (which is the current method of JARB 
coordination between geographically dispersed units).  The CELB would listen to the 
requirements and, with input from the CAP representatives in the region (i.e., the CAO 
Commander, the geographic contractor, etc.), and, if necessary, outside the area (i.e., the 
CAP PEO), determine which CAP is the most appropriate for each requirement.  Once 
the decision is made, the customer works with the appropriate PEO and CAO to add their 
requirement to the selected CAP.   
The CELB is also responsible for gathering and providing feedback regarding the 
programs to the USD (AT&L).  Feedback includes everything from basic data calls for 
monthly expenditures and force support functions, to more encompassing matters such as 
assessing contractor performance and assessing administrative and oversight 
performance.  For instance, the board will be required to assess the staffing of each 
program for proper oversight and administration.  If additional administrative forces are 
needed, the CELB will work with USD (AT&L) to ensure proper staffing levels are met.  
The CELB will provide the programs and military services the necessary clout to ensure 
they receive adequate attention and support. 
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Figure 4.   CAP EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP BOARD (CELB) SUGGESTED 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART  
The advantage of this arrangement is that the services begin to work with and 
understand each other’s CAP (i.e., increasing joint logistical operations), processes are 
standardized throughout all theaters of operation, and data is reported in a standard 
fashion making report compilation and data requests easier to fulfill (e.g., requests from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense or Congress).  Commanders are more aware and 
have better control over the contractors in the AO, financial processes can be streamlined, 
and requirement definitions and performance feedback can be standardized.  As the 
customers use the programs and as the administrators administer them, they will become 
more familiar and easier to use.  This course of action could serve as a stepping-stone to a 
full JCAP.   
The disadvantage of this arrangement is that no duplicative costs—in maintaining 
separate program office personnel and in the overlap of capabilities provided—are 
eliminated.  Each CAP will continue to operate its own PEO and rely on its own set of 
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CAO representatives.  Additionally, no duplicative capabilities are eliminated in this 
alternative, and thus, the CAP logistical tail will continue to operate separately rather 
than in a streamlined, efficient approach.  In other words, all the CAP contractors will 
still be vying for use of common transportation assets with no common prioritization 
mechanism.  This is a large disadvantage when the contingency theater cannot support 
multiple logistical requests.  This is currently the case in Afghanistan, where the lack of 
transportation infrastructure makes the logistical tail particularly difficult to manage.  
Finally, this process will likely drive the need for more MIPRs as the services exchange 
money for support.  More MIPRs is not a show-stopper (since most informants agreed 
they are fairly easy to execute), but it is an additional consideration for this alternative.  
Table 24 provides potential efficiencies and/or efficiencies foregone if this course of 
action is used. 
COA 2:  Create a CAP Executive Lead Board (CELB) 
Current Efficiencies / Efficiencies Foregone 
 Current Efficiencies Efficiencies Foregone 
Each service is able to plan for their 
service-specific requirements without 
the extra effort associated with 
including other services’ 
requirements/needs in the process.  
This efficiency benefits the individual 
service, but not the public interest (i.e., 
it is easier for the people doing the 
planning, but not necessarily more cost-
effective or efficient for the taxpayer). 
Fewer time-consuming Acquisition 
Planning and Source Selection Processes 
(potentially as few as one/decade when 
using one basic plus 9 option years 
contract using a JCAP). 
Foregoing a potential Acquisition 
Planning and Source Selection time 
reduction of 173,700 hours, or $5.5M per 
contract iteration. 
1.  Planning 
Does not require inter-service 
agreements on how (i.e., via JARB, via 
detailed SOW, via Work Order, etc.) or 
where (i.e., CONUS at the PEO or 
OCONUS at the CAO) new 
requirements will be handled. 
Joint determination of requirements as 
planning for new requirements is done 
collectively at the sole joint program 
office (would require service agreement 
on how and where new requirements will 
be handled) 
2.  Capabilities 
Provided 
Having more than one source available 
to fulfill a requirement (i.e., taking 
advantage of program capability 
overlaps). 
Having all capabilities available to all 
services, zero capability gaps. 
Reduced duplication of capabilities, zero 
capability overlaps. 
More thorough and efficient 
administration, oversight, and 
performance measurement as 
performance standards for quality and 
timeliness are standardized. 
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COA 2:  Create a CAP Executive Lead Board (CELB) 
Current Efficiencies / Efficiencies Foregone 
3.  Financial 
Processes 
This COA will likely result in even 
more MIPRs than the 252 per year that 
currently exist. 
Ability to negotiate and maintain Labor 
Rates deemed realistic and appropriate 
for and individual service (i.e., no need 
to come to Labor Rate agreements with 
the other services). 
Reduction of 216 MIPRs per year using a 
JCAP.   
One set of standardized Labor Rates used 
for proposal reviews. 
4.  Command and 
Control 
No need to change/modify current PEO 
structures to accommodate a joint 
program. 
Able to maintain current program 
training processes. 
One PEO with a total of 18 personnel; 
reduction of 19 PEO personnel, or the 
equivalent of $1.45M savings per year. 
Potentially more thorough administration 
due to standardized training processes, 
flattened learning curve, bigger pool of 
candidates from which to draw/match 
administrators, one face to the supported 
Commander 
5.  Ease of Use No need to change current guidelines 
and procedures/processes for an 
individual program.   
One set of standardized guidelines and 
procedures/processes for the joint 
program.  Standardization helps the 
strategic and operational planning process 
by showing Commanders what they can 
expect from their supporting 
contract/contractors. 
To increase effectiveness and efficiency, 
the best practices from each of the four 
programs could be implemented in the 
creation of a JCAP. 
Table 24.   COA 2:  Current Efficiencies / Efficiencies Foregone  
3. COA 3:  Create a JCAP 
The third and final course of action is to create a JCAP.  Creation of a JCAP 
would be closely followed by the transfer of existing and new requirements to the new 
program, and the winding down and eventual close-out of each of the four service-
specific CAPs.  The advantage of creating a JCAP is that the DoD will be able to 
capitalize on many of the efficiencies associated with having one, joint program.  
Acquisition planning and source selection could be performed by one office (vice four) 
and, pending acceptable contractor performance, only once per decade (assuming a one 
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basic plus nine option years contract).  This would result in a saving of 173,700 
manhours or the equivalent of $5.5M per contract iteration.   
Command and control of the program would take place in one (vice four) 
program office, a manpower savings of $1.45M per year, or $14.5M for the life of a ten-
year contract.  Furthermore, standardization of policies and practices would improve the 
efficiency of new requirements planning, program and contract administration, 
performance feedback, financial processes, and customer demand management and 
training.  Cost efficiencies could be realized in the elimination of duplicative contract 
support capabilities such as those mentioned in Table 12 (e.g., food service operations, 
light construction, O&M, and power generation services) and in a coordinated supply 
chain/logistics system that encompasses the whole theater of operations.   
Arguably, there would be less program and contract management mistakes 
(particularly OCONUS where the administrators rotate much more frequently than in 
CONUS) as the administrators become more familiar with the program and its associated 
contracts.  The administrators would be able to build on their training and previous 
experience with each deployment; ultimately leading to fewer errors and/or more 
effective contract management and contractor oversight.  Pooling the administration 
resources of all the services would provide CAO Commanders with the ability to place 
personnel in positions commensurate with their experience and abilities, which, again, 
could potentially reduce the number of administration errors and improve oversight.   
The disadvantages of creating a JCAP are that it requires a lot of cooperation, 
hard work, and commitment from all of the services.  Getting past the hurdles associated 
with service-specific requests and requirements will be no small task.  The leaders 
assigned to take on this task must be committed to the joint concept.  Furthermore, they 
must be able to separate service “wants” from service “needs.”  Naturally, each service 
will want to maintain the level of capabilities and comforts they currently have with their 
individual program.  However, they must be willing to compromise some of their 
“wants” to ensure the needs of all services are covered.  Furthermore, bridging the gaps 
between each of the services’ cultures will require a significant amount of time to 
complete.  Creating a JCAP will not be easy; however, the potential cost savings and 
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efficiencies make the effort worthwhile.  Table 25 provides potential efficiencies and/or 
efficiencies foregone if this course of action is used. 
COA 3:  Create a JCAP 
Efficiencies Gained / Efficiencies Foregone 
 Efficiencies Gained Efficiencies Foregone 
Fewer time-consuming Acquisition 
Planning and Source Selection 
Processes (potentially as few as 
one/decade when using one basic plus 9 
option years contract using a JCAP). 
Potential Acquisition Planning and 
Source Selection time reduction of 
173,700 hours, or $5.5M per contract 
iteration. 
None. 1.  Planning 
Joint determination of requirements as 
planning for new requirements is done 
collectively at the sole joint program 
office (would require service agreement 
on how and where new requirements 
will be handled). 
The ability for each service to plan for 
their own requirements without having to 
consult or come to agreements with the 
other services. 
2.  Capabilities 
Provided 
Having all capabilities available to all 
services, zero capability gaps. 
Reduced duplication of capabilities, 
zero capability overlaps. 
More thorough and efficient 
administration, oversight, and 
performance measurement as 
performance standards for quality and 
timeliness are standardized. 
Having more than one contractual source 
for a capability. 
3.  Financial 
Processes 
Reduction of 216 MIPRs per year with 
a JCAP.   
One set of standardized Labor Rates 
used for proposal reviews. 
None. 
4.  Command and 
Control 
One PEO with a total of 18 personnel; 
reduction of 19 PEO personnel, or the 
equivalent of $1.45M savings per year. 
Potentially more thorough 
administration due to standardized 
training processes, flattened learning 
curve, bigger pool of candidates from 
which to draw/match administrators, 
one face to the supported Commander 
The ability of service-specific PEOs to 
control service-specific programs. 
5.  Ease of Use One set of standardized guidelines and 
procedures/processes for the joint 
program.  Standardization helps the 
None. 
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COA 3:  Create a JCAP 
Efficiencies Gained / Efficiencies Foregone 
strategic and operational planning 
process by showing Commanders what 
they can expect from their supporting 
contract/contractors. 
To increase effectiveness and 
efficiency, the best practices from each 
of the four programs could be 
implemented in the creation of a JCAP. 
Table 25.   COA 3: Efficiencies Gained / Efficiencies Foregone  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the data provided in the Courses of Action, it may seem obvious that 
creating a JCAP is the best alternative for the Government in terms of cost savings and 
program efficiency and effectiveness.  However, during the course of this study, the 
researchers realized there are several large cultural barriers that must be mitigated or 
overcome before the services will agree to share a CAP.  These barriers were presented at 
the conclusion of each of the areas of efficiency in Chapter IV and are presented in Table 
26. 
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Cultural Barriers to JCAP Implementation 
1.  Planning Where the program can be used: • LOGCAP and AFCAP: In safe zones of openly hostile areas 
• GCCC/GCSC: Only outside openly hostile areas. 
 
How new requirements are added to the contract: 
• LOGCAP: By working hand-in-hand with the CAO and the contractor in 
theater 
• GCCC/GCSC and AFCAP:  By working with the PEO using minimal 
contractor input. 
2.  Capabilities 
Provided 
Loss of sole decision-making rights and overall program control as service-specific 
programs are replaced by a single JCAP. 
Developing a system to ensure equity of program use/ensuring all services’ 
requirements are given priority and attention commensurate to their need. 
3.  Financial 
Processes 
No peculiar organizational culture considerations for Financial Processes. 
4.  Command and 
Control 
Complete Command and Control over service-specific programs (i.e., Army 
command of an Army program, Navy command of a Navy program, etc.) would be 
replaced by joint Command and Control. 
Performance standards for each capability must be developed and agreed upon by all 
services. 
The potential for the current members of each service-specific PEO (i.e., those with 
the inherent knowledge and skills to administer a CAP) to have to move to a new 
joint PEO location in order to remain in the CAP field. 
The requirement for each service to provide trained, prepared administrators to 
perform OCONUS program management (i.e., each service must provide OCONUS 
administrators vice allowing one or two services to shoulder the burden). 
5.  Ease of Use Requires inter-service agreement on program policies, processes, guidance, and 
approval levels.   
How new TOs will be structured/awarded: 
• LOGCAP:  Geographically/regionally 
• GCCC/GCSC and AFCAP:  By task or requirement regardless of location 
Table 26.   Cultural Barriers to JCAP Implementation  
Short of the Secretary of Defense or Congress mandating that the services share a 
CAP, there are few reasons why the services would willingly join their logistical support 
programs.  As mentioned, in the contingency environment (where these programs are 
most heavily used), funding or costs are generally not limiting factors.  Accordingly, 
many commanders are willing to pay more to have the sole control of their services’ 
logistical support program.  Generally, commanders only willingly use another service’s 
program when their own program is unavailable or unable to support their needs. 
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So how can the gap between cost savings/program effectiveness/efficiency and 
cultural differences between the services be bridged?  The researchers recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense mandate the use of a JCAP and essentially coerce the services 
into bridging their cultural differences.  The ultimate goal is to develop and maintain a 
program that serves the interests and fulfills the contingency support requirements of all 
of the services while also serving the interest of the public by ensuring the program 
operates in a cost-effective and efficient manner.  The best way to meet that goal is to 
mandate a JCAP be formed, and the existing CAPs be rolled into the JCAP upon their 
expiration.   
Should the cultural differences prove to be initially insurmountable, the 
researchers recommend take a two-step approach to creating a JCAP:  (1) start the 
process by establishing a CELB that familiarizes the services with each other’s program 
and allows the programs to be used in a joint manner.  When the services mitigate or 
overcome their cultural barriers and begin to interoperate and act jointly, (2) create a 
JCAP.  This two-step approach recognizes and accounts for the cultural differences that 
exist between the services while working toward the ultimate goal of creating a JCAP; 
however, it does little to improve efficiency in step (1), and may actually hinder current 
program efficiencies by adding a layer of bureaucracy/approvals.  This is not the 
preferred method of implementation, but it may be necessary to bridge cultural gaps. 
F. JCAP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
Referring to the recommendation to mandate the use of a JCAP, an 
implementation plan is necessary to ensure the JCAP PEO is established and staffed 
properly and to ensure the transitions from individual CAPs to the JCAP are smooth.  
There are three steps necessary to transition to a JCAP: 
1. Establish JCAP as a legitimate program and determine appropriate PEO 
staffing levels  
(Timeframe:  N to N+1.5 years) 
2. Perform Acquisition Planning and Source Selection Processes 
(Timeframe:  N+1.5 year to N+3 years) 
3. Transition individual CAPs into the JCAP  
(Timeframe:  N+3 years to respective TO expiration dates) 
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The researchers recommend performing Step 1—Establishing a JCAP PEO—
immediately to begin the staffing processes.  The PEO could be headed by an Executive 
Lead Agency, such as appointing the current AFCAP office as the location for the new 
JCAP and relying largely on the knowledge and skills of current AFCAP personnel to 
collect input from the other PEOs as they define the requirements and begin the 
Acquisition Planning process.  Or the PEO could be developed from scratch using  
personnel from all four individual CAP offices to begin the Acquisition Planning process.  
Note that this second option will likely require personnel to change stations, thus 
incurring costs associated with moving.  The researchers recommend appointing and 
existing PEO to be the Executive Lead Agency for simplicity and cost purposes.  As 
mentioned, a thorough workload analysis of the current CAPs should be performed to 
determine the appropriate staffing levels for the new JCAP PEO.  Establishing JCAP as a 
legitimate program and determining the appropriate staffing levels is estimated to take 
approximately one and a half years—one year to establish the program and six months to 
perform a workload analysis to determine staffing requirements. 
Step 2—Acquisition Planning (i.e., defining the requirements, developing an 
Acquisition Strategy, developing a SOW, crafting an RFP, etc.) and Source Selection—
should begin immediately after the completion of Step 1, or approximately one and a half 
years after the start of the implementation process.  Using the information contained in 
Table 8, the researchers estimate that it will take one and a half years to perform the 
Acquisition Planning and Source Selection processes (average duration presented in 
Table 8 is approximately 1.5 years).  This process would not start until Step 1—Establish 
JCAP as a legitimate program and determine appropriate PEO staffing levels—is 
complete; therefore it would end approximately three years after the start of the 
implementation process. 
The JCAP PEO should have a coordinated transition plan prior to sending out the 
RFP; therefore Step 3—Transition individual CAPs into the JCAP—should begin 
immediately after the completion of Step 2.  The transition plan should be the JCAP 
PEO’s best estimate of when the new JCAP contracts intend to be awarded and, knowing 
the point at which each current contract either expires or requires the exercise of an 
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option (see Table 27), details when and how each program will be folded into the JCAP.  
Transitions may be performed at the individual TO level (rather than at the ID/IQ 
contract level) as an intermediary step.   
Program Expiration Dates 
Program Award Date Award Years, Including Options Expiration Date 
LOGCAP 17 Apr 2008 1 Basic + 9 Options 16 Apr 2018 
GCCC 4 Aug 2006 1 Basic + 4 Options 3 Aug 2011 
GCSC 30 Aug 2006 1 Basic + 4 Options 29 Aug 2011 
AFCAP 8 Nov 2005 1 Basic + 9 Options 7 Nov 2015 
Table 27.   Program Expiration Dates  
Implementation and transition will take several years to accomplish.  The process 
will not be fast, however it should intentionally be very thorough.  The magnitude and 
importance of the capabilities provided by each individual program requires that 
transitions occur methodically and in a systematic manner to ensure that no requirements 
go unmet during the process.  While the process will undoubtedly be painful, the 
implementation of and transition to a JCAP will ultimately provide the contingency 
logistical support capabilities required by all the services in a single program that is 
effective and an efficient use of public resources. 
G. STUDY LIMITATIONS 
The subjective nature of qualitative analysis is, indeed, a limitation.  It is not an 
objective science, and it is, by its nature, incomplete.  In other words, different 
researchers asking the same questions may arrive at different solutions due to variations 
in answers from informants and/or different valuations of the information received.  As 
such, the reader should understand that the solutions provided by this study are the best 
approximations of the reasearchers.  When possible, quantitative figures (i.e., costs based 
on time and labor rates) were used to support the analysis. 
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A convenience sample of respondents was used in this study.  The researchers did 
not have enough time or resources available to randomly sample from the thousands of 
people who have played roles in the performance and use of these programs.  Therefore, 
some doubt may be cast on the ability to generalize the findings herein to the entire 
population of CAP users and experiences.     
Additionally, due to the highly competitive and sometimes political nature of 
these large support programs, the researchers were not able to garner any specific and 
research-relevant information from the contractors.  The information received from the 
public affairs offices, while given with good intent, did not provide valuable insight into 
the specific areas of research addressed in this study.  Therefore, the contractors’ 
“voices” are silent in the data collected for this study. 
Finally, the geographic- or regional-based approach used to estimate the FTE 
savings in Chapter IV “Command and Control” is a significant weakness of this study.  
As noted, a more thorough and more accurate approach is to estimate the staffing 
required for a JCAP by examining the quantity of work required (i.e., the number of TOs, 
the number of modifications, the number of audits performed, etc.) and the time required 
to perform each task.  The resultant manhour assessment would provide a more accurate 
estimation of the number of personnel, or FTEs, necessary to administer the program. 
H. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study analyzed five potential areas of efficiencies:  (1) Planning, (2) 
Capabilities Provided, (3) Financial Processes, (4) Command and Control, and (5) Ease 
of Use.  There are undoubtedly other potential areas of efficiency that could be studied.  
While quantitative methods were used where possible, there are other areas that could 
also be quantified if the researcher has access to, or can gather, the appropriate 
information.  For instance, for Command and Control and Ease of Use, user and customer 
satisfaction surveys could be presented to a wide range of administrators and users to 
obtain their feedback.   
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One could also expand the study to include the number of auxiliary agencies that 
monitor and evaluate each of the programs (i.e., Defense Contract Audit Agency, Army 
Audit Agency, Naval Audit Service, Air Force Audit Agency, Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service, etc.) and the potential savings or efficiencies that could result from 
monitoring and evaluating one program vice four.  Finally, the benefit of expert 
information and analysis cannot be overemphasized.  While the researchers sought out 
and interviewed many program experts, there are several more out there that could 
provide valuable insight into the advantages and disadvantages of combining the four 
CAPs into a single JCAP.  Getting experts together for a conference on the subject would 
be extremely beneficial as ideas could be presented and immediate feedback provided.   
Another useful information-gathering tool might be the implementation and 
review of a joint database where all CAP representatives—the user, the administrators, 
those providing oversight, and the contractors—can input information and suggestions 
that are not screened by the chain of command.  This sort of open, non-attribution forum 
might create new, innovative ways to use and administer these large logistical programs.  
These ideas are presented with the hope of making better decisions that represent the best 
interest of the Government and taxpayers. 
Finally, a separate study could be performed to more accurately determine the 
number of PEO and CAO personnel necessary to administer the JCAP.  Historical TO 
data (i.e., the number of TOs written and administered each year, the capabilities 
provided by each TO, the number of TO modifications performed, the number of troops 
supported, etc.) could be examined to determine the number of manhours of PEO and 
CAO administration that goes into each TO.  From there, one could extrapolate the 
number of PEO personnel and CAO personnel necessary to properly administer JCAP 
TOs.   
I. SUMMARY 
The idea to consolidate the individual, service-specific logistical support 
programs is not new.  The 1997 GAO study, “Contingency Operations:  Opportunities to 
Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program,” first suggested that the services, the 
 117
Government, and the taxpayer might be better served by consolidating the efforts of the 
separate programs into one, joint program.  Since then, studies performed by Dowling 
and Feck (1999) and Culkin (2004) have shown how a joint program could provide 
efficiency and streamlining benefits, particularly as they relate to Joint Publication 4-0 
(2008) and the Joint Vision 2010 idea of “Focused Logistics.”  This study takes the 
general concepts presented in each of these reports and builds on their logic by showing 
qualitatively (and, where possible, quantitatively) that it is indeed more cost-effective and 
efficient to have one JCAP vice four individual CAPs in five efficiency areas.  This study 
relies on information garnered from actual program managers and administrators in 
addition to logistical and program regulations and policies, whereas the other studies are 
more conceptual and rely only on regulations and policies. 
This study examined five potential efficiency areas—(1) Planning, (2) 
Capabilities Provided, (3) Financial Processes, (4) Command and Control, and (5) Ease 
of Use—using Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) to determine and, where possible, to 
quantify the potential cost savings and streamlining that might exist under a JCAP.  The 
results show that significant cost savings will be realized by a JCAP, particularly in the 
area of Planning, which could save 173,700 manhours, or $5.5M per program iteration.  
Beyond the monetary benefits, having one program would standardize and streamline 
Planning, Financial Processes, Command and Control functions.  Standardization and 
streamlining would ultimately increase Ease of Use as both administrators and users 
become familiar with one set of program protocols.  Finally, one program would 
eliminate duplicative capabilities, duplicative processes, and duplicative program 
management and program administration offices (valued at $1.45M per year or $14.5M 
over the life of a ten-year contract) while covering the capability gaps that currently exist 
in each program to ensure that all military services have the full range of support 
functions available for use. 
The study then examines three courses of action—Do Nothing, Create a CAP 
Executive Lead Board (CELB), or Create a JCAP.  The examination details the 
advantages, disadvantages, and cultural barriers/implications of each alternative.  Finally, 
the recommendation is made to mandate the establishment of a JCAP.  If cultural barriers 
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are deemed too significant or too difficult to overcome to immediately establish a JCAP, 
then the creation of a CELB is recommended to allow the individual programs and their 
administrators and users to function jointly before finally implementing a JCAP. 
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APPENDIX—INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS 
Question PM PCO CAO Commander 
ACO QAR Users/Customers 
GENERAL QUESTIONS 
Which CAP programs have 
you been associated with? 
X x x x x x 
How long were you 
associated with each 
program? 
X x x x x x 
What was your 
position/duties for each 
association? 
X x x x x x 
How long have you 
performed duties in your 
function (overall, including 
outside the program)? 
X x x x x x 
Is your experience with the 
program mainly 
CONUS/OCONUS/both?  
If both, how many years 
CONUS, how many years 
OCONUS? 
X x x x x x 
What would be the benefits 
of combining all CAP 
contracts from your 
perspective?   
X x x x x x 
In terms of manpower 
reductions? 
X x x x x x 
In terms of process 
efficiencies? 
X x x x x x 
What would be the costs of 
combining all CAP 
contracts from your 
perspective? 
X x x x x x 
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Question PM PCO CAO Commander 
ACO QAR Users/Customers 
PLANNING QUESTIONS 
Did you experience any 
planning with the 
contractor?  If yes, please 
describe your experience. 
x x x x x x 
Please describe your 
acquisition strategy and 
contract award selection 
process?   
x x     
What were the evaluation 
factor for award and their 
relative importance?   
x x     
What is your role after 
delegation occurs? 
x x     
Please describe your 
relationship and interaction 
with the PCO. 
x      
Please describe how a TO 
is let—who defines the 
requirements, who cuts the 
TO, who oversees the TO? 
x x     
Please describe your 
relationship and interaction 
with the PM. 
 x     
Do you find TO 
renegotiation easy or 
difficult?  Would 
standardization of TOs 
make renegotiation easier, 
no change, or more 
difficult? 
 x x    
Please describe your 
relationship and interaction 
with the PCO and PM. 
  x x   
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Question PM PCO CAO Commander 
ACO QAR Users/Customers 
Do you play a role in TO 
renegotiation?  If so, do 
you find TO renegotiation 
easy or difficult?  Would 
standardization of TOs 
make renegotiation easier, 
no change, or more 
difficult? 
   x x  
Please describe your 
relationship and interaction 
with your ACO. 
    x  
From your perspective, 
what are the most difficult 
factors involved in 
planning?  (e.g., the 
uncertainty of the 
requirement, working with 
a bureaucratic command 
structure, timeliness of 
involvement in the 
planning process?) 
     x 
CAPABILITIES PROVIDED QUESTIONS 
How consistent do you 
think capabilities are 
rendered across TOs?  Very 
consistently?  Not very 
consistently? 
x x x x x x 
Do you believe the current 
program does not meet, 
does meet, or exceeds the 
needs of the supported 
units?  Please explain. 
x x x x x x 
Do you feel there are any 
significant gaps in 
capabilities in your 
program?  In other words, 
is there work that needs to 
be performed that cannot be 
performed because it is out 
of the contract’s scope or 
x x x x x x 
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Question PM PCO CAO Commander 
ACO QAR Users/Customers 
outside the contractor’s 
ability?  Or do you feel the 
program is too big and 
should be more 
specialized?   
Do you feel the 
contractor(s) are capable of 
providing the proper level 
of support for all 
capabilities, or are there 
areas where they are 
stronger/weaker? 
x x x x x  
Has your program ever not 
been able to meet the needs 
of another service or 
coalition partner?  If unable 
to meet needs, why? 
x x x x x  
How consistent do you 
think capabilities are 
rendered across TOs?  Very 
consistently?  Not very 
consistently? 
  x x x x 
On average, how would 
you rate the contractors 
performance?  Do you have 
CPARs information that 
you can share with us? 
x x x x x  
Do you feel there are any 
significant gaps in 
capabilities in your 
program?  In other words, 
is there work that needs to 
be performed that cannot be 
performed because it is out 
of your scope or outside the 
your ability?  Or do you 
feel the program is too big 
and should be more 
specialized?   
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Question PM PCO CAO Commander 
ACO QAR Users/Customers 
Do you feel you are 
capable of providing the 
proper level of support for 
all capabilities, or are there 
areas where they are 
stronger/weaker? 
      
FINANCIAL PROCESSES QUESTIONS 
Do you believe the 
program is less costly than 
other options, about the 
right price for the 
capabilities provided, or 
more costly than other 
options?  Please explain. 
x x x x x x 
What do you believe could 
be done to help the 
program reduce costs?  
x x x x x x 
What are the costs of the 
current CAP contracts? 
x x x    
In terms of manpower? x x x    
In terms of TO cost per ktr 
employee? 
x x x    
Please describe your role in 
the award fee process. 
x x x x x  
How often is your program 
under budget?   
x x x x  x 
How often is your program 
over budget?   
x x x x  x 
Do you ever need to 
request additional funding?  
If so, how often?  Are the 
additional requests large or 
small relative to the overall 
cost of the TO? 
x x x x  x 
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Question PM PCO CAO Commander 
ACO QAR Users/Customers 
Who determines what type 
of contract you use for 
TOs? 
 x x x   
Please describe any 
pay/funding problems 
you’ve experienced due to 
different services or 
coalition partners using 
your contract. 
  x x  x 
How are funds added to 
your contract? 
  x x  x 
COMMAND AND CONTROL QUESTIONS 
Do you believe there are 
inefficiencies in the use of 
CAP contracts?  If yes, 




x x x x x x 
Do you experience 
problems due to multiple 
contractors (different 
companies) working 
different parts of the same 
overall process?   
x x x x x x 
Does your program support 
more than one service 
(Army, AF, Navy)?  If yes, 




x x x x x x 
Does your program support 
coalition forces?  If yes, 




x x x x x x 
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Question PM PCO CAO Commander 
ACO QAR Users/Customers 
Please describe what you 
believe to be the biggest 
challenges your program 
currently faces. 
x x x x x x 
Do you have a PM-
Forward to assist units and 
your CAO in the field?  If 
so, who?   
x      
Do you feel he/she has the 
necessary qualifications to 
perform their duties ?  
x      
Please describe your 
biggest command and 
control problems from both 
your point of view and 
from the point of view of 
the supported 
Commanders. 
x x x x x  
Have you ever experienced 
problems with 
Commanders in the field 
who did not understand the 
concepts and 
rules/constraints of your 
program?  If so, please 
explain. 
x x x x x  
Do you have a PCO-
Forward to assist units and 
your CAO in the field?  If 
so, who?  Do you feel 
he/she has the necessary 
qualifications to perform 
their duties? 
 x     
Are the delegations issued 
to the ACOs/QARs/PAs 
appropriate for their level 
of expertise and for the 
requirement on the ground? 
  x    
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Question PM PCO CAO Commander 
ACO QAR Users/Customers 
Is your delegation issued 
by the PCO appropriate for 
your level of expertise and 
for your requirements on 
the ground? 
   x x  
Do you experience 
problems due to multiple 
contractors (different 
companies) working 
different parts of the same 
overall process?   
  x x x x 
EASE OF USE QUESTIONS 
What do you believe could 
be done to make the 
program more efficient? 
x x x x x x 
Would standardization of 
service/performance levels 
across the board help you 
perform your duties easier?  
If yes, how so?  If not, why 
not? 
x x x x x x 
Would standardization of 
service processes (i.e., less 
variance) across the board 
help you perform your 
duties easier?  If yes, how 
so?  If not, why not?  If 
yes, how so?  If not, why 
not? 
x x x x x x 
After TO award, what 
changes occur most 
frequently?  In other words, 
what issues are people 
calling you about? 
x x x x x  
Please describe your role in 
requirement generation for 
TO award. 
x x x x   
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Question PM PCO CAO Commander 
ACO QAR Users/Customers 
Would you describe 
meeting the end user’s need 
as more difficult with 
multiple contractors than 
having a single contractor?  
What is the nature of the 
difficulty? 
x x x x x  
Do you keep a record of all 
problems or issues?  If so, 
can we see it to read 
through the history?   
x x     
In your own words, what 
are the most difficult areas 
of getting a requirement 
added/turned on to your 
contract?  How would you 
propose changing the 
process to make it easier? 
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